AAPP Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry

Bulletin

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From the Editor

In his Commentary included in this issue of the Bulletin, Cory Wright raises a challenging question concerning our efforts in the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry: namely, "What justification is there for thinking that a new subdiscipline formed around this intersection is needed?" Whether we label it a 'subdiscipline' or not, we certainly take it for granted that our work in the intersection is important and unique. In the limited space available to me I would like to address the question posed in the Commentary.

I will distinguish a practical from a theoretical dimension in the 'subdiscipline' question. Practically speaking, the existence of AAPP, the Royal College Philosophy Interest Group, PPP, this Bulletin, and of course the multitude of national groups that have come together for international meetings and that coalesced, as reported in this issue, in South Africa as the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry–all this bespeaks a desire on the part of a lot of philosophers and mental health professionals to gather together over the issues in which their respective disciplines overlap. Call it a 'subdiscipline' or not, it seems merely efficient to carry out this dialogue between the disciplines in meetings and in a journal where the participants know one another and can take their shared interest for granted.

As a footnote to this discussion of the practical dimension of the subdiscipline question, I should point out that, in the case of AAPP, we are doing it both ways this year. We are holding our annual meeting as usual in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association; but in addition to our meeting on first weekend of the APA, we are involved in the APA meetings themselves: one symposium officially sponsored by AAPP, another organized by AAPP members, and finally a course given on conceptual issues in psychiatry by AAPP members.

Aside from the practical advantages of shared meetings and a targeted journal, there is a theoretical dimension to the question raised by Cory Wright in his Commentary. He writes: "Now, either psychiatrically-posed questions are inherently philosophical, or they are not...Also, the traditional aims of psychiatry–that of understanding and treating mental illness–would be grounded in the history and epistemology of mental illness rather than purely in the clinical situation itself..." Well, why must all "psychiatrically-posed questions" be inherently philosophical or not. It might be the case–and I for one think it is–that there are some psychiatric issues that pose no philosophical problems and others that do. Deciding on the merits of one treatment of depression versus another does not require philosophical discussion. But sorting out the role of unacknowledged values in the DSM nomenclature (a favored activity of some of our members)

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President's Column

This first 'president's column' must begin with thanks to Jennifer Radden, on behalf of AAPP, for the truly splendid work that she did as president for the past four years. Many of us had hoped that she would not notice the passage of time and might stay on indefinitely, but such was not to be. Jennifer has led and represented AAPP with wisdom, dignity, and enthusiasm, and we are all appreciative of her leadership. It will be an accomplishment if I can manage any two of the three qualities mentioned above. This is my second stint of being a president of something, and it is entered with trepidation. The first, at the dawn of my 'career', was my election as president of the high school student body. The election campaign was fierce, and I won on an imaginative list of promises utilizing student government funds to fix up the football field, purchase art and history films, increase the number of social clubs, and other whatnots. The campaign promises were sincere, and I was devastated to learn, after the victory party, that the faculty advisors of the student government fund (which was sizable) never had any intentions of letting students get their hands on the money. This was my early introduction into the distance between promises and delivery, and into the ease with which promissory platforms divorced from reality can be convincingly sold. Upon entering college, I vowed to avoid campus politics and found consolation in philosophy, never running for or holding an organizational office from that tender time fifty years ago until now, at the 'other end' of my career.

Holding office in AAPP is an honor that hopefully will not be burdensome or disillusioning to myself or others. It should be a corrective emotional experience. The important thing is not to make promises. However, this would be a good opportunity to outline some goals for AAPP for all of us to work towards. There are several organizational imperatives if AAPP is to flourish. These involve, interrelatedly, increasing the general membership, attracting younger members to the Executive Council, and increasing our appeal and thereby usefulness to minority and women professionals. None of these goals is easily reached. In psychiatry, as the importance of a philosophical perspective becomes increasingly important, the time and energy even to think beyond the immediate clinical problem is increasingly diminished. Philosophers may be in a reciprocal position; they may have much to say, but it is hard to get anyone other than other philosophers to listen.

The critical answers must somehow encompass relevance and marketing. This is a terrible thing to say, but if by marketing we mean not hucksterism, but publicizing our existence and our relevance, then it becomes important and valuable. The issue of relevance is, of course, essential, and here AAPP has to continue to offer a forum for interdisciplinary dialogue and a clearing house for philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists to find each other to work together. The three main vehicles for critical exchange of ideas are the Bulletin, the journal PPP, and the annual May meeting in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association. In addition, formal panels at the three different APA (philosophy, psychiatry, psychology) meetings, the formation of local groups, and an

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AAPP presence at international meetings serve as opportunities for collaboration and discussion between our respective fields.

Readers of this newsletter and members of AAPP are encouraged to contact the Executive Council with ideas for conference topics and other thoughts about interdisciplinary work. Finally, I do not recall if a solicitation for financial contributions has ever been made to the membership, but AAPP is always on the lean side of the ledger and if you are at a loss for which deserving non-profit organization to make a year-end tax-deductible donation, think philosophically.

Best wishes for the New Year.

Jerome Kroll, M.D.

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Report
AAPP Annual Meeting

The title of this year's Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry, held in Philadelphia on May 18 and 19 2002, provoked a series of creative and insightful elaborations in the papers presented which, while at times orthogonal to one another, combined and ricocheted in an exciting and heady mix which left the two days of the AAPP meeting, in the words of one observer later in the week, "the most interesting thing at the whole APA."

Emphasis on psychiatry & personal agency produced Kennett's sophisticated dicussion of the way mental disorder confounds the usual process by which our agency and our selves are 'co-authored' by those around us. Perring's intriguing review of the increasingly popular literary genre of memoirs of mental illness showed how profoundly individualistic are the ways people with mental disorder understand and experience their own agency. Rego offered a clear and thoughtful application of the philosopher Frankfurt's notion of externality to the experience of the patient in the therapeutic process, illustrating the sense of agency achieved through the narrative task, showing, as he put it " what the relationship of one's self to one's experience ought to be" in order to get better from a psychiatric problem. Developed around two case histories of lives and agency affected by September 11, Brendel's presentation emphasized the provisional nature of all clinical diagnosis and static DSM-IV predictions, and clinicians were admonished to always remain "open to surprise." Matthews and Kennett explored the way dissociation and delusion disrupt the usual unity of agency, casting the task of therapy in dissociative disorder as one of restoring not only unity but agency itself. Some of the political strands of the notion of agency were taken up by Yaryura and Pinto,who revealed the social structures - from the family, the media, and the government to the mental health industry itself - which serve to reduce the mental patient's autonomy and freedom. Others, on a more complex level, were explored by Mender, who used an analysis of language to illustrate what he identified as a privileged status for the linguistics of economic transactions.

