

## From the Editor

In this column I would like to supplement Joe Loizzo's superb review of recent Wittgenstein literature with a brief review of still another addition to recent Wittgenstein commentary—Jacques Bouveresse's *Wittgenstein Reads Freud: the Myth of the Unconscious* (trans. Carol Cosman, Princeton, 1995). In this short and very readable text, Bouveresse quotes and comments on virtually everything Wittgenstein wrote and said about Freud and psychoanalysis, organizing the scattered material around such chapter headings as "The Problem of the Unconscious," "Reasons and Causes," "The Mechanics of the Mind," etc. His commentary includes ample discussion of other contemporary discussion of the Freudian and Wittgensteinian themes covered in the text.

The general thrust of the book is better conveyed by the original French title: *Philosophie, mythologie, et pseudoscience: Wittgenstein lecteur de Freud*, for Wittgenstein's critique of Freud is that he was more caught up in some combination of philosophy, mythology, and pseudoscience than in the science he was claiming for psychoanalysis. This is not to say that Wittgenstein did not find Freud interesting or engaging. As Bouveresse writes: "Wittgenstein told Rhees that just when he had become convinced that psychology was simply a 'waste of time,' he read Freud and experienced what he felt was a true revelation. 'And for the rest of his life,' notes Rhees, 'Freud was one of the few authors he thought worth reading. He would eagerly speak of himself—at the period of these discussions—as a 'disciple of Freud,' or as a 'follower of Freud'" (p. 3). Wittgenstein's attitude toward Freud was in fact highly ambivalent; on the one hand he admired him for his imaginative brilliance, and he recognized an analogy between the therapeutic aims of psychoanalysis and the therapeutic aims of his own philosophizing; on the other hand he saw real destructive potential in Freud's persuasive gifts for passing off his mythologizing as real science. In a summarizing remark Wittgenstein said: "Freud has very intelligent reasons for saying what he says, a

## President's Column

A well known bioethicist was asked in an interview to comment on the ethical issues associated with neuroscience research. He responded by criticizing the US health care system for pouring vast resources into research when many people lack basic health care services. Instead, he talked about health care reform efforts. Although he talked at great length on the problem of deciding which services should be included in a basic package of health care benefits available to all, he addressed this issue as a question of justice alone. Perhaps this story only illustrates the folly of reducing bioethics to public policy, which tends to focus on a rather limited range of topical issues. It also indicates one deep problem that affects the perception of work in the field of philosophy and psychiatry, namely, that it seems to lack *relevance*.

We know we are in the "Decade of the Brain," but the hoopla ceased early in the 90s. Even had it persisted, philosophy and psychiatry is not primarily concerned with neuroscience research anyway, so many of AAPP concerns would continue to be peripheral at best. No matter how one puts it, philosophy and psychiatry seems marginal. Perhaps, that is the nature of philosophical topics. After all, I didn't claim that philosophy and psychiatry was marginal only that it appears so. However, I do not recommend that we seek solace in the view that we are engaged in deeply important work that is simply beyond the public's or the media's attention.

Although our work is specialized, it does link with many important topical and, indeed, political concerns. At least *some* philosophical issues in psychiatry bear directly on public debates such as deciding what constitutes a basic minimum of health care. AAPP should be concerned when these topics are not recognized for what they are. For example, psychiatric nosology has tremendous implications for deciding whether abnormal mental states are diseases for which treatment is reimbursed or not, which illnesses are regarded as deserving professional care, and which professionals and what kind of care is legitimate. Although questions of justice are involved and, as such, are relevant topics for bioethics and health policy, the issues involved are much broader including philosophical questions about the interrelationship not only of values and disease language, but the conceptual commitments of preferring certain models of explanation over other competing models. Dealing with justice and allocation or access questions in abstraction from the conceptual commitments embedding in the very terms in which the questions are posed seems rather fruitless. No wonder that health policy in the United States looks more like a quarrel in a dysfunctional family. Too often, conceptual questions are glossed as empirical matters which, it is assumed, Science will resolve. It is left to the philosophy to ask impolitely, "Which *science* might that be?" Regarding an illness as a disease is not a value-free act of Science, but an act that is embedded in a scientific practice to be sure, but a practice that has epistemic, logical, metaphysical, as well as ethical and political components. So, far from being tangential, philosophical interests in psychiatric diagnosis and the associated developments in neuroscience are central concerns.

