AA P&P Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry

Newsletter

Volume 2, Number 2 **1994**

From the Editor

Following a tradition established at the onset of the organization, an autumn Executive Council Meeting was held this year. On this occasion the meeting was hosted by George Agich in Springfield, IL on Oct. 28-29. Many topics were covered, and I will try to summarize the discussions.

George Agich was installed as the new President of AAPP and chaired the meeting. Michael Schwartz, who has been President of the organization since its inception, will take over as Program Chair of the Annual Meeting and continue his activities as Chair of the Fund-Raising Committee and Liaison to the UK Group, and will have the title of Founding President.

John Sadler gave a Treasurer's Report in which he indicated that there are now (as of Oct. 28) 404 subscribers to PPP, of which 366 are AAPP members (subscribing to PPP by virtue of the bundled subscription/membership package). There are about 80 individuals who were AAPP members but have not paid the new membership dues which include the PPP subscription. In view of the fact that the Hopkins Press looks for a subscription quota of 600, we are well on our way to meeting their goal.

John also indicated that our current balance is $6018, all from dues. This will have to cover the ongoing cost of the Newsletter as well as as the 1995 Annual Meeting.

Affiliated local groups received a lot of attention at the meeting. Jerry Kroll will be taking over as the local group liaison. There are now seven local groups in existence or formation. In addition to New Haven, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. groups, which have been reported on in the Newsletter, groups are forming in Boston, Cleveland, New York, and Rochester, MN. In an effort to support local group activity, it was decided to institute a second annual meeting, to be held on a regional basis and sponsored by a local group. AAPP will offer the respective local group $1000 to assist in funding the meeting. The New Haven group was suggested as a first sponsor because of its longevity, and contacts are being made with that group.

We are making an effort to develop contacts and sponsor sessions at the meetings of other related groups. In this regard George Agich has already made contact with the three divisions of the Americal Philosophical Association, and we have a session scheduled for the meeting of the Central Division in April in Chicago. Melvin Woody was proposed to serve as liaison to philosophy societies, and Jennifer Radden to serve in the same capacity for psychology societies. (Addresses: J. Melvin Woody, Ph.D., Philosophy Dept., Conn. College, New London, CT 06320; Jennifer Radden, D. Phil., Philosophy Dept., U. Mass., Boston, MA 02125.) We are making an effort to make ourselves known to related groups and journals, and members who have contacts with a particular group and can be of assistance in this project are encouraged to contact us.

The 1995 Annual Meeting was discussed. Since the extension of the Annual Meeting

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President's Column

It is a pleasure and honor to assume the Presidency of AAPP at this particular point in the Association's development. Under Michael Schwartz's leadership AAPP has passed through the early, somewhat uncertain, stage of its development into a stage in which the membership is growing significantly and AAPP's significance for the field is being assured through its programs and sponsored publications. The present and future membership of AAPP as well as scholars working in the field of philosophy and psychiatry, whether they know it or not, owe Michael a considerable debt for his vision and commitment to seeing AAPP established on a sound footing. Our journal *PPP* is establishing itself as the journal of choice for publication of work on philosophical aspects of abnormal psychology and psychiatry. In recognition of his unique contribution, the Executive Council has voted to honor Michael with the appellation, Founding President, as acknowledgment of his contribution. Fortunately, Michael is not retiring to greener pastures, but will be directing his efforts on behalf of AAPP in two other important areas: fund raising and chairing the annual meeting program committee. Michael has agreed to spearhead fund raising activities and I hope that each of you will be willing to offer advice or other assistance to augment his efforts. As AAPP broadens its scope of activity, the need for resources beyond that provided by dues grows. Michael will be exploring the ways that AAPP can augment its efforts. I have asked him to report on these ideas in a future issue of the Newsletter. Michael has also assumed the Chair of the Annual Meeting Program Committee. This year's theme is "Recovered Memories of Abuse or False Memory Syndrome: Clinical, Scientific and Philosophical Approaches" which promises to be a very lively topic. The meeting is scheduled for May 20-21, 1995 in Miami, Florida just before the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting. The location will be determined in the not-too-distant future by the APA Program Committee and we will send a notice to all members.