The subtitle 'Nature vs Nurture Revisited' stimulated a series of necessary corrections, clarifications and qualifications. Hirsch reminded us of the deterministic "passivity assumptions" equally present in nature and nurture theories, and emphasized the importance of the sense of agency required for therapeutic success. An historically sensitive classification was offered by Hoff, which showed the dangers of assuming unambiguous reference with a phrase like "biological psychiatry"; that phrase, he explained, can be understood in four different ways, each conceptually distinct: the somatic substrate; the function of the somatic substrate; correlations of somatic findings with complex mental phenomena, and finally 'biological explanation' of mental phenomena in general. Mindful of Kraepelin's enormous influence on modern psychiatry, Hoff pointed out that while Kraepelin was not interested in philosophy, he worked with clear philosophical presuppositions, realism, naturalism, parallelism and experimentalism.
(He also acknowledged Kraepelin's reactionary politics, which designated all revolutionaries as 'psychopaths.') Sadler pursued the nature/nurture theme in a continuation of his extensive research on values considerations in the classification of mental disorders, now asking what implications evaluative concept-tooling will hold for molecular neuroscience/ genetic explanation in psychiatry. Sadler made reference to the nosology emerging in psychiatric genetics, and to the role of one particular regulatory molecule in addiction, comparing the sorts of evaluations involved in these molecular paradigms of mental disorder with those of DSM diagnosis. In a phenomenological tour de force Jan Broekman provided a stream of consciousness narrative illustrating the way the internet and e-technology blur the divide between nature and culture. Young approached the nature/ nurture issue by way of Aristotle, attempting an application of Aristotelian theories of causation to explanation in psychiatry.

One paper which crossed and recrossed the divide between agency and determinism was that by Sauvayre, entitled 'Agency, Time, and Identity; or, Agency is found in the Dialectical Nowhere.' Working with the philosopher Bergson's notion of experienced time within which agency unfolds as an emergent, will-o'-the-wispish property, Sauvayre showed the way the psychoanalytic or therapeutic process at the same time heightens the sense of agency, while acknowledging the inevitability of one's sense of oneself as the product of determining causes. Another paper spanning the two sets of ideas was that of Daly, who pointed to psychiatry as the locus of questions linking agency with determinism; as he puts it, psychiatrists want to know how agency-diminishing states come about so that we can restore or maintain the sanity of persons. Last but not least, the two distinguished plenary speakers, Horacio Fabrega, MD, and Kenneth Schaffner, MD, PhD, offered contrasting interpretations, styles and substance in their sweeping and more comprehensive papers.

Fabrega explored the notion of 'contested territories' in which, as he showed, psychiatry inevitably finds itself. Psychiatry, as he put it, is rooted in controversy and contestation. In contested territories such as legal commitment and the application of the insanity defense, he revealed the role and risk of stigma and the controversial part played by the clinician. Schaffner's elegant discussion of the application of behavioral genetics to psychiatry provided a brilliant synthesis of recent work, albeit that he emphasized the complexly intertwined contributions of nature and nurture in both behavioral genetics and psychiatry and warned away from any simple or reductionistic answers.

This conference was organized by Professor Nissim-Sabat, and enormous credit goes to her and to Linda Muncy for their hard work .

Jennifer Radden, D. Phil.

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Report
Society of South African Psychiatry Congress

In September, I had the opportunity to attend the Society of South African Psychiatry (SOSAP) Congress in Cape Town, South Africa as AAPP's (temporary) official delegate. SOSAP held its first Special Interest Group by hosting an International Symposium on the Philosophy and Ethics in Psychiatry. This group was also the host for the launch of the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry (INPP), an umbrella organization much needed as the number of local and national groups around the world grows. These events together created great expectations and momentum for future collaborative and supportive research.

The Conference

The Philosophy and Ethics in Psychiatry section of the conference, organized by Werdie von Staden, was well attended with audiences ranging in numbers from 50-120. The majority of participants was South African, but international participants came from the United States, England, Scotland, Netherlands, and Italy. Discussions of presentations frequently turned to issues of multiculturalism and trauma in South Africa. There was a good blend/interweaving of philosophical rigor and psychiatric practice.

To give an idea of the range of topics, I will mention a few papers. Bill Fulford (United Kingdom) opened the conference by arguing that values (and therefore ethics) should not be thought of as downstream from evidence-based medicine. Instead, Fulford said, both facts and values are an inherent part of good day-to-day practice, both in terms of diagnosis and treatment. Boet Preller (South Africa) pushed on nature/nurture debates in psychiatry by arguing that questions about free will should not be overlooked. He argued for an understanding of free will as purposive, where purposive action can be either conscious or unconscious, and applied this framework to a patient's manic episode. The topic of delusions was examined both in terms of what delusions are (Werdie von Staden, South Africa) and what effect it has on patients to say to patients that they have lost touch with reality (Jürgen Harms, South Africa). Von Staden argued that the standard definition of a delusion does not match up with the clinical use of the concept and suggested that research be done on clinical usage of the term; Harms argued that delusional patients need more sympathy and understanding, starting from the patient's experience of being ill and not the patient's cognitive relation to reality. Paul Falzer (USA) discussed deployment of the language of the self to buttress the theory that healing from schizophrenia requires a recovery of the self. Falzer argued that mingling technical terms with everyday language of experience is conceptually murky, but that attempts to tighten up philosophical concepts can lead to a high level of abstraction. On a related theme, Robert Kimball (USA) showed that numerous understandings of a "narrative conception of the self" exist and argued that how we evaluate a healthy narrative self depends on which definition we employ. Christa Kruger (South Africa) and Daniel Orr (USA) separately discussed depersonalization, Kruger presenting evidence that depersonalization is a dissociative disorder and Orr arguing that an understanding of depersonalization reveals flaws in a certain theory of mind. Giovanni Stanghellini (Italy) analyzed disorders of awareness with an eye toward showing how an understanding of common-sensibles can account for a connection between depersonalization and desocialization. He drew on the concept of attunement in non-pathological development to illustrate his point. Eric Matthews (Scotland) argued that Merleau-Ponty provides a useful framework for understanding embodiment that avoids problems of dualism, and Gerrit Glas (Netherlands) provided a critical analysis of Kandel's reductionism by showing its ambiguities and arguing, instead, for the need to flesh out meanings in the areas between reductionism and imaginative extrapolation. Although this summary only represents a portion of the intellectual activity we experienced at this conference, it gives readers some idea of the numerous points of connection that were made between various authors and topics.