Writing this in the AAPP Newsletter is like preaching to the choir, but the point needs

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great imagination and colossal prejudice, prejudice which is very likely to mislead people" (quoted on p. 14).

For Wittgenstein science involves the postulation of hypotheses that may be subjected to experimental verification. While Freud claimed to be doing science, he in fact offered instead a new "manner of speaking." This is strikingly the case in Freud's hypothesis of the unconscious. "But it is a way of speaking to say the reason was unconscious...What Freud says about the subconscious sounds like science, but in fact it is just a *means of representation*" (quoted on p. 27). This is to say that, in Wittgenstein's view, Freud takes

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## Letter from Moscow

Our Group on Philosophy and Psychiatry in Moscow was set up in April, 1996. It unites clinicians, researchers, philosophers, psychologists and social workers who share an interest in the interface of philosophy and psychiatry. The group is open to all professionals. It was established both to respond to the needs of the present as well as to continue a tradition of Russian psychiatry that has always tended to reflect on the essential problems of human being. The major Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev said, "The cardinal discoveries of the human nature has have been made by psychopathology."

Today Russian psychiatry is in a time of transition. Some of yesterday's principal ideas have lost their value, but new ideas are far from being formulated. It is all but impossible to comprehend and overcome this situation, to abolish ideas that were claimed earlier more for political than scientific reasons, to change other ideas that are not in keeping with current data, but at the same time to hold on to the core of Russian psychiatry's underlying philosophical background. So the group activity tries to favor such a the development of this background.

The group focuses on the traditional problem of Russian thought—the problem of human being. We concentrate on those facets of this problem that belong to the cross-disciplinary areas of psychiatry and philosophy: religion, correlations and contradictions in the understanding of human being in philosophy and psychiatry, holistic and positivist paradigms in psychopathology, personal identity, mental disorders as a special "virtual" reality, delusion, belief and "magic thought," pathography/creativity and mental disorders, the problem of *grundstimmung* disturbance in schizophrenia, and the description and understanding of linguistic problems of psychopathology.

We hold a monthly session including formal presentation and response, followed by a general discussion. The last session dealt with classification in psychiatry. The problem of taxonomy is crucial for psychiatry. There is no agreement about the best way to classify mental disorders. The technical language of psychiatry is complex and marked by conceptual differences between psychiatric schools of thought. Historically Russian psychiatry stood somewhat apart from Anglo-American psychiatry and closer to German psychiatry. The principal current classifications, the ICD-10 and the DSM-IV, are for the most part both based

on a positivistic foundation and the so-called categorical approach-characteristics of the Anglo-American tradition. In contrast the Russian psychiatric tradition is founded on a phenomenological background but at the same time on an aetiological-nosological orientation.

At this time Russian psychiatry is in the process of officially adopting the ICD-10. To improve their professional development Russian psychiatrists need to understand the DSM-IV, including such of its innovations as a dimensional approach, with attention to the quantification of attributes rather than the assignment to categories. So the shift of diagnostic paradigm is certain to call for revision of key ideas of Russian psychiatry. However, to avoid thoughtless borrowing, the adoption of the ICD-10 must be effected in the context of the Russian tradition. It is important to realize such weak points of the categorical approach as its reductive oversimplification and its neglect of a holistic and anthropological in favor of a biological-behavioral orientation.

The group is also going to carry out educational projects devoted to the humanitarian dimension of psychiatry, its social-cultural and ethical aspects, and the doctor-patient relationship. The younger generation of psychiatrists for the most part have unreflective, materialistic, biomedical backgrounds and are not prepared to realize the spiritual essence of the human being—or even basic psychiatric notions such as delusion and depression. They are more prone to take a biomedical, reductionistic point of view and fail to understand the humanistic approach. They regard the sick person solely as a "sick" entity, with biochemical, physiological and other problems, not as a personality with soul, suffering and in pain. The goal of our project is to discover the correct applications and limitations of such an attitude.

The group aims to encourage and support research in the philosophical aspects of psychiatry. We believe that improving the the academic cross-links between philosophy and psychiatry will widen scholars' outlooks, opening vistas for the eternal problems of the person.

Today the group is not very large and is still in the process of developing itself. For now the group covers only the Moscow region. We have strong intentions of organizing a network of professionals from all regions of Russia. Unfortunately we have no sponsorship and are searching for support and resources.

The group is interested in international cooperation. Our foreign colleagues are welcome to contact us and cooperate

with us.

