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From the Editor

This issue of the Bulletin is devoted to a spirited exchange over the question of naturalizing phenomenology, focused on a recent volume organized and edited by the late Francisco Varela and his colleagues in Paris. The issue of naturalizing phenomenology is of relevance for both neuroscience and psychiatry. In a lead essay Marilyn Nissim-Sabat argues vigorously that the naturalization project cannot be carried out without betraying the essence of Husserlian phenomenology. The three commentaries, each in its own way, challenges Nissim-Sabat's Husserlian purity.

In reading the exchange I am reminded of Merleau-Ponty's now famous lines from the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception*. Speaking of the Husserlian reduction (epoché) he writes: "All the misunderstandings with his [Husserl's] interpreters, with the existentialist 'dissidents' and finally with himself, have arisen from the fact that in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it and, also from the fact that that from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction." It is around this point that the lines are drawn in the debate between Nissim-Sabat and her commentators. She argues for the possibility of a complete reduction—that "all we know is what we know in and through our subjectivity," and that objective metaphysical knowledge of the world is out of bounds. In contrast, the three commentaries converge on the lived body as a challenge to Nissim-Sabat's reading of Husserl and its consequent critique of *Naturalizing Phenomenology*. Each focuses in its own way on the lived body as a phenomenon that resists total reduction, as a sphere of experience prior to the reduction, and as a sphere where the unity of subject and world are indissoluble. This hesitation regarding the possibility of complete reduction leaves all of the commentators more sympathetic to the naturalization project than is Nissim-Sabat. Let each reader decide for him– or herself.

James Phillips, M.D.

President's Column

This column notes a milestone in AAPP or, rather, the entry of AAPP into the technological aspects of the twenty-first century, perhaps fitting in terms of the theme of this year's meeting in Atlanta, Technology and Psychiatry. The technology to which I am referring, however, is relatively low-tech as it goes, but was nevertheless controversial enough to generate several years of debate within the organization. The question was whether to go to the Web for publication and distribution of this Newsletter or to continue to publish and mail out a paper copy of the AAPP Newsletter. The struggle was between sentiment and affection for the heft, feel, and appearance of a paper copy which can remain stacked up respectably on one's shelf, versus the practicality and economy of an internet-distributed newsletter that each individual can just read on the screen evanescently or print out on a few undistinguished sheets of computer paper. Not surprisingly, and not only in this microcosm, practicality and economy won out over aesthetics and sentiment. However, rather than lamenting this, it is probably best to embrace Internet technology in the full awareness that the cost of printing and distributing the newsletter consumed a large portion of AAPP's annual budget. Save your paper Bulletins as they might become collectors' items in the distant future. If you happen to be a principled Luddite and/or technologically challenged, AAPP will print up and mail out a hard copy to you, if you let Linda Muncy know.

Speaking of technology, this year's annual meeting in Atlanta turned out to be an exciting one. The papers encompassed a variety of thoughtful viewpoints, many from first time presenters at an AAPP meeting, and, happily, moved well beyond the tired lament that technology is destroying psychiatry, and all else, as we have come to know and love it. This is said despite my startled awareness that my most frequent cliché has become "In the old days, . . ." By contrast, Carol Gould's letter to the editor in this edition picks up the theme that I raised last issue relating to "philosophical counseling." This might be seen as heralding the "good new days," in which philosophers use their own style of analytic training combined with virtue ethics and insights into the enduring issues in life to offer a reflective form of psychotherapy. My concern about philosophical counseling, to reiterate from the last column, is that the temptation to offer a facile and quick certification of competency in a complex field may prove irresistible. But philosophy has as much of an historical claim to psychotherapy as does medicine. Thank you, Carol Gould, for your insights and workshop experience.

Finally, I wish to welcome the two newest members to the executive council, Claire Pouncey of the University of Pennsylvania and Christian Perring of Dowling College, Oakdale, New York. Their willingness to serve on the Executive Council reflects the younger generation's commitment to the soundness and flourishing of AAPP's mission to philosophy and psychiatry.

Jerome Kroll, M.D.

Important Notice

As indicated above in the President's Column, this is the last paper issue of the AAPP Bulletin. Since further issues will be provided in electronic, pdf format, it is imperative that our Administrative Secretary, Linda Muncy, have e-mail addresses for AAPP members. If Linda does not have your e-mail address, please forward it to her at linda.muncy@utsouthwestern.edu. If you wish to contact her regarding a hard copy, as discussed above, her mailing address is on the masthead.

Naturalizing Phenomenology: An Exchange

The following is an exchange over a volume entitled *Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, edited by Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy (Stanford University Press, 1999). In the following essays the volume will be referred to as either *Naturalizing Phenomenology* or *NP*.

...Editor

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The Future of Psychiatry and the Naturalization of Phenomenology

Marilyn Nissim-Sabat, Ph.D., M.S.W.

In the contemporary lifeworld, psychiatry is faced with two all-important and intricately interrelated problems: the problem of demarcation, and that of values. (The term "psychiatry" is used here broadly to include the work, not only of psychiatrists, but also of non-medical psychoanalysts and others in the field of mental health.)

Resolution of these problems turns upon whether or not many, if not most, mental disorders are understood to be disorders of the brain, where the human brain is construed as a physical object (in the sense of physics). If so viewed, mental disorders, it would seem, are best treated by administration of appropriate physical treatments, medications, for example. If, on the other hand, mental disorders are viewed as resulting from an interplay of social, psychological, developmental, and other factors that are held to be non-reducible to physical factors, then treatment presumably will have to be carried out through other means. These other means will involve, it would seem, considerations of meaning, as in psychodynamic or other forms of psychotherapy.

The significance of a determination regarding the status of mental disorders, i.e., their demarcation vis-à-vis naturalistic reducibility, is highlighted when we see that if the latter is the case, i.e., that mental disorders are ineluctably related to issues of meaning (where meaning is construed as non-reducible), for example, as such issues impinge on human development, then use of any medication at all, or as the sole or primary form of treatment, presumably would be incorrect and potentially harmful. Thus, it is in light of mental health as a value, the primary value of psychiatry, that resolution of the problem of demarcation becomes an ethical imperative. (The issue of ethics and values will be taken up again in the conclusion of this critique.)

However, this manner of describing the problems leaves unstated certain important questions. In particular, if meaning is held to be non-reducible to materiality, what then is its ontological status, and, what is its relation to materiality? Or, if meaning is held to be reducible, how can this be shown? There appears to be an unexplained gap between the mind, held to be identical to the brain as a physical thing, and meaning. How can this gap be closed, we may ask, while doing justice to both materiality and meaning?

The view that a non-reductive continuity between materiality and meaning can be shown has been given powerful expression in a recent book called *Naturalizing Phenomenology*. (All mentions of phenomenology refer to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.) The editors of this book, and most of the authors of the articles in it (not all of the authors are sanguine about the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology), are among the most prominent American and European cognitive science researchers, including some whose primary discipline is philosophy. They believe that integrating phenomenology into cognitive psychology will enable them to demonstrate the non-reductive continuity of meaning, or, more broadly, phenomenality, i.e., conscious experience, with materiality. For these researchers, phenomenology has provided descriptions of phenomenality, e.g., of perceptual experience, which can be used to show that there is no gap between phenomenality and materiality. This will be shown, they hold, by naturalizing phenomenology.