The Network

On the last evening of the conference, audience members joined together for a ceremonial launch of the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry. The purpose of this organization is to provide a network for activities of rigorous thinking and analysis that have an impact on practice and of practice-based philosophical thinking. There is a clear need for such an umbrella organization, as there are now at least 27 national joint philosophy/psychiatry groups around the world; five international conferences have already been held, and five

AAPP Annual Meeting 2003

Psychopharmacology and the Self: Philosophical Questions

May 17 & 18, 2003
San Francisco, CA, USA
(in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting)

The Annual Meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry will take place in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association on May 17 & 18, 2003 in San Francisco. This meeting will be devoted to the theme: Psychopharmacology and the Self: Philosophical Questions. In addition to presentations of submitted papers, there will be two keynote speakers:

(Saturday, May 17, 11 AM)
Richard Wollheim, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
University of California at Berkeley

(Sunday, May 18, 11 AM)
John Livesley, M.D.
Professor of Psychiatry
University of British Columbia
Editor, Journal of Personality Disorders

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more are being planned (see below.) The prestigious journal *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* has been flourishing since 1994, and an international book series by Oxford University Press has at least seven books lined up.

The stated aims of the INPP are:

- to support educational, research, policy and service initiatives in mental health that are based on valuing individual and cultural differences and respecting diversity;
- to contribute to such initiatives through rigorous philosophical and cross-disciplinary work on the concepts guiding mental health practice;
- to facilitate collaborative learning through exchange of ideas, experience, knowledge and skills; and
- to work with national, local, and subject-based organizations with appropriate aims, in developing and strengthening their unique identities.

Research initiatives will support international collaborations. Membership can be gained through a national group or individually. Communication will be facilitated primarily though list-serves and the web; a draft of the website has already been created.

The ceremonial launch was deeply moving due to the politicized locale of the conference. Psychiatrist and neurologist, and longtime anti-apartheid activist, Frances Ames, was honored in an impassioned speech, after which the President of SOSAP spoke about the role of psychiatry in South Africa at this time. Because it was Heritage Day in South Africa, we heard from a museum curator who addressed conceptual and political problems in defining art as "ethnic" and how such distinctions distort a people's narrative history. We were also treated to a lively and engaging theater performance that was collaboratively created by young people from the townships. Embedding the ceremonial launch of INPP in the political and historical context of South Africa was very effective in highlighting the centrality of culture and tradition to intellectual understanding across borders and boundaries.

This organization has been in planning stages for the past two years and its Executive Officers, Fulford, Stanghellini, and John Sadler, have worked hard to prepare the legal documents necessary for the creation of this organization. We greatly appreciate the time and effort they devoted to this project.

The **VIth International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology** will be held in Brasília, Brazil on 2-5 July 2003. The theme is "Ethics, Language, and Suffering." The Call for Abstracts is now being circulated; for more information, visit their website at www.ppp2003.hpg.com.br. Future international conferences are scheduled as follows:

2004: Heidelberg, Germany
2005: Yale University, USA
2006: Utrecht, Holland
2007: South Africa

Nancy Potter, Ph.D.
University of Louisville

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Essay/Review

The Social Construction of What?, Ian Hacking, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses, Ian Hacking, Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1998.

Reality, truth and knowledge are three rather grand ideas, and getting a firm grasp on any of them has always proven to be more than just a little difficult. Tackling all three, simultaneously, and doing it well is an even greater challenge. But it is just this challenge that Ian Hacking meets in each of these books. The trick, it would seem, is to approach these subjects from a novel perspective—a perspective that provides fertile case studies that not only help to crystallize new ways of approaching old topics but also help to challenge recalcitrant ones. Each of these books does just that while at the same time presenting us with case studies—mental disorders figuring prominently in *The Social Construction of What?* and centrally in *Mad Travelers*—that themselves warrant our attention.

The Social Construction of What? is an in-depth exploration of the meaning and significance of social construction, an idea that has fueled bitter and often ugly debates, dividing those who view themselves as humanists from those who call themselves scientists. The idea has even produced schisms within sub-disciplines such as philosophy of science—Hacking's own area of expertise and the perspective from which he writes. And while the breadth of knowledge he weaves through his analysis is, as is typical of Hacking's work, truly astounding, much of the book is dedicated to the examination of particular scientific examples, including schizophrenia, child abuse, and autism as well as dolomite, lasers and Captain Cook (the last being a contentious figure in anthropology). Hacking claims that his observations on the issue may be interpreted as much like a United Nations resolution, ultimately having little effect on the troubles at hand. However, much like the deliberations leading up to the resolution, the detailed analysis of the problem that he produces allows us to see where mistakes have been made, what is of value in the idea of social construction, and even that the idea of construction, itself, is not such a new and radical idea but, in fact, in some incarnation traces its roots back to Plato.

Most individuals react in one of two ways when confronted with the idea that things such as emotions, facts, illness, knowledge or quarks (just to choose a few from Hacking's alphabetical selection of construction titles) do not have meanings that are fixed and inevitable but rather meanings that are formed by social force. Either they find the claim obvious or they find it ridiculous. But why is it obvious? Why ridiculous? Perhaps the reason for these diverse responses lies in how each side interprets the claim: X is socially constructed. Hacking begins (Chapter One—'Why Ask What?') by looking at the question of what is meant by saying that something is socially constructed? *What* is socially constructed?

Hacking uses claims that he, himself, has previously made to demonstrate just how confusing social construction claims can be when it comes to identifying X. In *Rewriting the Soul* (Hacking 1995), he examined the issue of child abuse. There, in order to avoid having to address the question of whether child abuse is real or socially constructed, he wrote "it *is* a real evil, and it was so before the concept was constructed. It was nevertheless constructed. Neither reality nor construction should be in question" (Hacking 1995, 67f as quoted by Hacking 1999, p. 29). Of these past claims, Hacking says, "What a terrible equivocation! What 'it' is a real evil? The object, namely the behavior or practice of child abuse. What 'it' is said to be socially constructed? The concept" (p. 29). Two fundamentally different categories have been conflated.