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### ADVANCE NOTICE CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

### THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PHILOSOPHY AND MENTAL HEALTH

### CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE L'ÉVOLUTION PSYCHIATRIQUE

Palais du Pharo  
Marseilles, France  
June 28-30, 1997

Theme:  
**Vulnerability and Destiny:  
On the Phenomenology of  
Schizophrenia**

(Organized by l'Association pour la Recherche et le Traitement des Schizophrénies, la Société de l'Évolution Psychiatrique, the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry, and the Philosophy Group of the Royal College of Psychiatrists)

The language of the conference will be French or English, with simultaneous translation. Registration fee: 1200 Frs, 800 Frs (EP, RCP, or AAPP members), 400 Frs (Students).

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## Essay Review

### The Latest Word on Wittgenstein's Psychology: Recent Releases by Johnston, Schulte, and Sass

Whatever your interest, familiarity or reading of Wittgenstein, there has never been a better time to study the psychology of our century's pivotal philosopher of mind. Four decades of commentary have clarified the thrust of the one "approved" publication of his later thought, the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). Called everything from behaviorist to phenomenological, the *Investigations* is acknowledged for its critique of the modern dualistic picture of minds as thinking subjects independent of brains and the linguistic conventions of other speakers. *Investigations* Part II, a selection by Wittgenstein's editors of remarks from his voluminous manuscripts on psychology, offers a sketch of his non-dualistic approach to the mind, as dependent on the communicative nature of human "language games," and on the conventional culture of intersubjective agreement in "forms of life." Closer scrutiny of this sketch is possible thanks to the recent release of his last manuscripts and lectures on psychology (Wittgenstein, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1992). Three full commentaries published after most of that material was released offer the curious reader a choice of direct routes to Wittgenstein's psychology, and the specialist an overview of the current state of understanding/applying Wittgenstein's approach to the mind. While the books discussed in this review range widely in format, argument and style, taken together they underscore the importance for psychology of Wittgenstein's critique of the egocentric framework of modern philosophy of mind, as well as the inevitable difficulty of trying to force his positive alternative into the standard dichotomy of behaviorist and phenomenological approaches, a difficulty all three mistake for a failing of Wittgenstein's, following the mainstream of Anglo-American and Continental commentary.

Paul Johnston's *Rethinking the Inner* (London: Routledge, 1990) does for Wittgenstein's psychology what an earlier book of his (1989) does for Wittgenstein's ethics: it offers one of the more accessible and reliable introductions to our subject available. As the title suggests, *Rethinking the Inner* is a thoughtful apology, meant to defend Wittgenstein against any one-sidedly behaviorist reading of the *Investigations'* key critique of incommunica-

ble privacy. In particular, Johnston's book softens the conclusion of Malcolm Budd's (1989) argument that the main thrust of Wittgenstein's psychology is to expose reified constructs of "inner process" as artifacts of introspectionist method. Although Johnston follows Budd's close reading of the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Wittgenstein, 1980), his book goes a long way toward correcting the overly behaviorist slant that comes of Budd's decision to separate the philosophy of psychology from the later philosophy of language, the basis of its methodology. While *Rethinking the Inner* may not part ways with Budd quite enough, Johnston's book does take a kinder, gentler behaviorist line, in which "the Inner" figures as the true focal point of Wittgenstein's psychology, and the critique of privacy serves not to deconstruct its "grammatical fiction" (Wittgenstein, 1953) but rather to clear the lens of grammar through which "the Inner" must be seen.

Striking a reader-friendly balance between philosophical argument and conversational style, Johnston's book has seven chapters that offer a tour, mostly following and complementing Budd's, of the unfinished structure roughly framed in Wittgenstein's manuscripts on psychology. The exception is the first chapter on the critique of private language, which starts the tour on a sounder footing than Budd's by showing how Wittgenstein lays the foundations of his psychology precisely where the *Investigations* "clears the ground of language" on which the inner life of the human mind stands. This sound start lets Johnston derive Wittgenstein's approach to psychology from his language therapeutic method of "describing the actual usage of language," in this case, describing the grammar that tells us what the inner world of the speaking subject is and is not. For Johnston, the strength of this method lies in its modest avoidance of "substantive" issues, the answers to those ultimate questions of life which had been the business of traditional philosophy. Here too, Johnston introduces his soft behaviorist view of "the Inner" as communicable because generically shared by others (pp.26-27), a sort of naturalistic version of Hume's argument from analogy. The second chapter takes the gestalt phenomenon of "seeing-as," treated at length in *Investigations* Part II, as Wittgenstein's paradigm for the "objective" treatment of the "perspective" (p.63) or point-of-view aspect of the grammar of subjectivity. The third presents a naturalistic account, again following Budd, of Wittgenstein's mature view of thought as a special behavior embedded in the ac-