The purpose of this essay is to dispute the claim made by these cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers, and to do so by showing that naturalizing phenomenology destroys phenomenality as understood in phenomenology. Thus, rather than naturalizing phenomenology, this effort is, contrary to the authors' claim, implicitly reductive; rather than showing that phenomenality in the phenomenological sense can be naturalized, the authors present one more effort to reduce the mental to the physical.

In this critique, I will deal exclusively with the introduction to *Naturalizing Phenomenology*, "Bridging the Gap," written by the book's four editors. Moreover, my critique will be confined almost exclusively to the first paragraph of the essay. My rationale for this is that "Bridging the Gap" is, in my estimation, pervaded throughout, from beginning to end, by the authors' determination to explain their point of view with logical and conceptual rigor. (Those who would like to study an additional critique of the book from a phenomenological perspective can read: Ron Bruzina, "Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Moving Beyond the Paradigms." *Husserl Studies:* 20: 42-84, 2004. Though I do not agree with Bruzina's critique of phenomenology itself, this does not bear directly on his brilliant and thorough critique of all of the essays in *Naturalizing Phenomenology*. Bruzina's critique overlaps significantly with the one I have made here, though this essay was substantially complete when I received Bruzina's just published piece. A review that supports the authors' claims is: Andrew Goffey, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Cognitive science and the bestowal of sense." In: *Radical Philosophy* 114, July/ August 2002, pp. 20-28)

The first paragraph of "Bridging the Gap" begins as follows:

> Researchers in the contemporary sciences of cognition have begun to approach many of the central problems of Husserlian phenomenology with new perspectives and new tools. Some of these problems, such as the necessity of 'going back to the phenomena,' the nature of consciousness, and the importance of intentionality as the hallmark of mental states or the embodiment of cognitive structures, are of special importance. Accordingly, each of them offers a possible way of introducing the general project of integrating Husserlian phenomenology into contemporary cognitive sciences.

In the authors' view then, the project of naturalizing phenomenology is a process of "integrating Husserlian phenomenology into contemporary cognitive sciences." Given that the contemporary cognitive sciences are naturalistic, whereas Husserlian phenomenology is not naturalistic, the latter cannot be useful to cognitive science, i.e., cannot be integrated into it, except in naturalized form. The authors fully acknowledge the non-naturalistic character of Husserl's view of phenomenology and they are quite forthright regarding the task they set themselves. However, their discussion has a crucial omission: *they do not point out that one of Husserl's most cherished goals was to accomplish the opposite task, namely, to integrate all of the sciences, both humanistic and natural, into phenomenology construed as the all-embracing science of science.* (A good discussion of this aspect of phenomenology can be found in: Elisabeth Stroeker, *The Husserlian Foundations of Science*, Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, Washington D,C., 1987.) My point here is just that the authors do not address the reverse process as a possibility advocated by Husserl, nor do they address why they think it is not a possibility. Below, I will suggest an interpretation of possible motives for this omission.

The first paragraph continues:

> We have chosen to take as a guideline the idea, currently growing in importance within the cognitive science

community, that a successful scientific theory of cognition must account for phenomenality, that is, to put it in quite general terms—for the fact that for a whole set of cognitive systems, and for the human one in particular, things have appearances. We will argue that on the basis of its past achievements in describing such phenomenality, Husserlian phenomenology can play a key role in helping to meet this requirement, provided that it can be naturalized, and even though Husserl himself strongly opposed naturalism.

Thus, in pursuing their goal of naturalizing phenomenology and integrating it into the contemporary cognitive sciences, the authors focus on phenomenality, on immediate experience as such. This is why they titled this introduction "Bridging the Gap": they recognize that heretofore science has proceeded without attempting to provide an account of immediate experience as such; i.e., previous science has been reductive. This reductive approach does not directly address the "gap"; rather, it only declares, without showing, that phenomenality is reducible to materiality as construed by physics. Be this as it may, it seems that cognitive psychology and neuroscience have now found that, in order to proceed, they must be able to take immediate experience as such into account without a reduction that bypasses the explanatory gap. These researchers have further come to believe that experience in the Husserlian sense, as phenomenality, can be naturalized without any reductive move. For cognitive psychology, important aspects of phenomenal experience are cognitively, and consciously, processed. It is clear, then, that the cognitive scientists do not want their domain of investigation, which includes investigation of conscious experience as such, to be absorbed into physics. On the other hand, neither do cognitive scientists want to introduce an ontological immateriality which would mean abandoning materialism.

However, the authors' project of naturalizing phenomenology is severely compromised in that they begin with a serious misconstrual of the meaning of phenomenality in Husserlian phenomenology, a misconstrual of the sense of that which they wish to naturalize. In order to show this, it is necessary to discuss first the nature of the phenomenological epoche or suspension. What is the phenomenological attitude?

Relevant to the above, we ask: how does phenomenology secure or demarcate its own object of investigation: phenomenality, experience as such, or, in other words, subjectivity as such? Phenomenology does this through its inaugural act, the phenomenological epoche. This is an act of abstention from all, I repeat, all, ontological commitments. What motivates the performance of the epoche? Phenomenology begins with the insight that it is in principle impossible to know the ultimate ontology of the world. (The ethical implications of this stance will be discussed below.) Inasmuch as whatever is knowable is so in virtue of consciousness, it is impossible to know whether or not anything exists independently of consciousness. As a consequence of grasping this insight, the inaugural act of consciousness that transforms the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude is suspension of all ontological commitments, suspension of all claims to know the unknowable. The things of the world are then given to consciousness as phenomena, as appearances to consciousness, as the correlates of intentionality. They are given just as they are, they themselves, the things themselves. And they are always given, always intended, always meant, with an existence-sense. e.g., "real", "imagined", "recollected", etc. Thus, the existence sense of the things of the world is phenomenal as well; it, too, is intended or meant. The epoche is, then, an act that constitutes the methodology of phenomenological investigation, and, as such, it yields its proper object of investigation: all of the contents of experience as phenomena. This is, for Husserl, not just a field for new scientific discoveries (as the authors aver), but a new, self-continuous world of being heretofore overlooked.

What then characterizes the attitude of naturalism prior to the phenomenological epoche? The most important characteristic of the attitude of naturalism is that it bears within it the presupposition that the things of the world are known, or can be known, to exist independently of consciousness as things in themselves with no inherent relation to consciousness. This is naturalism and it is the core belief of positivism. Within the phenomenological attitude, this belief is suspended, put out of play; it is still given to consciousness as a belief, but it, too, is a phenomenon.

Most importantly, the epoche *does not mean that the things of the world do not exist independently of consciousness*. Within the epoche, no judgment is made regarding the ontological status of the things of both inner and outer experience. Thus, things are given as phenomena, as experienced, but there is no presupposition that there either is or is not a thing which does not itself appear of which the phenomena are the appearances. The epoche is a suspension of judgment; it is not a judgment, but a refraining from judgment.

We can now explain the manner in which the authors misconstrue the sense of phenomenality within phenomenology, and how in so doing, they introduce an

The 8th International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology

New Philosophies for Community Psychiatry: Recovery-Oriented, Evidence-Based, and Beyond

October 16-18, 2005
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut, USA

The 8th International Conference on Philosophy Psychiatry, and Psychology will take place at Yale University, New Haven, CT, on October 16-18, 2005. The conference theme will be "New Philosophies for Community Psychiatry: Recovery-Oriented, Evidence-Based, and Beyond." The conference theme will include topics such as the philosophical, ethical, and theoretical assumptions underlying current approaches to community-based practice, philosophic issues implied in the notion of evidence-based practice, and theoretical issues involved in the terminology of "recovery" and "recovery-oriented" care.