According to Hacking, such equivocations abound. Thus, in Chapter One we are presented with three distinct types of things that are said to be socially constructed. Hacking labels them objects

(things "in the world"), ideas (included here are concepts, beliefs, and theories) and elevator words (facts, truth, reality and knowledge, named *elevator words* because of the effect they have of raising the level of discourse). The first task, then, in understanding social construction and disagreements between those who think the idea obvious and those who think it ridiculous, lies in identifying which of these types of things is under consideration. When one says that quarks are socially constructed, as Andrew Pickering does in *Constructing Quarks* (1986), does one, Hacking asks, mean the idea of quarks or the quarks (objects) themselves? If we claim that anorexia is socially constructed, are we claiming that the *idea* of anorexia (the theories we have and claims we make about anorexia) is a product of socially contingent forces? Or, is anorexia as a property of people (and, thus, as a feature of the world) so constructed?

Grasping the claim that an *idea* may be socially constructed (since ideas are products of humans mired in social settings – matrices, as Hacking calls them) is, perhaps, somewhat easier than grasping the claim that an *object* is socially constructed. Hacking's abstract characterization of social construction helps in this regard. He writes:

> Social constructionists about X tend to hold that:
>
> > (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things: it is not inevitable (p. 6).

Anyone who has thought at all about the nature/nurture dichotomy and the role of the environment in forming the products of organic development can perhaps begin to understand the notion that an object need not be as it is. Environments can significantly alter the course of development. If, by analogy, we think of nurture in terms contingent social and historical forces, we may be able to begin to grasp how an object may be said to be socially constructed. The social and historical forces that exist may have been different enough such that the nature of the object in question could have been significantly different. The object need not be at all as it is. However, the gap in Hacking's characterization between 'X need not have existed' and 'X need not be at all as it is' is quite a large one. Maintaining that social forces are responsible for the existence of an object is quite different from maintaining that social forces are responsible for the properties of an object. And while lawyers, guns and money may fall under the first of Hacking's disjuncts, trouble begins when we try to think about schizophrenia, child abuse, and autism in this way.

One other idea from Chapter One that weaves its way through the rest of the book is the notion that objects and ideas interact. Hacking has written more extensively about this interaction before (see, for example, Hacking, 1994). It involves particular kinds of objects and ideas: specifically, classifications of human being (the ideas) and the human beings so classified (the objects). Hacking maintains that these classifications -- classifications of the social sciences -- are interactive and, thus, importantly different from those of the natural sciences. Quarks, for example, "are not aware that they are quarks and are not altered simply by being classified as quarks." (p. 32) But humans are aware of the labels that are placed upon them. Because of this awareness, people modify their behavior in response to these labels and, in turn, change. Thus, the object is changed by the idea. However, in response, the idea (the label), itself—or more specifically, the meaning of the label—must change, for the object is no longer as it was when it was originally labeled. Hence we have a sort of feedback between classification and object classified—what Hacking calls the looping effect of human kinds.

In Chapter Two—"Too Many Metaphors"—Hacking considers the 'construction' metaphor and the many ways in which it is used. Construction can be understood as building, or assembling from parts. This building metaphor entails stages of building, where an object or idea is seen as being put together, bit by bit. The final product has a history and, as with all construction, is more than the sum of its parts. The metaphor of construction also has a sense of unmasking. Social construction studies done in this light aim to uncover or identify hidden pre-suppositions or ideologies that lie at the heart of certain ideas. By showing what purposes are served, for example, by the construction of gender, the presuppositions or ideologies can be challenged.

Most interesting in this chapter is the way in which Hacking puts construction within the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. Citing Kant as "the great pioneer of construction" (p. 41), we are then shown how Kant's insights influence many thinkers. From Bertrand Russell's logical constructions, Rudolf Carnap's logical construction of the world, and Nelson Goodman's world-making to constructivism in mathematics, all explore the critical idea of the role of the knower in knowledge. If we are to include in this Kant's influence on moral theory and the insistence that "the demands of morality are constructed by ourselves, as moral agents, and that only those we construct are consistent with the freedom that we require as moral agents" (p. 47), we expand Kant's range of influence, and the influence of construction, considerably.

As for the natural sciences, talk about social construction in this context fuels what have come to be known as "the science wars"—disagreement over whether the results of science, including physics, chemistry and microbiology, are social constructs or whether they hold independently of society. To get to the bottom of this issue, Hacking proposes in Chapter Three—"What about the Natural Sciences?"—that several sticking points, points that separate the two sides, be more closely examined. These sticking points are basic philosophical issues that "are contemporary versions of problems that have vexed Western thinkers for millennnia" (p. 63).

Sticking point #1 is Contingency, #2 is nominalism, and #3 concerns the External Explanatiion of Stability. Hacking explains each in detail and asks his readers to score themselves, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is a strong vote for social con-

VIth International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology

Ethics, Language, and Suffering

July 2-5, 2003
Brasília, Brazil

The VIth International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology will be held on July 2-5, 2003 in Brasília, Brazil. This is the first of the international conference series to be held in South America. The theme of the conference is "Ethics, Language, and Suffering." Details about the conference can be found at the conference website: www.ppp2003.hpg.com.br. The email address of the Organizational Committee is ppp03@unb.br.

struction. As I briefly explain them here, perhaps you can get a sense of your own leanings.

Contingency is the idea that a science could have developed in a way different from the way that it has and, nevertheless, be as successful as the actual version is. For example, psychiatry could have developed in a way such that there is no depression or anxiety. If one believes such a thing (perhaps not about anxiety and depression, but other details of psychiatry) one rates high on contingency. Alternatively, if the appearance of certain kinds of things within the science, or perhaps all things, are taken to be inevitable, the contingency rating is low.

Sticking point #2 is a quite familiar—nominalism. Quite simply, if one is a nominalist, one believes (as, for example, Lilienfeld and Marino do about 'disorder' (Lilienfeld and Marino, 1999)), that our names do not identify any unique feature of the world but are rather useful for structuring our experiences. The opposite of nominalism (Hacking has some worry with calling this by its traditional name —realism—and thus suggests inherent-structurism) is a conviction that it is at least possible for the world to be structured as we describe it.