tivity of human "forms of life," rather than some ethereal "inner process" (p.87). Fourth, Johnston turns to prosody, the music of language, which he presents as Wittgenstein's paradigm for the aspect of speech which is "non-descriptive," or as Budd says, "non-representational." Johnston presents the common tongue of instinctive gestures, the "natural" aspect of speech which conventional language neither describes nor regulates but extends, as a culture-medium that enriches our native powers of expression with a specifically human "second nature" (p.113). In his fifth chapter, the author shows how Wittgenstein respects the complexity of "the Inner" by avoiding the temptation to reduce the grammar of human subjectivity to one kind of example. For Johnston, *Rethinking the Inner* entails substituting the objective method of describing our actual use of psychological concepts for the introspectionist method of describing one's supposedly privileged experience of "inner processes and states" (p.157). True to its argument, the book balances its behaviorist critique of introspective appeals to privileged access with a defense of Wittgenstein's account of the "picture" of inner and outer in chapter six. Here Johnston makes his strongest cases in defense of the distinctive grammar of "the Inner," reviewing Wittgenstein's accounts of the grammatical privilege of first over third person subjective reports (p. 177); of the plasticity and unpredictability that characterize our concepts of "the Inner," and of the grammar of expert judgments of "imponderable evidence" (p.181-2) and aesthetics (p.191). He concludes that the picture of outer and inner plays a vital role as "a picture of the human subject in relation to others" (p.199). The book's last chapter on mind, brain, and soul aims to finally clear Wittgenstein of all suspicion of being an extreme behaviorist, citing his critique of any reductive parallelism that conceives mental processes as shadows of brain processes. Johnston correctly locates Wittgenstein centrally, as one whose method avoids the dualistic extremes of both behaviorism and introspectionism (p.236). He closes with his own reading of that method as "non-substantive" (p.234), a modest "technique of unraveling philosophical knots" which leaves us free and responsible for the "substantive" moral decisions of human life: "Having attained clarity about our concepts, we are now confronted with the real problems, the answer to which each must work out for him or herself" (p.239).

The scholarly and stylistic virtues of *Rethinking the Inner* offer a reading of Wittgenstein's psychology that is both con-

sistent and available. These strengths allow Johnston to succeed in his primary aim of defending Wittgenstein from more strictly behaviorist readings (Fodor, 1983; Budd, 1989). The only real weakness I see in his book is perhaps inherent in the genre of apology. In his effort to make Wittgenstein more palatable to mainstream analytic philosophers, Johnston has conceded too much to those who dismiss the decidedly audacious claims of the later philosophy. True, the mature Wittgenstein confines himself to offering "a method," but hardly one he sees as providing no means to solve substantive problems. Wittgenstein's method may "leave everything as it is," but it aims to show us how it is for the first time, providing "a series of examples" that lead to "a changed mode of thought and life." In his reply to Budd, Johnston seems to have been led astray, both by too close a focus on Wittgenstein's manuscripts on psychology, and by too non-psychological a reading of the method of the later philosophy of language. If we remind ourselves that, in his mature work, Wittgenstein saw his ultimate philosophical aim of "complete clarity" as inseparable from his therapeutic aim, the "peace" that stops compulsive egocentrism and doubt, it makes sense that his writings on psychology serve as background studies for the larger non-dualistic method he developed to solve the most intractable problem of the human mind: the reification of egocentric habits of thought and behavior that block our communicative activity.

If Johnston's book shows the promise of Wittgenstein's mature psychology—the promise of a non-dualistic approach to the mind—Joachim Schulte's *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) is an excellent introduction to the philosophical problems that stand in the way of understanding and applying that psychology. While Schulte, like Budd and Johnston, focuses on the recently published materials, he does so highlighting the key role they played in the larger work of the later philosophy, as background studies for the *Investigations*, especially Part II. The result is an illuminating glimpse at the method Wittgenstein followed in his later writings, a complex process of distillation whose understanding does much to explain the condensed simplicity of style and organicity of structure some have found too "elliptical" or "confessional" to read as philosophy. By scrutinizing the writings on psychology under this text-critical lens, Schulte's book avoids several of the problems of interpretation that limit its predecessors, opening a window on the psychological import and method of Wittgen-

stein's language therapy. Also because of its methodology, *Experience and Expression* will be especially helpful to those curious about how Wittgenstein's effort to use everyday language in a way that could "end" the ills of egocentric philosophy led to a style dense enough to support decades of debate and widely divergent readings.