The Organizing Committee is requesting abstracts of papers to be presented at the conference. Abstracts should be 250 words and may be for lecture/discussion (30 minutes), roundtable discussion (45 minutes), or symposium (20 minutes or 60-90 minutes for complete symposium) format. Abstracts should be mailed or faxed to Larry Davidson, Ph.D., conference organizer:

Larry Davidson, Ph.D. Director,
Yale PRCH
Erector Square Suite 1C, 6 West
319 Peck Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06513
USA
(*fax*) 203-772-2265

For further information concerning the conference contact Larry Davidson at the above address or at larry.davidson@yale.edu.

equivocation in their use of this term, 'phenomenality.' This misconstrual is evident when they explain phenomenality (in the second quote above) by saying that "things have appearances." This statement is not an accurate description of the stance of Husserlian phenomenology. For phenomenology, within the phenomenological attitude, as just explained, no distinction exists between thing and appearance; i.e., things do not "have appearances"; rather, they are appearances. In immediate experience, we, the subjects, do not experience appearances of a thing which does not itself appear; rather, within the phenomenological 'brackets' (the epoche), such a distinction is suspended: things are phenomena and we experience things directly as they give themselves to us, as they appear to us. To speak of things having appearances is, then, to presuppose the very subject/object splitting, the postulate of the independent existence of materiality, that phenomenology aims to suspend. This is what is meant by naturalistic reduction. Thus, phenomenology, and particularly its notion of phenomenality, cannot be naturalized, for, *it is constituted in an act of suspension of naturalization.* Given, then, that the authors have not grasped the phenomenological concept of phenomenality, the term 'phenomenality' is used equivocally throughout "Bridging the Gap" in that it de facto simultaneously refers to both phenomenological and non-phenomenological, e.g., Kantian senses. Equivocation, is, of course, a logical fallacy.

The last part of the first paragraph of "Beyond the Gap" states:

> By "naturalized" we mean integrated into an explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences.

What are the properties admitted by the natural sciences? They are of course properties of materiality: properties of the spatio-temporal manifold, including extension in space, size, etc. The authors' goal is to show that mental and physical are "continuous," i.e., that between phenomenality and materiality there is no gap. The authors claim that, in fact, Husserlian phenomenology, as non-naturalistic, posits and accepts such a gap. For example, in the change from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude there is a radical change that can not be bridged. Once again, this is not an accurate rendition of phenomenology. For Husserl, phenomenality and materiality are continuous in the sense that the sciences of materiality, and their objects of investigation, are understood to be aspects of the lifeworld, the surrounding world of life. These sciences arose historically on the ground of the pre-scientific lifeworld and have their proper domains of investigation constituted in and by their methodology. Most importantly, all scientists engaged in theoretical work must return from theories to immediate lifeworld experience in order to carry out experiments and communicate findings. The lifeworld, the world as we experience it, is the world that comes into existence in and through acts of meaning bestowal by subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and is the ground of all human practice, including scientific practice. It is precisely as the science of the lifeworld as such that phenomenology is the all-embracing science of science in and through which the sciences of nature are founded and develop historically.

More directly, however, the question I wish to address is this: why is it that the authors, who wish to represent phenomenology accurately and have an entire lengthy exposition of it, do not take up, do not even point out, the issue of whether or not phenomenology can and should be integrated into cognitive science as they maintain, or whether, rather, cognitive psychology can and should be integrated into phenomenology as phenomenology maintains?

On the horns of this dilemma, the authors adopt a position that is inherently incoherent. As shown above, the project of naturalizing phenomenology begins with the unquestioned presupposition of a materialist ontology, i.e., the presupposition that there are "things" that appear. Thus, because the authors presuppose materiality in the sense of physics, they cannot constitute a unique object of investigation for their field, and this is, I hypothesize, what they desire greatly. For, a science can be said to be a science if, and only if, its methodology constitutes a unique field of investigation, one that can be studied only in and through that method. However, their presupposed materialist ontology precludes a definitive claim that their discipline is not reducible to physics. Thus, they attempt to import into their scientific self-conception a notion of phenomenality, that of Husserlian phenomenology, that rules out any materialist presuppositions that would enable physicalist reduction. This is a contradiction in terms that gives rise to the equivocation discussed above. In wanting to naturalize phenomenality, they show that, rather than grasping phenomenality in the Husserlian sense (despite that they may in some of their exposition seem to grasp it) they have accepted an equivocal notion of it and thus believe that they can reconceive phenomenality so that it is materiality, but in a sense that precludes reduction of cognitive science to physics. If successful, cognitive science would be left with its own object of investigation, while remaining nonetheless not a form of idealism, or "spiritualism."

In conclusion, to "integrate" phenomenology into a world construed naturalistically, i.e., based on the presupposition of the knowability of existence independently of consciousness, is impossible without implicitly negating the phenomenological attitude in and through which the world is given purely as phenomenon.

I mentioned above that I would return to two issues: the issue of the failure of the authors to discuss the phenomenological perspective on the relation between phenomenology and the natural sciences, and the issue of ethics. These issues are, too, interrelated. I begin by discussing additional implications of the phenomenological epoche.

Husserl's notion that in principle we cannot know whether or not the world exists independently of consciousness was not intended by Husserl, nor does it, mean that the capacity of humans to gain knowledge is limited in a manner that constrains our efforts to know or the scientificity of those efforts. What it does mean is that our being as humans, as creators and bestowers of meaning, is an ineluctable factor that is reflected in all of our efforts, including all scientific efforts, to gain knowledge of ourselves and of the outer world. This is the meaning of phenomenology as Husserl conceived it, as *constitutive* phenomenology. Our freedom as humans is to create and bestow, i.e., constitute, meaning, and thus to make and remake our world, not ab novo, like gods, but in the only coherent sense that "making the world" can have. This implies absolute responsibility for the character of our subjective and intersubjective life. Socrates brought philosophy into existence when he placed ethical responsibility at the center of human existence. Husserl does no less: he both renews and recreates philosophy when he construes the world as we know it as constituted by our acts of meaning bestowal. Phenomenology calls upon us to assume responsibility for these acts, seek knowledge of which are rationally motivated, i.e., conducive to human well-being, and which not, and shows us that we can and will discard those that we see, insightfully, are not conducive to human well-being.

In maintaining that all of the sciences can and should reconstitute themselves as within phenomenology construed as the all-embracing science of science, phenomenology issues a call to ultimate self responsibility. To hear and heed that call requires an openness that allows for placing in the brackets, suspending one's commitment to the belief that we know or can know that the world exists independently of anything and everything human, of any meaning or acts of meaning bestowal. This is the demand of the most radical of all empiricisms, the empiricism that sees that the phenomena can be understood as an affair of our freedom and of our pursuit of happiness through ultimate self fulfillment. This free-

dom is constituted in and through a priori laws of compossibility, of possibilities to be human.

As Husserl wrote in his astonishing masterpiece *The Crisis of the Human Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,* "Positivism decapitates philosophy." In strict analogy we can say that "Naturalism decapitates phenomenology." As the adage says, we can't have our cake and eat it. In pursuing its fundamental value of mental health, psychiatry can advance by self-understanding as a discipline within phenomenology. As a force for human liberation, it has nothing to lose but its chains.

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Phenomenologizing Naturalism?

James Morley, Ph.D.