Finally, sticking point #3 – how to explain the apparent stability of science. Large parts of science are thought to be here to stay. For example, significant portions of physics, mathematics, chemistry and biology have been around, with only minor alterations, for decades. The reason for this is often said to be the fact that these portions of the sciences in question—the theories and claims that are made—correspond to something real. Science has an objective nature. However, constructionists challenge this claim and offer an alternative interpretation. The apparent stability of these portions of the natural science—the persistence of bodies of beliefs—is due to social or psychological factors. Such explanations, Hacking claims, are external explanations of the stability. Importantly, this is not to deny reality, facts or laws of nature, but only to say that the reasons for a science's stability lies outside the professed content of that science. Where do you stand on social construction? If you are not yet sure, one of the last five chapters may help to work this out. Each chapter examines a particular case in light of what has been said thus far concerning the ideas and conflicts surrounding social construction. Chapters Four and Five—"Madness: Biological or Constructed," and "Kind-Making: The Case of Child Abuse," respectively—may be of particular interest to readers of this review. Chapter Four begins with a look at why the claim that something is socially constructed is not at odds with the claim that it is real. Hacking examines how it is possible for there to be a definite neuropathology for childhood autism, which "is the cause of prototypical and most other examples of what we now call childhood autism" and yet maintain that the "idea of childhood autism is a social construct..." (p. 121). The answer to this depends, once again, on thinking about kinds—and in particular, interactive kinds as opposed to indifferent kinds. Indifferent kinds—formerly called *natural kinds*—do not respond to the labels that are given them. The neuropathology in this case is what Hacking calls an indifferent kind. However, at the same time, childhood autism is an interactive kind that involves the children so labeled, their parents, teachers and therapists, just to name a few of the social factors involved. How can we have it both ways? Hacking explains:

> Terms for interactive kinds apply to human beings and their behavior. They interact with the people classified by them. They are kind-terms that exhibit a looping effect, that is, that have to be revised because the people classified in a certain way change in response to being classified. On the other hand, some of these interactive kinds may pick out genuine causal properties, biological kinds, which, like all indifferent kinds, are unaffected, as kinds, by what we know about them. (p. 123)

It is the dynamic relationship of interaction that concerns the constructionist. And the relationship lives alongside the semantic one—the one that asks: To what, in the world, do we refer when we utter the term 'autism'?

But if correspondence to the world is the criterion one uses to assess the objectivity of natural or indifferent kinds, what criterion is used to assess interactive kinds? Chapter five examines child abuse. Hacking takes this as an example of the creation of an interactive kind and uses it to examine why interactive kinds qua socially-constructed kinds are relevant to the doing of science rather than randomly selected, morally motivated, or otherwise non-scientific. How is it that we can both "select and organize new kinds" (p. 130) and yet have those kinds be scientific? To answer these questions Hacking turns, once again, to Nelson Goodman and his constructionalist (Goodman's word) ideas, presented in *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978). "Goodman writes of a "fit with practice" that is "effected by evolving traditions" (p. 129). But this is just the framework of an answer according to Hacking, and he proceeds, in Chapter Five to fill in that framework. Doing this involves looking at the historical development of the kind in order to see both how it is formed and molded as well as how and why it has become relevant to the doing of science. And while there is no one formula that explains this for all socially constructed, interactive kinds, such an account will nevertheless involve the effect that the constructed kind has on the objects labeled by that term and the effects made on the world by those so labeled.

Chapters Six, "Weapons Research," Seven, "Rocks," and Eight, "The End of Captain Cook," pursue further the ideas of contingency, nominalism and stability. In Six, Hacking argues convincingly that it is not so much the answers that we get in science that are contingent, but rather the questions that we ask. Given the particular questions, the answers are determinate. However, getting to the point where we ask a particular question—where a particular question is legitimate and intelligible—depends upon highly specific contexts that arise under highly contingent conditions.

In Chapter Six, Hacking also discusses an idea, picked up in more detail in Chapter Seven, that traditional philosophy (and in particular, philosophy of science) continues to have something significant to contribute to understanding science in addition to the contribution made by a social constructivist approach to science. Hacking shows us that the two approaches are not inconsistent. They can, in fact, co-exist and simultaneously provide important insights.

The final chapter contains a wonderfully insightful and entertaining look into the polemics of social construction. A contemporary disagreement in anthropology over the interpretation of records concerning Captain Cook's third and final Pacific voyage provides the data. The disagreement is over the claim, inferred from what amounts to flimsy data at best, that Cook was thought to be a god by the Hawaiians upon whose shore he landed during this trip. Alternatively, this interpretation is claimed to be a European myth foisted upon Hawaiians by European and other "white men." The story that Hacking presents is captivating. It allows us to see the role and force of interpretation (in this case of the exact same data) on the final theory proposed.

After having read *The Social Construction of What?*, one may still have an uneasy feeling that something important has been overlooked. In particular, the question of reality still looms large. If

kinds are socially constructed, what does this mean for their reality? Hacking has argued that we must look at the historical role that a kind has played in the science—how it fits with the practice of science—in order to address the question of their reality. However, once the question of reality passes from its previous realm of ontology to the realm of sociology, as Hacking is suggesting, questions concerning illegitimate social and political pressures arise. Why is it not the case, for example, that some kinds are artifacts of a science increasingly under pressure to save itself from financial cutbacks or political scrutiny?

Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses takes on these concerns. It tells the story of fugue, a disorder that first appeared as a specific diagnosable type of insanity in 1887, and had all but disappeared by the first decade of the 20th century. Fugue was identified as a strange compulsion to travel, often long distances, without knowing who one is or why one travels. Hacking's reasons for examining fugue and the historical period during which the diagnosis existed, is not merely to provide a case study of a socially constructed kind or a closer examination of the idea that human kinds are interactive rather than indifferent—both of which he does here. But perhaps more importantly, *Mad Travelers* takes on the question, apparently one that Hacking is asked repeatedly, "Yes, but is it real?". Hacking shows us how such a question is the product of the underlying organization of ideas. These ideas—reality, truth, facts—may be central to how we think and thus, impossible for us to give up. Nevertheless, Hacking is prepared to show us how these organizational concepts confuse our understanding of significant scientific ideas.