If one counts the invaluable introduction to its methodology, Schulte's book has ten chapters. The second chapter performs the same service as Johnston's first; it links Wittgenstein's psychology to the philosophy of language, only using the concept of the "language game" rather than the "private language argument" to stress the non-dualistic, non-foundational logic on which the later work rests: "The bedrock of psychology is the intersection of acting and speaking in the language game" (p.18). From the "ungrounded" and "unjustifiable" nature of language games Schulte derives Wittgenstein's mature method of examples, meant to "persuade his interlocutors that his point of view is a helpful one" (p.19). Chapter Three, on psychological concepts, examines Wittgenstein's "genealogical tree of psychological concepts," once again focusing on the philosopher's "impressionist" method of studying and portraying the mind by juxtaposing examples of grammar that clarify the language games of subjective experience: "Only what can be checked on intersubjectively is admitted..." (p.35). In Chapter Four, under the concept of expression, Schulte treats the music of language, countering the residual behaviorism of Johnston's appeal to "natural responses" by showing that Wittgenstein saw their "primary" expressive value not as intrinsic but as dependent on mastery of a sociocultural technique, learned and used in the context of a language game (p. 51). Next, the author turns to Wittgenstein's "objectivized" treatment of subjective experience in light of the language game of *seeing as*, a game whose grammar resists the dualistic categories of phenomenology and behaviorism, offering a paradigm case that "cannot easily be divided into separate parts corresponding to either seeing or interpreting, experience or activity" (p.65). The sixth, seventh and eighth chapters, on objects of vision, memory and emotion, respectively, show how Wittgenstein applied this non-dualistic approach to clear away reductionist and introspectionist pictures that come of applying the methods of mechanics and obscure our view of these basic concepts of psychology. These chapters show in lucid detail how Wittgenstein restored such concepts to their "natural habitat"—what Schulte calls the "contexts" of everyday language

games—as a means of exposing the misguided efforts of Moore, Kohler, Russell, James and their heirs, to force the rich and varied grammar of experience into the rigid mold of mechanistic explanation, be it "outer" or "inner." The ninth chapter, on Moore's paradox, "I know it is raining but I don't believe it," uses the complex grammar of knowledge and belief to trace the mechanistic confusions of psychology back to unilinear views of logic and mechanistic models of perception presumed with the foundational epistemologies of modern dualism, contrasting it with Wittgenstein's non-dualistic, non-foundational approach to the human mind in the living context of the language game. This non-foundationalist theme finds its conclusion in the final chapter of *Experience and Expression*, in which Schulte defends Wittgenstein from claims that he accepts either a behaviorist or phenomenological answer to "ultimate questions" of psychology like the mind-body problem, insisting instead that the later philosophy pronounces these questions "unanswerable."

The strengths of Schulte's *Experience and Expression* lie in its painstaking use of text-critical and historical detail to reveal the connections linking Wittgenstein's psychology with his therapeutic philosophy of language and with the confusions of dualistic psychology it was meant to treat. Schulte's focus on the non-dualistic, non-foundational concept of language games helps him highlight the substantive contribution the later philosophy offers psychology, most important of which is a non-egocentric approach to other minds that "does not start from my own case but from another person's experience" (p. 59; Saunders & Henze, 1976). The stress on language games also helps Schulte further balance the behaviorist leaning still present in Johnston. Yet despite its refinement of method and interpretation, his book is not entirely without problems, the most serious being the subtle ones it shares with the "behaviorist holism" of Rorty (1976) and others. In this most pragmatic of behaviorist readings, there remains a dualistic distinction between what is objective and what is valid based on mere intersubjective agreement or convention. Thus, Schulte defines a "primary expression" much as Johnston might a "natural response," i.e., as "an utterance or description of experience which is essentially based on conceptual connections that have not been learnt" (p.37, n.1). While Schulte rightly calls language games the "bedrock of psychology," his definition betrays a slight blurring of Wittgenstein's critical line that the only "bedrock" language has