"There is a truth in naturalism, but that truth is not in naturalism itself."

Merleau-Ponty

It is impossible to disagree with Dr. Nissim-Sabat's brilliant critique of pseudo-phenomenology. Phenomenology and naturalism are divergent ontological paradigms which like two soap bubbles can only explode when forced together. Indeed, it would be a gross injustice and a violation of Husserl's entire life's work to merely insert phenomenology into a naturalist research paradigm. Husserl went to great lengths to found the science of phenomenology on an entirely independent basis from that of the Cartesian materialism of natural science. In fact, as Nissim-Sabat so rightly illustrates, Husserl actually intended phenomenology as the philosophical foundation of natural science itself. In other words, natural science was to be situated as a particular branch of phenomenological research. This is counter to the pseudo-phenomenology we too often see in contemporary cognitive science, which would, with limited comprehension of the phenomenological literature, misapply the term 'phenomenological' to describe mere introspectionism or symptomatology. A phenomenologically informed natural science would be understood in its appropriate context: as a 'particular way' of experiencing the world, a particular type of 'mindset' through which the 'material' sphere of existence could be comprehended. This is hardly the way contemporary natural science, for the most part, tends to view itself.

As Husserl vividly pointed out, natural science is itself a mental attitude that involves an implicit abstention (*epoché*) of belief in the very subjectivity of the scientist – albeit one of which the scientist is unaware. Far from rejecting natural science itself, Husserl would simply wish scientists become aware of the particular *epoché,* implicit to naturalism, which subjugates subjectivity in favor of the external world of Cartesian *res extensa*. Hence, Husserl's phenomenologically grounded naturalism would be one ontological region or domain amongst others. Profoundly influenced by William James' notion of 'multiple realities,' Husserl's vision of natural science is one that would be strengthened, even complemented by this 'pluralistic' approach to metaphysics. I wonder if this is not *NP*'s same project? While Nissim-Sabat rejects *NP*'s project of 'naturalizing phenomenology' on the grounds of it being a pseudo-phenomenology as mentioned above, it is not clear to me that this applies to the *NP* group. In fact, one could make the case that these authors were actually attempting the reverse: i.e. to phenomenologize naturalism!

First, I must note that this collection is not easy reading. In publishers' parlance, this is a 'cross-over' project that will challenge and provoke both natural scientists and phenomenologists. Herein rests the strength and weakness of the text. The *NP* project appears to be analogous to the mediating diplomat who risks exacerbating two alienated parties while also opening the possibility of rapprochement. To succeed, the diplomat must be very clear in communication - never taking for granted the understanding one party has of the other. If this collection of articles can be criticized it would be for taking for granted what naturalists and phenomenologists actually know of each other's work. Some initial clarifications of a more introductory nature would have served both sides of this wedding feast.

Having said this, we must now ask if *NP* is guilty of pseudo-phenomenology by failing to fully comprehend the radical nature of Husserl's project, specifically the full philosophical power of the *epoché.* I must say that throughout the text we find detailed discussions of the complexities and various modes of the *epoché.* Not only is this true of the editors' introduction, but several of the contributors make explicit reference to the vicissitudes of the phenomenological *epoché.* In all fairness, *NP*'s is no pseudo-phenomenology. It is something of another category altogether.

Moreover, several of these chapters are written by some of the most respected phenomenological philosophers in Europe today, namely Natalie Depraz, and Renaud Barbaras (to name only two), who explicate non-idealistic versions of phenomenology culled from the mature works of Husserl as taken up by Merleau-Ponty. This represents a stream of phenomenology which enters into questions of the 'co-constitutive' relation between objectivity and subjectivity, nature and consciousness, experience and embodiment, in a way that would support *NP*'s claim that naturalism and phenomenology can indeed serve a mutually informative, mutually restraining, even a mutually humbling, and complimentary relationship.

We are not pure spirit. Materiality is real. Experience is influenced by nature. And yet, nature is influenced by experience. "There is a truth to naturalism, but that truth is not in naturalism itself" (M. Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the College De France 1952-1960.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 80). In this spirit I think *NP*'s acknowledgment of materiality is not the same as capitulating to a totalizing naturalism. It is no accident that Merleau-Ponty's co-constitutive aspect of phenomenology is cited throughout this collection. Merleau-Ponty emphasized the 'passive' dimensions of intentionality i.e. the frontier where intentional experience brushes against the involuntary upsurging facticity of nature – the lived human body. Viewing the sensory body as itself a pre-categorical *raw being* that is both *within* nature while also *outside* nature, Merleau-Ponty points the way to a new philosophical/scientific nomenclature that well serves the 'naturalizing phenomenology' project. Here, we encounter attempts to sidestep the Cartesian language of subject-object, consciousness-nature, interior-exterior that has so plagued our common Western tradition. His new nomenclature would employ terms such as "flesh-of-the-world," 'chiasmatic intertwining,' 'interlacing,' 'interwoveness,' etc, all attempts to describe the inherently ambiguous quality of human corporeality – a condition of *reversible* relations between active and passive dimensions of human existence. In this brief sketch we may see how Merleau-Ponty took phenomenology to a point where the frontiers of naturalism and phenomenology may indeed share a common touching point – however tentative. But to touch each other, *both* will have to stretch out. It is not clear to me which point of view will have to change the most. Certainly no scientist who ever grasps the core concepts of phenomenology will ever view her data in the same way again. Here 'naturalizing phenomenology' may well be a dangerous Trojan horse to naturalism.

In the case of Psychiatry, we cannot ignore the impact of nature upon experience, nor can we risk equating consciousness with nature. In light of this tension which is emblematic of philosophical psychiatry, I think readers of this Bulletin really owe it to themselves to work with this difficult yet profoundly provocative collection of studies. In conclusion, if *NP*'s is a distortion of traditional phenomenology, it is a creative one for which we should be grateful. Without engaging in direct dialogue with naturalism, phenomenology risks stagnation into mere textual exegesis

or even becoming lost in the semiologic wilderness of mirrors that is postmodernism. *NP* is a revitalization of the phenomenological tradition. Moreover, it may well contribute to a revolution in natural science itself in a way which Husserl would have approved of. With or without such approval, this project is a bold endeavor.

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Phenomenology and Neuroscience (But Not Cognitive Science)

Osborne P. Wiggins, Ph.D.
Michael Alan Schwartz, M.D.

Marilyn Nissim-Sabat's review, "The Future of Psychiatry and the Naturalization of Phenomenology," sets out the fundamentals of a Husserlian reply to Petitot, Varella, Pachoud, and Roy's *NP*. She maintains that, despite their repeated assertions that they are not seeking to reduce mental phenomena to brain processes, their very naturalism will prevent Petitot et al from adequately appreciating phenomena in the Husserlian sense. The Husserlian sense of "phenomena," according to Nissam-Sabat, can be fully comprehended only by that person whose theoretical stance includes the *"suspension of naturalization"*effected in the phenomenological epoche. Hence to conceive of phenomena as naturalized—or even as naturalizable—requires an intellectual standpoint contrary to the epoche and hence a standpoint from which the Husserlian sense of phenomena cannot be accurately grasped.