Why examine such an obscure historical event in the history of psychiatry? It is Hacking's contention that the case sheds direct light on contemporary issues in psychiatry. Thus, while fugue is the focus of *Mad Travelers*, the *transient* in the subtitle refers not to a particular disorder or disorders that compelled late 19th century individuals to wander purposelessly. Rather, *transient* refers to those disorders that occupy discrete time periods and particular places. Disorders that later disappear. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: these are just a few example of those Hacking takes to be contemporary counterparts of fugue: transient mental illnesses. Debates persist over whether such disorders are real or cultural artifacts. And perhaps, given changing social conditions, these disorders, like fugue, will disappear as well.

Hacking begins with a short chronicle of the first recorded fugueur, Albert Dadas, who could not prevent himself from traveling when the need took him. Traveling obsessively from the Bordeaux region of France to places as far away as Moscow, almost always on foot, Albert's voyages would typically end with his arrest. After being returned to his home, Albert would stay put for only short periods of time before the inexplicable obsession overtook him again.

When Albert's condition was finally noticed and reported, a small epidemic of compulsive travelers arose. This epidemic prompted much research and debate about the causes and cures for fugue. But almost as quickly as it became a hot topic of debate, fugue disappeared. What did these people suffer from? Was it a real mental illness? Were doctors of the day warranted in believing it to be a real mental illness? By the time we get to answering these questions in the final chapter of the book, Hacking has made a convincing case for his interpretation. "By 1990's criteria, some suffered from head injuries, some from temporal lobe epilepsy, and some from dissociative fugue" (p. 80). No, it wasn't a real mental illness; however, doctors of the day were warranted in believing it to be real.

Providing answers to these questions is not the purpose of this book. Rather, Hacking's purpose is to look closely at the framework within which the answers are given. For it is only by looking at this framework, he believes, that we can uncover our presuppositions about reality and begin to see how these presuppositions confine our answers to the questions. We learn, in Chapter One, that mass tourism had arisen around the same time as fugue, along with a physical education movement and the invention of the bicycle. All of the world, it must have seemed, was moving about in one way or another, and such movement was, for the most part, viewed as a good thing. The French, however, were also particularly concerned with vagrancy, which they viewed as an intolerable social evil. And this social tension is part of the matrix, or framework, within which fugue appears.

In Chapter Two, we continue developing this framework by looking at more historical details of the outbreak of fugue. Here we learn, among other things, about the specific discipline of psychiatry at the time and the taxonomy in use. In particular, knowledge of hysteria and epilepsy as kinds of disorders was in its infancy and the symptoms of each, including "ambulatory automatism," were hotly debated. Add to this the increasing role of hypnotism as a means of psychiatric treatment, along with the claim that fugue states were hypnotic states, and we begin to see a very rich context in which fugue has found itself.

Chapter Three, building upon this historical framework, introduces the idea of a niche. Working with the biological concept of a niche, Hacking employs this idea metaphorically to develop the concept of an ecological niche in which psychiatric conditions not only survive but thrive. Just as with biological species, a combination of unique circumstances is necessary for this to occur. And as with biological species, Hacking claims that functionally similar conditions will evolve in similar ecological niches. It not only makes sense, then, to ask what circumstances were required in order that fugue become a recognized psychiatric condition, but also whether similar circumstances have existed allowing for the survival of functionally similar disorders.

Hacking goes on, in Chapter Three, to explore these ideas. While carefully avoiding anachronism, Hacking examines the possibility that disorders similar to fugue have existed in different parts of the world at different times in history, all with similar niches. He looks at the ancient Greeks—Odysseus, Oedipus, and the three daughters of King Proetus: Iphinoe, Lysippe, and Iphianassa—and all of their alleged mad roamings. He looks, also, at the women of the Jakun tribe in

AAPP in the APA

(Monday, May 19, 2-5 PM)

Presidential Symposium
"Moral and Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry"

(Deborah Spitz, Chair; Bill Fulford, James Phillips, Jennifer Radden, John Sadler, Kenneth Schaffner)

(Monday, May 19, 9 AM-4 PM)

Course
"The Conceptual Basis of Psychiatry"

(S. Nassir Ghaemi, David H. Brendel)

(Tuesday, May 20, 2-5 PM)

Symposium
"Personal Identity and Bipolar Disorder"

(Deborah Spitz, Chair and Presenter; Bill Fulford, Nancy Potter, Jennifer Radden)

the Malay peninsula, who "were frequently seized by a kind of madness – presumably some form of hysteria ....ran off singing into the jungle, each woman by herself, and stopped there for several days and nights, finally returning almost naked, or with their clothes torn to shreds" (p. 53). While recognizing that each case may be a manifestation of the same underlying biological phenomenon, Hacking, nevertheless, questions why it is that we see the condition arising only in certain places, at certain times, seemingly skipping over whole continents (North American is seemingly spared any cases of mad roaming) and vast periods of time. Understanding the context—the niche—that makes the expression of these disorders possible is the key to answering this question. And with fugue, a culture bent on traveling, yet deeply suspicious of vagrancy, along with a medical taxonomy flexible enough to welcome fugue, were key factors in the niche.

After exploring the historical context in which fugue becomes a viable diagnosis, we turn to five questions: What made fugue possible as a medical diagnosis? (a unique ecological niche), What did those old fuguers suffer from? (a variety of things), Were doctors of the day warranted in holding hysterical fugue to be a real mental illness? (yes), Was hysterical fugue a real mental illness? (no), and Are analogous conclusions to be drawn about transient mental illnesses today? (yes). By drawing upon the details of the historical account that has been presented along with the idea of an ecological niche, Hacking develops the framework necessary for understanding how these answers are possible.

Perhaps the last question is the one of most interest to us. Arriving at Hacking's conclusions about a diagnosis that no longer exists within psychiatry (in its historical form) is one thing. However, drawing analogous conclusions about contemporary conditions—conditions that appear to be the permanent end products of years of research—is troubling, at best. But once one fully understands the importance of an ecological niche, the question of the reality of disorders is given new meaning. And, in fact, the importance of asking about reality is, in the end, quite convincingly diminished. For while all sorts of things are real—from fashion, money, and property to genes, neurons and atoms—not all of these things have a significant role to play in science.

The second half of *Mad Travelers* contains a number of Supplements and Documents. Given that the chapters were originally delivered as the Page-Barbour Lectures at the University of Virginia in 1997, the supplements, of which there are three, provide the sort of detail that would be inappropriate in a public lecture. They include a more detailed look at "What Ailed Albert?", as well as the case of "The Wandering Jew" in Europe and "Wandertrieb in Germany." The six Documents that follow the supplements are all excerpts from the work of Philippe Tissie, the medical student who first described Albert Dadas in his thesis and who worked with Albert and chronicled his case for the next decade.