is learned mastery of a cultural technique or "convention." In effect, Schulte seems to take Wittgenstein's clear claim that language games are ungrounded and unjustifiable for the hazy claim that they are ungrounded and unjustifiable only ultimately; while being pragmatically subject to a kind of "contextual" verification based on "criteria" or "conceptual connections" that "can be checked on intersubjectively," although they "have not been learnt." But if it is to be intersubjective, such checking must be learned and practiced as part of a language game, along with the sense of whatever is checked, as Wittgenstein (1953) says: "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)" This "grammatical reduction" clearly shows the thrust of the later philosophy: that intersubjective agreement based on learned conventions of language must be accepted as the definitive form of objectivity. There is no more objective measure of what human minds and bodies are than what our ordinary and special language games say they are. Whether we call it a philosophy, psychology or therapy, Wittgenstein's later method brooks no half-measures, no holistic indeterminism that would proclaim the "ultimate questions... unanswerable." His answer to questions like the mind-body problem is that the illusion of any question apart from conventions must be "dissolved" so that any real question we have concerning conventions can be methodically solved, either by clarifying existing conventions or inventing new ones, depending on our aims and needs. It is a testament to Schulte's care with method that, despite this subtle behaviorist misreading, *Experience and Expression* is perhaps the most reliable and informative introduction to Wittgenstein's psychology out.

Louis Sass describes his *Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber and the Schizophrenic Mind* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), as a "thought experiment," using the paradigmatic Schreber case to test his hypothesis that Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy offers a more empathic and coherent way to understand the thought disorder in schizophrenia, and, by extension, other forms of mental illness. Although its structure as an "experiment" requires the reader, as much as possible, to enter it without preconceptions, I think it fair to say that its interdisciplinary method and literary style should make our last book of special interest to the historian, critic and philosopher of psychiatry. Answering the challenge posed by Jaspers' claim that the pathology of schizophrenia defies rational or empathic comprehension, Sass takes a phenomenologic-existential approach in

this study that not only frees him to experiment with directly applying Wittgenstein's psychology, but also lets him show the other aspect of Wittgenstein's centrist non-dualism, offering a valuable complement to our first two, more behaviorist books. Like others of existentialist bent, Sass' use of Wittgenstein is double-edged. Critically, he uses Wittgenstein as a sort of neo-Kantian first line defense against the the rationalism of analytic philosophy and psychiatry. Practically, he uses him as a phenomenological explorer of the so-called limits of language and discursive intellect. In using Wittgenstein to deconstruct Freud's classic reading of Schreber's autobiography, *Paradoxes of Delusion* presents the intellectually and clinically compelling argument that paranoid schizophrenia, and, by extension, "madness" in general, may be most humanly understandable as what Sass calls forms of "quasi-solipsism," ways of thought and life that are existential counterparts to philosophical solipsism. In an application inspired by Foucault, Sass turns the Kantian edge of Wittgenstein's critique of objectivism and solipsism against the way biological and psychoanalytic schools of psychiatry objectify mental illness with explanations framed in terms of outer or inner mechanisms. The structure and style of his presentation in the book is anything but mechanical, juxtaposing, in impressionist fashion, excerpts from the whole range of Wittgenstein's writings with lengthy quotes from Schreber's psychic autobiography, marrying in the process a phenomenologist's care for detail with a deconstructionist's freedom of expression.

In three short chapters framed by a concise introduction and conclusion, Sass advances the Foucault-like claim that "Madness is, to be sure, a self-deceiving condition, but one that is generated within rationality itself rather than by the loss of rationality....Madness in this view is the endpoint of the trajectory consciousness follows when it separates from the body and the passions and from the social and practical world, and turns in on itself in what might be called the mind's perverse self-apotheosis" (p.12). Sass' argument and method are clear and elegant. After making his case against the prevalent descriptive and analytic views of schizophrenia and for his own "Wittgensteinian" view, Sass proposes and goes on to show that certain "anomalous features" of schizophrenic phenomenology fit Wittgenstein's picture of solipsism far better than they fit the traditional dualistic formulas of "disordered reality-testing" or "regression to primary process." The three

chapters, "A Mind's Eye View," "Enslaved Sovereign, Observed Spectator" and "A Vast Museum of Strangeness," deal respectively with the phenomenology of delusional perception, the "oscillating" sense of self, and the sense of heightened reality and particularity evident in Schreber's writings. Sass effectively compares these with Wittgenstein's remarks about private objects, the solipsist's sense of self, and the reification and projection of grammar. *Paradoxes of Delusion* closes with the author's claim that his notion of "quasi-solipsism" as a retreat from bodily and social realities into a hyperintellectual realm fits Schreber's self-described pathology better than the readings of Canetti, Niederlander and Schatzman, finally explaining Schreber's fantasies of hermaphroditic self-sufficiency of mind over body and world.