We do not wish to discuss Nissim-Sabat's criticism of naturalism directly although we do in our own fashion agree with her. We shall rather move in the vicinity of her criticism by first posing a problem. We wish to express our firm sympathy with a conviction that is growing among present-day phenomenological psychiatrists. It is the conviction that some viable way must be found to establish connections between phenomenology and neuroscience. Since, of course, the subject matter of neuroscience is the brain and the brain is a physical system, this conviction implies that some connection must be found between the mental life studied by phenomenology and a natural reality, the brain. Now this search of connections between what neuroscience is revealing about the brain and what phenomenologists are describing in both normal and abnormal experience might sound like the program of naturalization that Petitot et al articulate. For after all Petitot et al state, "By 'naturalized' we mean integrated into an explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences" (*NP*, 2). We say that connections must be found between the neurological processes of the brain and the intentional processes of mental life, and Petitot et al maintain that experienced phenomena must be "made continuous with" brain processes as depicted by the natural sciences. What is the difference between their position and ours? The difference is that empirical neuroscience is not cognitive science, and Petitot et al make it clear in their first chapter, "Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology" (*NP*, 1-80), that when they speak of "naturalizing phenomenology" they are seeking to close an "explanatory gap" in Cognitive Science by availing themselves of "many descriptions of cognitive phenomena belonging to the Husserlian tradition" (*NP*, 3). In only slightly different words, Cognitive Science suffers from an explanatory gap that in their view phenomenology, if "naturalized," is best qualified to close. Hence the relationship between neuroscience and phenomenology is not really the issue for Petitot et al. It is rather the incorporation of phenomenology into the conceptual framework of *Cognitive Science.* The primary difference between neuroscience and Cognitive Science lies in the fact that Cognitive Science, despite the term "science" in its title as well as the discipline's appeal to empirical evidence, is not strictly an *empirical* science as is neuroscience. It is rather a philosophy, indeed even a metaphysics. Petitot et al themselves delineate the fundamental tenets of this philosophical metaphysics. They write:

> 2. Cognitive Science makes the basic assumption that what goes on inside the 'black box' (of the mind) is some kind of explicit process, usually referred to as 'information processing.'
>
> 3. Cognitive Science makes the crucial assumption that the processes sustaining cognitive behavior can be explained at different levels and varying degrees of abstraction, each one corresponding to a specific discipline or set of disciplines. At the most concrete level the explanation is biological, whereas at the most abstract level, the explanation is only functional in the sense that 'information' processes are characterized in terms of abstract entities, functionally defined. A definition is functional when it says no more about the *definiendum* than what it does, and consequently says nothing about its composition. In this sense, Cognitive Science differs from strict eliminativism, which recognizes only the basic biophysical level as objectively real and banishes all others.
>
> 4. This functional level of explanation is further assimilated with a psychological and mental one. In other words, Cognitive Science maintains that there is no substantial difference between giving a functional explanation of the information-processing activity responsible for the cognitive behavior of an organism and explaining this behavior in mental terms. It is only through this supplementary hypothesis that Cognitive Science becomes sensu stricto a new form of the theory of the mind.
>
> 5. Finally, by interpreting cognitive mental concepts functionally, Cognitive Science claims to have discovered a noncontroversial materialist solution to the mind-body problem. Because they are purely functional in character, mental entities postulated at the upper level of explanation do not have to be seen as ontologically different from the biological ones postulated at the lower level. They are exactly the same although characterized in terms of the role they play in cognitive processing. A cognitive mind is what an embodied brain looks like when contemplated through a functional window (*NP*, 4-5).

Surely no one can claim that these are simply empirical assertions. They are philosophical propositions that may provide a metaphysical framework for empirical claims but that go far beyond what any empirical evidence supports.

When we speak, by contrast, of the need to find connections between neuroscience and phenomenological psychiatry, we mean "neuroscience" as an *empirical science.* That is, we mean a wide range of empirical findings along with hypotheses that remain closely tied to those findings. Of course, various metaphysical interpretations can and have been imposed on empirical neuroscience. But neuroscience as empirical research can be considered apart from these metaphysical frameworks. For example, it is certainly possible to make sense of the empirical data and hypotheses of neuroscience apart from the framework of Cognitive Science as defined in the above quotations. Hence phenomenologists can make use of the data and hypotheses, even the empirical theories, of neuroscience without adopting the philosophy of Cognitive Science.

If phenomenologists do seek to avail themselves of neuroscientific claims, however, the real problem still remains: What is the connection between the natural entity, the brain, and the intentional mental life described by phenomenologsts? The answer to this question must be sought, we suggest, through a rethinking of Husserl's notion of the "science of science" to which Nissim-Sabat refers in her review. Husserl's most forteful presentation of that

notion is to be found in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Husserl, 1970). A careful examination of how the natural sciences are depicted in that work leads one to recognize that, for Husserl, the natural sciences conceptualize abstract strata, namely, physical, chemical, and biological strata, of a reality which in its pre-scientific concreteness he calls "the lifeworld." What Husserl does not delineate there is that his own reasoning implies that phenomenology also conceptualizes one abstract stratum, namely, the mental stratum, of a more concrete reality, namely, the human person. By "abstract stratum" we mean a level of reality that can be *conceptualized* (abstractly) apart from other levels of reality but which cannot *exist* apart from those other levels. One of the achievements of the phenomenological reduction is to conceptually "purify" mental life of anything other than the mind and its intended objects. As a result, the province studied by the phenomenologist within the reduction is a province abstractly separated from other provinces of reality. Hence what is needed to complete this picture is a description of the concrete human person living in and experiencing the lifeworld. Some may want to maintain that this description is best supplied by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) or some phenomenologist other than Husserl. We cannot enter this debate here although we would like to add that we think that Helmut Plessner (1981), Hans Jonas (1966), and Arnold Gehlen (1988) have much to contribute to the philosophy that psychiatry now needs. In any event, the attempt to connect neuroscience with phenomenology must acknowledge that both disciplines study conceptually abstracted provinces. Consequently, any attempt to connect them needs to discern what they have been abstracted from. It is on the basis of that more concrete reality that the clues to their connection must be sought.

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Whose Phenomenology, Which Naturalism?

J. Melvin Woody, Ph..D.

> The heart of the problem of naturalization is to make intelligible the fact that one entity can have both the properties characteristic of matter and those characteristic of mentality in spite of the apparent heterogeneity between them.[1]

Orthodox Husserlians are sure to reject the project of naturalizing phenomenology. The editors of *NP* describe Husserl's own objections to naturalism in some detail in their introductory essay, "Beyond the Gap." Prof. Nissim-Sabat's essay more succinctly exemplifies Husserlian antagonism to naturalism. She conceives of naturalization entirely in terms of an eliminative reductionism to a physics conceived in terms of a mechanistic physics devoid of meaning, intentionality and freedom. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists conceive of the task of naturalizing epistemology and philosophy of mind in just those terms and therefore collide with what David Chalmers calls "the hard problem" of getting over the hump from electrochemistry to conscious thought. Prof. Nissim-Sabat protests that it would be more feasible to abandon naturalization and recognize that physical objects are not things in themselves but constituted by consciousness. But the question of the origin of consciousness has thus been ruled out of court by the original epoche along with the thing in itself.

We are thus confronted with the two "partial monisms" that Hans Jonas describes as the precipitates of the failure of dualism:

> ...(I)n the postdualistic situation there are, on principle, not one but two possibilities of monism, represented by modern materialism and modern idealism respectively: they both presuppose the ontological polarization which dualism had generated and either takes its stand in one of the two poles, to comprehend from this standpoint the whole of reality. They are thus in their origin though certainly not in their intention, partial monisms...
>
> But since the point of departure in either case is partial with respect to integral reality, they severally embody the internal contradiction of a partial monism—a contradiction which betrays itself in the failure of their reduction of one element to the other. In the case of materialism, this failure happens in relation to consciousness, in that of idealism—in relation to the thing-in-itself.[2]

If we envision the project of naturalization in terms of a phenomenology and a nature thus conceived, then Prof. Nissim-Sabat is clearly right in dismissing it as ill-conceived from the very outset and on the basis of the opening paragraphs of the book.