Taken together, these two books provide a unique approach to understanding not only the subject matter of psychiatry but also many of the conceptual and theoretical puzzles that continue to plague the discipline. Becoming comfortable with the role that environments, societies and history have to play in this understanding while maintaining our much valued scientific standards and remaining open to the signficance of neuromolecular research is no easy task. But Hacking makes it all seem, not only possible, but absolutely necessary.

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Revisiting the Classics:

Remembering Philip Rieff

The tides of intellectual fashion roll in and out with such frequency, and historical memory is so short, that figures such as Philip Rieff, once so prominent, are nearly forgotten. In this brief encomium, we shall pause to remember him and to pay tribute to his ideas, so often recycled by others, wittingly or unwittingly.

One can characterize Rieff in a number of ways. A sociologist by training, he was an analyst of culture, similar in scope to Max Weber, but less systematic. The rhythms and literary resonances of his writings, as well as his playfulness and startling originality, perhaps make Nietzsche a better comparison. As an astute observer and critic of American culture, his perspicacity ranks with that of Tocqueville, Twain, and Mencken. He was also a Freud scholar of the first rank, in an era when that appellation meant something, when Freud's work was authoritative both for the mental health professions and the temporal priests of high culture. Rieff is best known for two books, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* and *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: The Uses of Faith after Freud*. In the paragraphs that follow, we shall summarize a few of his central ideas, but there is no substitute for the nuances of the original work, which are highly recommended.

As were many of the great sociologists, Rieff was preoccupied with the analysis of modernity and the attendant secularization, fragmentation, and rationalization of Western society. In the course of his work, he produced a penetrating critique of the culture of psychotherapy and therapeutic humanism that remains virtually intact and unimproved by four decades of imitation and expropriation. For Rieff, culture was the culture of the West and its vanguard American culture.

Rieff (1966) drew a distinction between pre-Freudian "therapies of commitment" and the historically novel "analytic attitude" that emerges with psychoanalysis. In Rieff's view, all traditional forms of psychological healing prescribe a certain amount of "repression" or self-denial. They do so in exchange for a sense of integrating meaning in life built around the affirmation of ethical or religious values, which only make sense when the self is conceived as part of a meaningful cosmic order with which one tries to get in touch or in harmony. One is compensated for these losses by "pleasures higher and more realizable than instinctual gratifica-

tion" (p. 10). By contrast, Freud's view of healing is based on an "analytic attitude" that explicitly rejects all objective moral laws, perceived cosmic purposes or divine will, or numinous religious experiences, which support such compensation. They are at best illusions, at worst symptoms of illness. Such beliefs or values exact a greater or lesser price of repression in return for no real psychic gain. It is an ironic mark of the moral seriousness of Freud's view that it allows no compromise whatsoever on this point.

In the Freudian scheme, according to Rieff, the ego seeks to "reduce the forces and influences which work in it and upon it to some kind of harmony." Rieff (1959, p. 61) terms this the "formal and integrative task" of managing conflicting forces or claims originating outside the ego in the id, superego, and external reality. The ego is the seat of "reason," but such reason is in no way the source of moral judgment, as in traditional views. Rather, it is a purely pragmatic, controlling reason, for which the slightest consent to the authority of traditional moral beliefs would undermine the ego's ability to gain accurate insight into the true causes of neurotic suffering, and undermine its ability to strike even a tenuous balance among the warring influences in everyday life.

In Rieff's view, Freud's "analytic attitude" not only reflects the now familiar idea that we live in a thoroughly disenchanted cosmos. It represents a rigorous application of that idea to basic problems of human suffering and fulfillment, something that was necessary to do in the wake of the many failures to refurbish or replace traditional moral views. The core of Freud's recommended outlook in a world devoid of larger purposes and traditional consolations is unbending realism about these losses and adoption of a stringent "doctrine of maturity . . . with its acceptance of meaninglessness as the end product of therapeutic wisdom" (1966, p. 43). Rieff makes it clear that in an age of science this stark view implies something quite different from the quasi-religious submission to fate of earlier tragedy. It puts a uniquely modern emphasis on "the control and manipulation of everyday life, the care and development of one's psychological forces" (p. 63). It is as if, for Freud, the negative of meaninglessness is balanced off by the positive of successful instrumental action—perhaps enhanced by what Rieff once termed the "comic solvent" of therapy—that gains what few pleasures are possible for beleaguered individuals in a post-traditional world.

Rieff (1966) suggests that in the world according to psychoanalysis, after one has lowered one's compulsions and increased one's options in living, one still may face the odd dilemma of "being freed to choose and then having no choice worth making" (p. 93). Thus, the Freudian psychoanalytic vision of a relatively sane existence appears to walk a very thin line indeed, likely an unnavigable one, between illusion and despair.

It seems to us that few, if any, therapy theorists since Freud have fully appreciated to the extent that Rieff did either the conundrums of modern culture reflected in Freud's theory or the resulting dilemmas of the modern therapy enterprise. No post-Freudian thinker seems to have found a way to hold on to Freud's relentless realism about the human condition without falling into nihilism. As a result, most subsequent theorists and therapies brighten up the picture with elements of naïve or utopian ideologies of unending control or untrammeled self-realization, thereby perpetuating some of the sources of modern emotional problems in living in the proposed cure for them.

For Rieff the inhabitant of the new therapeutic culture exemplifies the pragmatism and expediency of science, being one who "takes on the attitude of the scientist, with himself alone as the ultimate object of his science" (p. 50). The therapeutic achieves an unprecedented flexibility and plasticity as one for whom "all options ought to be kept alive because, theoretically, all are equally advisable—or inadvisable, in given personal circumstances" (p. 50). No longer bound by absolute moral strictures, the individual is presented with a dazzling array of options.

Although the promise of the new age may be great, there are for Rieff, attendant perils: serpents in the new therapeutic Eden. The rise of therapy is concomitant with the "impoverishment" of Western culture and its institutions. Infinite possibilities can be difficult to bear. The constant self-focus of an anomic life, reduced to one's own individualistic calculus of pleasure and pain, can fragment and destabilize the self, producing lives lived with "no higher purpose than the maintenance of a durable sense of well-being" (p. 13).