After much discussion over the last few years, the Executive Council has decided to initiate a second annual meeting that we hope will be organized on a rotational basis by Local Groups in conjunction with AAPP. AAPP will extend modest financial support and assist with publicity. Like the decision to add a second day to or annual meeting that we have held in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting, this decision is prompted by the recognition of the growing work in our diverse field. We are striving to provide a diverse range of academic settings in which clinical and scholarly work can be presented. A second regularly scheduled meeting would afford an additional programmatic outlet that is especially important to younger workers in the field. We strongly encourage the membership to support these regional activities by attendance and submission of papers.

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There are other changes in the organization of AAPP activities that I should report. These changes are designed to increase the level of activity in the field of philosophy and psychiatry and to enlarge the circle of participants in AAPP functions. As new Vice-President, Jerry Kroll will assume the function of Local Group Liaison. As AAPP grows we hope that local groups will provide a regional focus of activities that will complement national and international meetings that AAPP will undertake. In addition, I have appointed Melvin Woody to serve as Liaison to Philosophical Societies and Jennifer Radden to serve as Liaison for Psychological Societies. Their charge is to complement local and regional interest in philosophy and psychiatry by developing a regular presence at meetings of the major philosophical and psychological societies. This will afford further opportunity for dissemination of work in this field. Jennifer and Melvin can be contacted with any suggestions for appropriate meetings and topics. I view their functions primarily as liaison, and I am sure that they will welcome your suggestions for session themes and submission of proposals. (Their addresses and phone numbers can be found elsewhere in this issue.)

Linkage with other professional groups is a natural outgrowth of AAPP's efforts to forge collaborative relationships with other organizations, the most notable of which is with the Royal College of Psychiatrists Philosophy Group whose most obvious product is the journal *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology*. This collaboration has also led to plans for the First International Conference on Philosophy and Mental Health to be held in Marbella, Southern Spain, February 28-March 2, 1996. An International Planning and Program Committee is now being constituted to assure that there is a diverse international participation. We are hopeful that AAPP members will be willing and able to participate in significant in the program and look forward to a positive response to the call for papers from our members. Mark your calendars and plan to contribute to this important inaugural effort.

Reporting on these activities provides a clue to the direction that I hope to lead AAPP as president. I want to increase the programmatic activity of AAPP in a wide range of settings. Combining with local groups to sponsor regional conferences, continuing the expanded two-day annual meeting, initiating sessions with coordinate societies, such as the American Philosophical Association, and continuing our participation in international meetings, AAPP should be at the forefront of developments in philosophy and psychiatry.

There has never been a time when the importance of philosophy to psychiatry and the importance of psychiatry's clinical insights for philosophy has been greater than at the present. The philosophical and clinical implications of cognitive science, developments in the neurosciences, and psychopharmacologic research for clinical practice and philosophy are truly awesome. Scientific and technical developments in these fields are accompanied by changes in the structure and delivery of mental health care services both in the United States and abroad as well as by changing social attitudes toward and understandings of psychiatric disorders and the social significance of psychiatric medicine. As president of AAPP, I promise to enthusiastically advocate for attention to the philosophical, e.g., the conceptual, theoretical, and valuational aspects of psychiatry in the widest of contexts. I look forward to your participation in this vital and challenging endeavor.

George Agich, Ph.D.

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Review

Madness and Modernism, by Louis A. Sass. New York: Basic Books, 1992.

Louis Sass's book, *Madness and Modernism*, accomplishes two difficult tasks: it clarifies the enigmas of schizophrenia and modernist high culture, and it represents (by example) the best argument for interdisciplinary scholarship in the psychology and the humanities - it's helpful. *Madness and Modernism* is not an easy book to summarize. On the one hand it is motivated by a simple thesis, and on the other it contains a treasure house of complexities which repay repeated close readings. The thesis that drives the book is that there is a remarkable parallel between the phenomena of schizophrenia and modern art. The treasure house of complexity is the vast literature that Sass weaves together to illustrate and amplify his thesis (the book is nearly four hundred pages long with over one hundred and sixty pages of footnotes).