But phenomenology did not end with Husserl and eliminative materialism is not the only form of naturalism. In concentrating upon the resources and challenges presented to cognitive science by the Husserian tradition, the editors and contributors to *NP* do not confine their attention to Husserl himself, but draw upon a Husserlian tradition that continues through Merleau-Ponti to Gurwitsch, Erwin Straus and Jonas and on to Dreyfus and Bermudez—as well as Barry Smith and other contributors to the volume itself. In "Closing the Gap," the editors call attention to elements in Husserl's own writings that lend themselves to the project of naturalization, while clearly acknowledging that successful naturalization will mean a revision, indeed "a reversal of Husserlian phenomenology."

But it will also require a revision in the conception of naturalism assumed in Prof. Nissim-Sabat's critique. What counts as naturalization depends upon how one conceives of nature—and the eliminative materialism that she takes as a paradigm would not fit the varieties of naturalism to be found in Dewey or Whitehead or Langer or Jonas, for example. All of these authors insist that organic nature involves activities and processes that cannot be reduced to the material constituents upon which they depend and which presage the emergence of explicit consciousness. In "Closing the Gap" the *NP* editors explicitly dismiss the reductionism as the least promising of the several naturalizing strategies that they subject to critical scrutiny and focus attention upon the analysis of the "lived body" in Husserl's later works and in Merleau-Ponty as opening a more inviting avenue of exploration. The lived body is both "*Leib*," the organ of experience and action (the hand that touches and grasps, Merleau-Ponty's "body subject") and "*Körper*" an object of experience and knowledge (the hand that is touched, the body as object of scientific investigation.)

> Broadly conceived, the idea is to explore seriously the close "relationship" between the subject and its body (both as Leib and Körper), for it is there that one has direct access to both the constitutive natural elements familiar to Cognitive Science and the phenomenological data required (*NP*, p. 66).

Thus conceived, the project of naturalizing phenomenology points to an "enlargement of the concept of nature" that might lead to a resolution of the problem Roger Chambon posed in *Le monde comme realité et répresentation*: "How does a world have to be if it is to bear within itself the potentiality of its own appearing?" "In order to answer this question," the editors remark, "it proves necessary to recast the very idea of nature and modify accordingly our modern conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity and knowledge" (*NP*, 16-17). But the editors argue that the evolution of science itself already invites such a redefinition. For one thing, they argue that contemporary quantum and relativity physics have already found their own reasons to abandon the claim to provide knowledge of things in themselves, independently of observation (*NP*, pp. 16-17).

On the other hand, if the naturalization of phenomenology is to succeed, it must be able to exploit the resources of contemporary natural science and the editors insist that phenomenological descriptions can only be integrated into the framework of the natural sciences if they can be mathematized: "We see mathematization as a key instrument for naturalization, being in fact consonant on this point with Husserl himself although drawing opposite conclusions from it." Whereas Husserl had denied the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology because he believed that pure lived experience cannot be mathematized, the editors urge that more recent developments in mathematics have rendered that conviction obsolete.

> Once again, the general project defended in this introductory essay is based on the fundamental hypothesis that today the progress of the sciences of cognition make it possible to unify the investigation of phenomenological data with the multiple level explanation of what is to be considered, in a naturalist perspective, as an essentially physical reality. Where Husserl saw the necessity for a fundamental epistemological discontinuity, the contemporary scientific context in our opinion offers the possibility of establishing a no less fundamental continuity (*NP*, 75).

In support of this hope, they point to "physico-mathematical theories (such as those dealing with catastrophes, attractors and bifurcations of nonlinear dynamical systems, critical phenomena and symmetry breakings, self-organization and critical self-organizing states, nonlinear thermodynamics and dissipative structures and so on" which, they speculate, "represent the first steps of a qualitative physics of phenomenal morphologies, of what could be called a 'pheno-physics" (*NP*, p. 55).

I am not competent to judge the adequacy of these new developments in mathematics and physics to supply a mathematical parallel to phenomenological description. But the editors themselves concede that only time will tell whether the project of mathematization can succeed and even close by citing strong Husserlian reasons for doubting its feasibility. Still, even if these new mathematical tools cannot close the gap, that does not leave us with the alternative between idealism and a materialism tha precludes meaning and freedom, as Professor Nissim-Sabat warns. We would still have to reckon with the living body as both organ of sentience and object of physiology. And, as Hans Jonas has so pungently reminded us in *The Phenomenon of Life*, we are not the only living bodies in the natural order. Jonas mounts cogent arguments to show that although entirely composed of matter and operating according to the laws of physics, the ontology of organic processes transcends that of the material entities and events upon which they depend. The identity of a living cell cannot be reduced to that of its momentary physical constituents. The cell can only survive by metabolizing, by recruiting new physical ingredients into the process of its own self-constitution. Every cell is therefore a being-for-itself, a rudimentary body-subject that survives in a relation of "needful freedom" to the environment upon which it depends for the nutriments and energy it must take into itself in order to endure. The roots of intentionality, meaning and freedom can be traced back to this most rudimentary vital process and Jonas goes on to show how those "subjective" functions are elaborated as we pass from plant to animal life and by the evolution of sentience and motility and, eventually, the distinctively human powers of symbolism.

One might find parallel accounts of the supervenience of organic processes upon matter without invoking any immaterial principles in Dewey or Langer or Whitehead or any of a number of other evolutionary naturalists. I cite Jonas's version because it stems from the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology and depends upon the same appeal to the authority of the lifeworld that Prof. Nissim-Sabat invokes at the end of her critique. When the editors and contributors to *NP* speak of establishing continuity between experience and physics, they do not propose to integrate phenomenology into cognitive science, but to exploit developments in computer theory and theories of self-organizing systems to "recategorize ontologies" in such a way as to bridge the gap between the two so that each can inform, enrich and challenge the other.

Clinicians struggling with the choice between psychopharmacology with psychodynamic therapies that Prof. Nissim-Sabat highlights in the opening of her essay will find the issues explored in this book all too familiar. Clinicians are apt to seek bridges across the gap in neuroscience rather than computer science or non-linear dynamics. Contemporary cognitive science embraces both—along with genetics and linguistics, which explore the transfer of information through the strikingly different media of molecules and symbols. Their inclusion invites recognition that meaning and matter are not mutually exclusive, after all, and that the integration of these several sciences in cognitive science does not entail reducing them all to any one. A naturalism that recognizes both the unity and ambiguity of the body object and body subject does not leave the clinician with an exclusive choice between serotonin enhancement and symbolic transformation as therapeutic strategies. Both doctor and patient are embodied interpreters, who never encounter the world in-itself, but always have to cope with a situation formed by their respective— and often competing—diagnoses. Psychopharmacology may be useless in dealing with a paranoid patient, or even one who scorns reliance upon drugs as a "crutch." Psychotherapy may be impotent in dealing with a patient too depressed—or too deranged—to cooperate. The use of anti-psychotic medications employs a deterministic physico-chemical process to liberate the patient from paralyzing or coercive interpretations whose origins may be more genetic than hermeneutic. In all such cases, the therapeutic challenge therefore mirrors the challenge of naturalization—to bridge the gap between mind and matter by integrating the body as object and the body as subject without reducing either to the other. Because the essays in *NP* address that challenge from such a different perspective – they may offer fresh insights to those baffled by its familiar clinical formulation.