*Paradoxes of Delusion* has many virtues that recommend it to the philosopher of psychiatry. Its ambitious project of applying Wittgenstein's thought directly to understanding psychopathology is balanced by the modest demands its "thought experiment" make on the reader, not to mention the richness of its phenomenological content and literary style. Its argument and method are coherent, and add to the recent literature on the subject an existential vantage on Wittgenstein's psychology that complements the more behaviorist

#### AAPP ANNUAL MEETING

May 17 and 18, 1997

San Diego, California

(in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting)

Theme:

Consciousness & Its Pathologies

Keynote Speakers:

Patricia Churchland, Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy  
U. Cal. San Diego

Gordon Globus, M.D.

Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry  
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readings of analytic philosophers. I leave it to the reader to decide how convincing or conclusive Sass' thought experiment is. For my part, it served to suggest the possibility of a communicative rather than epistemologic approach to psychopathology, treating delusions as egocentric blocks to intersubjective exchange rather than failures of reality testing or signs of regression. It is perhaps this tantalizing promise that made me keenly aware of the book's limitations. There are problems with Sass' use and reading of Wittgenstein. His account of Wittgenstein's psychology, while on track in its stress of the critique of solipsistic privacy, lacks coherence as a result of the book's structure of impressionistic comparison. In fact, Sass' account of Wittgenstein seems to suffer in the comparison, in part because it is tailored to fit Schreber's pathology, and in part because it draws from different strata and textual versions of Wittgenstein's thought, while sticking close to the systematized logic and text of Schreber's autobiography. Moreover, Sass' argument would benefit greatly from relying less on Foucault's neo-Kantianism, which at best only suits the early Wittgenstein, and more on Cavell's "confessional" reading of the later work (which Sass mentions in passing) or the strong phenomenological studies of Gier (1981) and Dwyer (1990). Such limited use of the literature may be to blame for what is perhaps the most serious flaw in Sass' book: its failure to do justice to the novelty and importance of the later philosophy. This would not be so serious a flaw if Sass acknowledged his bias toward the early work. As it stands, however, Sass' view of Wittgenstein as having held his youthful neo-Kantian stance throughout his life negates the revolutionary shift for which the later philosophy is renowned: a shift away from the egocentric paradigm of modern dualism toward a non-dualistic, intersubjective one. Sass' claim that Wittgenstein continued to see a "negative...anti-intellectual" critique of reason as the only way out of our modern captivity to solipsism misses the breakthrough of the later philosophy. In direct contradiction to the premise and conclusion of Sass' thought experiment, the mature Wittgenstein came to see linguistic intelligence as essentially *intersubjective*, and to treat egocentrism as an illness whose cure lies not in some pragmatic return to any and all bodily passions and social realities, but in a non-egocentric language therapy meant to show a philosophical way of thought and life that extends our sympathetic instincts and relations, cultivating the naturally cooperative use of human intellect. For me, the best proof of the success of

Sass' pioneering experiment is that, despite even such serious problems, the virtues his book offers easily outweigh its limits.

Taken together, then, the recent contributions of Johnston, Schulte and Sass do much to advance the current consensus on understanding and applying Wittgenstein's mature psychology. Interestingly, despite their distinct viewpoints and methods, all three agree in countering any one-sided behaviorist reading of Wittgenstein's pivotal critique of privacy. Of the three, Johnston's and Sass' books are more accessible, offering valuable introductions to the holistic-behaviorist and existential-phenomenological readings of Wittgenstein's psychology, respectively. Schulte's, with its stress on the later philosophy's picture of language games and method of examples, offers the most central reading of Wittgenstein's non-dualistic view and stays closest to his language-therapeutic method of treating the human mind. To be still more central and complete, this review would have had to discuss the fourth recent release cited above, Paul Dwyer's *Sense and Subjectivity: A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty* (Leiden: Brill, 1990). Although limited space and a strict focus on Wittgenstein's psychology made it necessary to postpone that review, I refer the reader to Dwyer for a current phenomenological account of the later philosophy as strong as Schulte's behaviorist account, one well able to compensate for the limits of Sass' existentialist reading and pioneering experiment with application. To compensate for the more or less serious problems the three works reviewed here have in linking Wittgenstein's mature psychology to the philosophy of language, I refer the reader to my comparison of the *Investigations'* conventionalist reduction to grammar and intersubjective approach to the mind with Freud's metapsychological reduction and transference approach (Loizzo, 1996). For another, more current experiment with application from the behaviorist-holist perspective, I recommend Hare and Gillett's *The Discursive Mind* (1994).