Rieff prefigured many influential culture critics. He described the "me generation" before Tom Wolfe and the "culture of narcissism" before Christopher Lasch. He analyzed the particular combination of individualism and materialism that developed in America to show why the U.S. would become the first therapeutic society. Most critiques of psychotherapy are footnotes to Rieff, if not minor variations on themes he enunciated. For those of us who care to consider the foundations of the mental health professions, his work should not be forgotten, but rather required reading.

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Commentary
On Disciplinary Miscegenation

When it comes to interesting and important questions arising at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry, members and sympathizers of AAPP face an embarrassment of riches–questions are numerous and answers have been less than forthcoming. Such questions also cover an immense amount of conceptual territory (e.g., the role of drugs in shaping self-authenticity, the nature of truth and logic in schizophrenic discourse, the ethics of duplicity and borderline personality disorder, the validity of nonhuman animal models of mental illness, whether boredom is rightly conceived of as an illness). Indeed, the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry seems to be a "buzzing, blooming confusion"–to exploit the immortal words of James–but scholars on both sides recently seem to be quite conscious of this embarrassment (e.g., Bracken & Thomas, 2001; Hobson & Leonard, 2002).

The intersection of these two disciplines therefore seems to call for a new, specialized subdiscipline, where this 'confusion' can be transformed into a fecund complex of explanatory theories. Stanghellini (2002, pp. 5–6) articulates an exactly similar claim, writing that, "Psychiatrists not only need the good advice of philosophers, but ... philosophers also need psychiatrists." The spirit of these two claims is also captured

in the president's welcome statement to new members of the AAPP: "Philosophy and psychiatry have never been as relevant to each other as they are today." These claims then justify certain arguments (e.g., practicing psychiatry demands "specific knowledge of ethics," and therefore the *need* for philosophical knowledge). In the excitement and haste of working toward fabricating this new, specialized subdiscipline, however, I think an antecedent battery of questions has been somewhat neglected: what is the *status* of the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry? What *exactly* is this relevance? What justification is there for thinking that a new subdiscipline formed around this intersection is needed? What purpose(s) would the fabrication of such a subdiscipline serve? (After all, psychiatry seems to have its own internally coherent ethical mechanisms, logic, review boards, etc., and the sort of ethical knowledge and problem-solving relevant to psychiatric contexts do not seem distinctly philosophical.) These questions are important, in part, because they show the above claims and their ilk to be nothing more than tacit assumptions about disciplinary integration and unification and the proliferation of subdisciplines. Such assumptions are, perhaps, agreeable to most; but like most assumptions, they have been insufficiently discussed and could stand to be reexamined.

It might be thought that this antecedent battery of questions is rather inane, and accompanied by rather obvious answers to boot. It might be argued, for instance, that problem-solving is enhanced, both in caliber and speed, when the joint efforts of philosophers and psychiatrists are brought to bear on the same problem set. Consilience is a theoretical virtue, and the integration and unification of disciplines is indispensable for increasing explanatory power. To attest to this, one might point to the fact that the fabrication of such subdisciplines is a common occurrence (and to see this, one need only consider some burgeoning academic journals, with names like, *Transcultural Psychiatry*, *Neuropsychopharmacology*, *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, and so forth).

Now, bringing multiple perspectives to bear on questions about some range of phenomena is oft-indispensable, whether it concern something as pedestrian as increasing explanatory power, or something as complicated as preventing stultified disciplines from degenerating further (Wright, 2002). Generally though, the joint efforts of scholars in different domains need not entail substantive integration and unification of their respective disciplines. Nor need they entail the fabrication and proliferation of subdisciplines. Of course, it might be the case that the particular features of the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry constitute an exception; but then, an argument needs to be given for why that is the case.

Here are two reasons that weigh in for why one might initially balk at the call for a new, specialized subdiscipline. First, there will be non-trivial costs to each discipline for off-loading, or taking aboard, the problem set of the other discipline. To wit, it seems as if the current academic scene is smitten by the view that interdisciplinary work is *always* beneficial; it is not. Disciplinary miscegenation, with all of its benefits, can be distracting to the scholars involved, can thin out a given discipline's expertise by overextending it to other disciplines, and further, the increased communication that comes at a disciplinary intersection may come at the cost of decreasing intra-disciplinary communication. The benefits are not always worth the effort; subsequently, psychiatrists might be rightly chary in considering Wittgenstein's warning that philosophers are prone to "kick up a bunch of dust and then complain that they cannot see."

Second, it simply is neither clear whether the scope of psychiatrically-posed questions is inherently philosophical, nor whether philosophically-posed questions about the "human condition" inherently breach the domain of psychiatry or abnormal psychology. Overlapping scopes are too often assumed, overlapping though they may be. Now, either psychiatrically-posed questions are inherently philosophical, or they are not. If they are, the consequence is that psychiatry turns out not to be the pure a posteriori science it is traditionally billed as; rather, its methods and models would not be distinctly scientific, but would include things like thought experiments, formal proof, and a priori conceptual analysis. Also, the traditional aims of psychiatry–that of understanding and treating mental illness–would be grounded in the history and epistemology of mental illness rather than purely in the clinical situation itself (and if philosophically-posed questions are inherently psychiatric, then the abstraction away from the details of any particular clinical situation required by philosophy will be unduly limited). On the other hand, if psychiatrically-posed questions are not inherently philosophical, then philosophy will be, at best, relegated to a consultant-based role, and, at worst, tainted with irrelevance.

Perhaps these reasons aren't very substantive; there are most likely others for initially balking at the call for a new, specialized subdiscipline. Perhaps none of these will be of much consequence either. In any case, what will be important is that the antecedent battery of questions about disciplinary miscegenation alluded to earlier gets sufficiently discussed–and that simply has not been the case thus far.

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(Continued from page 1)

lends itself readily to philosophic discussion.

By some good fortune this commentary has landed in the same issue of the Bulletin as the long review of Ian Hacking's work. Good fortune in the sense that Hacking's work represents a striking response to some of the questions raised in this commentary. As I understand him, Hacking argues strongly, and cogently, that in the case of some psychiatric conditions (e.g. fugue and MPD), we do indeed need to pay attention to "the history and epistemology of mental illness," and that, at least with these conditions, it would be a mistake to insist on an exclusively clinical *or* historical/philosophic analysis.

James Phillips, M.D.

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