References

1. *NP*, p. 48. This and further references to *NP* refer to "Beyond the Gap," the Introduction to *NP*.

2. Jonas, Hans, *The Phenomenon of Life (*Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2001), pp. 16-17 passim.

* * *

Response to Commentaries

Marilyn Nissim-Sabat

Morley

After an introduction in which he states that it is "impossible to disagree with Nissim-Sabat's critique of pseudo-phenomenology" and in which he displays considerable insight into the mission of Husserlian phenomenology (HP), Morley says, regarding pseudo-phenomenology, "it is just not clear to me that this applies to *NP*. In fact, one could make the case that *NP* was actually attempting the reverse: i.e., to phenomenologize naturalism!" However, naturlism can no more be phenomenologized and remain naturalism than phenomenology can be naturalized and remain phenomenology.

Morley goes on to develop the idea that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, oft cited in the entire *NP* book, overcomes or transcends the naturalism-phenomenology dichotomy and argues that not only the editors but many of the other chapters of the book advocate Merleau-Ponty's view. Morley quotes Merleau-Ponty to the effect that, "There is a truth to naturlism, but that truth is not in naturalism itself." I find this quote to be self-contradictory. Be this as it may, nowhere in my original paper did I suggest that the articles in the book were useless or meaningless or had nothing to offer to ongoing research, or that Merleau-Ponty's views are not worthy of study.

Morley writes, assumedly against Husserl, that "We are not pure spirit. Materiality is real." Here I ask, what does Morley mean by these terms, "spirit" and "real"? He believes that materiality is real. Does he believe that pure spirit is real? Does he use the adjective 'real' as a modifier only for materiality? Actually, one way to characterize HP is just so as the most far-reaching philosophical stance ever conceived that asks the question: what do we mean when we say of anything that it is 'real'? In what manner is the givenness of things as real constituted? What are the modes of givenness of the real? How are the existence-senses of experienced things and states of affairs constituted? Indeed, one of the motivations for Husserl's conception of the epoche was to preclude the *metabasis eis allo genus*, the transformation into another genus that is brought about when the presupposition of positivism, that it is known that the world exists independently of subjectivity, is surreptitiously construed as the only possible mode of the real, as the essence of reality. As Husserl wrote in *The Idea of Phenomenology* (Trans. By W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian. Nijhoff: The Hague, 1964.):

> As far as the critique of cognition is concerned, all the sciences are only *phenomena of science*. Every tie of that sort signifies a defective *metabasis*… This comes about only by way of a mistaken but often seductive *shifting between problems*: between explaining cognition as a fact of nature in psychological and scientific terms and elucidating cognition in terms of its essential capabilities to accomplish its task... [I]f we are to avoid this confusion…we need a *phenomenological reduction*..This means: everything transcendent...is to be assigned the index zero, i.e., its existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as *the phenomenon of a claim to validity*. (4)

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Wiggins and Schwartz

Wiggins and Schwartz state that they "do not wish to discuss" my "criticisms of naturalism directly although we do in our own fashion agree with her." However, they criticize the *NP* project by maintaining that cognitive psychology, favored by Petitot et al, is itself "not strictly an empirical science. It is rather a philosophy, indeed even a metaphysic." Wiggins and Schwartz then present an extensive rationale for this claim. Our critiques, mine and theirs, of the *NP* project are different. My claim was that *NP*'s claim to have naturalized phenomenology is based on a gross misapprehension of the phenomenological concept of phenomenality. Wiggins and Schwartz, on the other hand, dismiss the *NP* project by arguing that cognitive psychology, the discipline of Petitot et al, is a metaphysics. I do not dispense with cognitive psychology at all; rather, my concern is to show that phenomenology cannot be naturalized, not that cognitive science is itself to be dismissed. Cognitive science cannot avoid dealing with phenomenal experience, yet the problem of doing so in a natural science framework remains. So, cognitive science seizes on phenomenology to provide a seamless transitioning between the two domains, to "bridge the gap" between the naturalistically reduced physical domain and the phenomenal domain. My point is that this approach cannot work—it negates the phenomenological concept of phenomenal experience, which Petitot et al profoundly misconstrue in the opening paragraphs of *NP*. My aim was, then, not to say that cognitive science should be dismissed *tout court*; rather, cognitive psychology should radically reconceive its relation to phenomenology.

Wiggins and Schwartz go on to critique my, and Husserl's, view of phenomenology. They aver that, "When we speak, by contrast, of the need to find connections between neuroscience and phenomenological psychiatry, we mean 'neuroscience' as an *empirical science*." They then point out that, "If phenomenologists do seek to avail themselves of neuroscientific claims, however, the real problems still remains. What is the connection between the natural entity, the brain, and the intentional mental life described by phenomenologists?" They maintain that, "for Husserl, the natural sciences conceptualize abstract strata, namely, physical, chemical, and biological strata, of a reality which in its prescientific concreteness he calls 'the lifeworld'." This is unexceptionable. Then they put forth, not a critique of *NP* nor of my critique of *NP*; rather, they put forth a critique of Husserl's own views: "What Husserl does not delineate there [in Husserl's late work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*]is that his own reasoning implies that phenomenology also conceptualizes an abstract stratum, namely, the mental stratum, of a more concrete reality, namely the human person." Their definition of abstract stratum is that it is "a level of *reality* that can be *conceptualized* (abstractly) apart from other levels of reality but which cannot *exist* apart from those other levels." Thus, "the province studied by the phenomenologist within the reduction is a province abstractly separated form other provinces of reality." They then go on to maintain that understanding the connectedness between brain and the mental "needs to discern what they have been abstracted from," i.e., the human person.

Thus, Wiggins and Schwartz seem to be saying that while I am correct in rejecting the *NP* project, on the other hand I am not correct in seemingly suggesting that the problem of the connectedness between brain and mind is resolved by HP. They imply that HP, and possibly post-HP phenomenology as well, cannot solve the problem of connectedness because phenomenology abstracts from the human person, isolating a province, the province of pure mental life, just as natural science, in abstracting from subjectivity, isolates a pure materiality that is an abstraction from the person. However, *Wiggins and Schwartz do not provide any rationale at all* for their claim that Husserl's "own reasoning implies that phenomenology also conceptualizes an abstract stratum, namely, the mental stratum, of a more concrete reality, namely the human person."

The problem with their critique of

phenomenology is that it is just not the case that the world as construed within the phenomenological suspension of all ontological claims is an abstraction. (Since Wiggins and Schwartz state as noted above that they agree with me, I assume that they do not construe the phenomenological reduction itself as an act of abstraction. Indeed, it is not; rather, it is the very act that brings the lifeworld into view.) This was certainly not Husserl's view, nor is it mine. For Husserl, then, any rapprochement between phenomenology and natural science must recognize that subjectivity is all encompassing and that nature is within subjectivity. In his extraordinary essay "The Vienna Lecture", an appendix to the *Crisis*, Husserl wrote that within the attitude of transcendental phenomenology,

> …the spirit [mental life] is not in or alongside nature; rather, nature is itself drawn into the spiritual sphere. Also, the ego is then no longer an isolated thing alongside such things in a pregiven world; in general, the serious mutual exteriority of ego-persons, their being alongside on another, ceases in favor of an inward being-for-one another and mutual interpenetration. (298)

Given this, we can say that, for Husserl, neuroscience would be welcomed into the domain of the phenomenological sciences so long as it acknowledged that it is an abstraction from subjectivity and that in principle subjectivity cannot be viewed as within nature as conceived and studied by the sciences of nature.