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#### Toronto Group

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to be made nonetheless. The real mission of AAPP is not to develop another professional organization or even to organize conferences, but rather to promote a field of study that itself links with other fields so central not only to psychiatry, but medicine as a whole. Perhaps the time will come when philosophy and psychiatry will draw media attention... Of course, I still reserve the right to be among the first to rue the day. Happy New Year!

George Agich, Ph.D.

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### Fiery Start to New Group

Greetings once again from the Antipodes! I am pleased to announce the formation of the Binational Special Interest Group in Philosophy of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists. The group was launched during the College Congress in Wellington, New Zealand, in May. Dr. German Berrios, from the U.K., gave the Inaugural Lecture, entitled "What is the Philosophy of Psychiatry?" followed by the first Business Meeting of the new group. Unfortunately, in the middle of question time following the address, the hotel's fire alarm sounded and the hotel was evacuated! When we were allowed to return for the meeting, there was plenty of material for humour, and we thought that at least the launch of the group would be remembered.

We hope to form regional groups across Australia and New Zealand, similar to the one which now exists in Sydney, with a binational committee which will organize a Newsletter, and an annual binational conference. Contributions from members of the AAPP to our Newsletter would be most welcome. The editor's address is:

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(Continued from page 1) *Editor*

puzzling instances of behavior—symptoms, slips, etc.—and shows how we can make them more comprehensible by re-describing them in the language of unconscious processes. For Wittgenstein Freud has not discovered a new region of the mind; rather he has invented a new language or grammar.

This distinction is developed further in Wittgenstein's discussion of reasons and causes. The confusion between *cause* and *reason* left psychoanalysis in an "abominable mess" (quoted on p. 69). The concept of *cause* belongs to the language game of science, with hypotheses, verification, and third person description. The language game of *reason* is completely different. "A reason is characterized by the capacity to be recognized as

such by the person whose reason it is, and not on the basis of an inductive inference" (p. 69). A reason or motive is what makes an action meaningful. It often emerges as an *interpretation* of the action after the fact. Further, as indicated above, a reason or motive must in principle be recognizable by the agent as his or her motive, even if in fact the agent was quite unaware of the motive at the time of the action. Bouveresse points out that Wittgenstein's insistence on the distinction between reason and cause does not necessarily imply that an explanation by reasons and an explanation by causes are incompatible—only that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. Thus, someone's motivational behavior may be so regular that it allows of the kind of predictability we usually associate with science. Even though in this case the predictable motive may act like a cause, the two remain distinct because they belong to two completely different language games. In Bouveresse's words, for Wittgenstein "...discovering a determining cause and agreeing to the existence of a reason or a motive constitute two very different things. And they continue to be different, even when it's allowed that a reason can also be a cause" (p. 82).

If Freud does not offer science, what he does achieve with his new language of reasons, motives, hidden meanings, and interpretations is a great extension of the meaningful understanding of human behavior. In viewing Freud and psychoanalysis in this manner, Wittgenstein proves himself to be a prescient forerunner of those philosophers and psychoanalysts who have come to see psychoanalysis as an interpretive, hermeneutic discipline.

James Phillips, M.D.

### ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHIATRY (AAPP) MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

Membership in AAPP is open to all individuals interested in the subject of philosophy and psychiatry by election through the Membership Committee. The Association welcomes Student Members (enrollees in degree-granting programs in colleges and universities and physicians enrolled in approved psychiatric training programs and post-graduates in post-doctoral programs). In order to join AAPP please detach this form and mail to: Ms. Alta Anthony, Journal Subscriptions/Memberships, The Johns Hopkins University Press, P.O. Box 19966, Baltimore, Maryland 21211.

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