Another indication that the phenomenological reduction is not an act of abstraction is that, contrary to what Wiggins and Schwartz state, Husserl does not indicate that the sphere of subjectivity cannot exist apart from "other levels of reality," e.g., nature. What Husserl does say in his *Vienna Lecture* is that within the natural (naturalistic) attitude, since we do not experience subjectivity except as embodied, we naturalistically construe the relation between subjectivity and nature as such that subjectivity, "spirit," is held to be causally related to, and causally dependent on, the objectified body, and thus as reducible to objectified nature. But, for Husserl, though spirit is *founded upon* corporeality, it is not causally related to it inasmuch as within the phenomenological reduction natural scientific, causal relations do not obtain. Thus, Husserl does not say that spirit or subjectivity or psyche cannot exist without corporeality. Husserl did not view the phenomenological revelation of subjectivity as the self-continuous sphere of phenomenological investigation as meaning that phenomenality cannot exist without corporeality.

For Husserl, the human person is a psychophysical unity of subjectivity and physicality, and this unity is the mundane concretization of a transcendental ego. This is the human person. Husserl addressed in great detail the phenomenology of the concrete reality of the human person in its relation to materiality and corporeality. He discusses these matters in "The Constitution of Psychic Reality through the Body" (chapter III of *Ideas II)*, causality, animal nature, the personalistic attitude, and so on in the second volume of his three volume *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*.

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Woody

Woody's main objection seems to be that my apparent assumption that eliminative materialism is the only form of naturalism is incorrect. For example, "the supervenience of organic processes upon matter" is a form of materialism that, according to Woody, is compatible with phenomenality in the sense of phenomenology. Woody presents the same notion of non-eliminative materialism, or, as it is also called in the literature, compatibalism, when he says that cognitive science "invites recognition that meaning and matter are not mutually exclusive." Earlier, he stated the same view when he said that "organic nature involves activities and processes that cannot be reduced to the material constituents upon which they depend and which presage the emergence of explicit consciousness."

In the first place, it is not correct to maintain that HP is a rejection of eliminative, or any other form of materialism. As I discussed in my original contribution to this symposium, HP reflects the view that it is in principle impossible to make a claim to metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the issue for phenomenology is not whether or not materialism or idealism or any other metaphysical stance is or is not knowledge of true being. Phenomenology is a perspective that founds itself on the view that since in principle, because all we know is what we know in and through our subjectivity, we cannot know whether or not, materialism, for example, is true, we ought to suspend our beliefs about the nature of true being. The phenomenological epoche is a mental act of suspending ontological commitments, not a denial of either materialism, idealism, or any combination or modification of these. What Husserl discovered is that when this mental act is accomplished, the world in its givenness as external remains and can be investigated as such; this is "the surrounding world of life", the lifeworld, the object of phenomenological investigation in both its static and genetic modes of givenness.

I submit that within the phenomenological attitude, science is open to all evidences, all scientific work that yields results in all conceivable regions of being. What phenomenology refuses is to validate as rational naturalism that one way or another rejects or seeks to undermine the absolute priority of the lifeworld as the always already presupposed ground of all scientific work.

In his opening paragraph, Woody states that "Prof. Nissim-Sabat protests that it would be more feasible to abandon naturalization and recognize that physical objects are not things-in-themselves but constituted by consciousness. But the question of the origin of consciousness has thus been ruled out of court by the original epoche along with the thing-in-itself." In the first place, phenomenology does not maintain that physical objects are not things-in-themselves. Instead, phenomenology maintains that we cannot know whether or not physical objects are things-in-themselves and therefore ought not to claim to know this. Secondly, in saying that the question of the origin of consciousness has been ruled out of court by the epoche which rules the thing-in-itself out of court, Woody seemingly implies either that consciousness is a thing-in-itself, or consciousness is an entity of some other metaphysical mode of being. Phenomenology, as we have seen, however, does not presuppose or demand any metaphysical stance. What, however, of the question of the origin of consciousness? Can this question be asked within the epoche? Yes, it can be asked and Husserl's response to the question can be addressed in this way: when, on his deathbed, Husserl was asked what is the most important philosophical question, he responded, "Die Frage des Gottes, natürlich." (anecdote communicated by Herbert Spiegelberg); "The question of God, naturally." Phenomenology does not rule out ultimate questions of origin. On the contrary, it renders such questions possible for the first time without presupposing answers.

Conclusion

I thank the respondents for their thoughtful and challenging remarks. I hope very much that as a result of this interchange they and others will be motivated to study at least the major writings of Husserl. The future of phenomenology, psychiatry, and the world depends on advancing the radical, transcendental humanism inaugurated by Husserl, yet in the tradition of *philosophia perennis.*

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Letter to Editor

Reply to Dr. Kroll,

I read with interest the "President's Column" in the AAPP Bulletin (vol.12, no.1) which raises some important points about the Philosophical Counseling Movement. I'd like to offer another perspective, though I am not myself a philosophical counselor, but a philosopher and philosophy professor who, with no prior acquaintance with Lou Marinoff, attended one of his workshops last year.

While I hardly felt prepared to hang a shingle after the three day workshop, the course was of value. The course did not address my strong interest in the philosophical foundations of psychiatry and psychotherapy more generally, but it was most enlightening about the logistical, legal, and moral issues involved in any psychotherapeutic activity. It became quickly evident that someone who cannot think rationally is not a candidate for this form of therapy.

One thing that Professor Marinoff emphasized was the importance of having a network of physicians to whom one could refer people who exhibit pathology. Of course, the tough issue is whether the philosophical counselor can recognize pathology, and this is where the philosophical counselor needs more training and simply the experience that hones one's judgmental powers. Moreover, the philosophical counselor cannot proceed by simply denying the validity of the concept of mental pathology, as some might be tempted to do (a la Szasz).

Despite his prodigious talent for marketing, Professor Marinoff struck me as a kind, unusually intelligent, well-educated philosopher with an incisive mind and wide acquaintance with the philosophy of science. His books presumably speak to a general reader, probably a philosophical novice. As for the politics of the Philosophical Counseling movement, I do not have the knowledge to speak to that. Even a cursory look, however, at academic politics from the time of Plato's Academy will show us how unsurprising such political divisions are, even among philosophers.

To return to philosophical counseling, it is obviously not a replacement for psychiatry. Some people are disquieted by problems that philosophers are well-equipped, perhaps *uniquely*-equipped, to address. Even people who function adeptly in life face moral dilemmas which unsettle their equilibrium. While a philosopher should not tell people what to do, a philosopher can help them disentangle the conceptual issues and guide them to reflect carefully on their values and which values they want to make preeminent. Moreover, some generally rational people face life-altering existential issues with which philosophers could be trained to deal.

At a cultural moment when many philosophers are returning to the eudaimonistic or virtue ethics of ancient philosophers like Aristotle, Seneca, and Plato, it makes sense that they are also reconsidering the classical view that philosophy has a practical, therapeutic role, as well as a theoretical one.

Sincerely,
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