Madness and Modernism represents a type of phenomenological research. As Sass explains (in a footnote), "I use the term *phenomenology* in the Continental sense, to refer to the study of experience or the lived world: not in the sense of Anglo-American psychiatry, where it refers to the study of observable or readily identifiable signs and symptoms of mental disorders." Rather than ask *why* did it happen, phenomenological research asks *what* was the experience. The researcher does not strive for a causal explanation. Instead, she attempts a detailed description of an aspect of the human mental realm. Phenomenological research has not been popular in English speaking psychology because of the dominating influence of positivism. A core feature of positivism is that only publicly verifiable data may be used. Psychological phenomena are not publicly verifiable because they cannot be seen, heard, or otherwise sensed by anyone except the person involved. With the waning of positivism, phenomenological research is having a resurgence. Modern phenomenological research is appearing with increasing frequency in social science journals under the label of "qualitative research." The new label is borrowed from sociology and education research where the term "qualitative" is used to distinguish it from "quantitative" research.

Typically, phenomenological (or

ADVANCE NOTICE

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PHILOSOPHY AND MENTAL HEALTH

Marbella - Southern Spain
Wednesday, February 28 - Saturday, March 2, 1996

The conference will be jointly organized by The Royal College of Psychiatrists Philosophy Group (UK) and The Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (USA) and will aim to bring together all those international groups and individuals working in philosophy and mental health.

Further details may be obtained from the Conference Office: Mrs. Jean Wales, The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 17 Belgrave Square, London SWIX 8PG, UK. Tel: (0)71 235 2351; Fax: (0)71 245 1231.

qualitative) research attempts to understand a human experience which is not easily accessible. Sample topics have been the experience of dying, the experience of urban poverty, or the experience of severe anxiety. Phenomenological investigation involves thematizing aspects of the experience that are relatively invariant and essential. Most phenomenological researchers are very attentive to method. The investigator gathers data by careful interviews of selected "subjects" who have had the experience while being studied and can articulate what they felt. Next, the investigator analyzes the data for the common elements that make the experience what it is. Finally, she produces a research report that gives an accurate description of the experience such that a reader may come away with a "better understanding" of what it is like to have the experience studied.

Madness and Modernism productively departs from typical phenomenological research in two ways. Instead of studying one human experience, Sass attempts a simultaneous study of two human experiences - schizophrenia and modern art. The products of these two phenomenological studies are then compared. Also, rather than follow a "rigorous" phenomenological research "method," Sass creates a phenomenological picture of schizophrenia and modern art by going to the library, the museum, and his memory of patients he has known. It has never been clear that "method" is the most important feature of phenomenological research. Husserl referred to discovering essential features of human experience as "eidetic seeing" or "direct grasping." To achieve eidetic seeing, the researcher needs a highly developed intuition more than a rigorous method. (This is how psychoanalytic investigators, like Kernberg and Kohut, have been so successful at generating useful descriptions without following a well worked out "qualitative research method.") The test of the qualitative research is the usefulness of the product rather than the method of discovery.

What are the essential experiences of schizophrenia? What is schizophrenia like from the inside? Sass draws on data for his phenomenological study of schizophrenia from descriptions in the psychiatric, psychoanalytic, and antipsychiatry literature. He also draws extensively from patients who have written about their illness and from patients he has known. He describes several "domains of schizophrenic symptomatology" and organizes the chapters of the book around these domains: the truth-taking stare (early symptoms of unreality, mere Being, fragmentation, heightened sense of the significance of minutia), cognitive slippage, disturbance of distance, languages of inwardness, loss of the self (Schneiderian First Rank Symptoms), the delusional cosmos, and distortions in the experience of the world (poor reality testing, loss of ego boundaries, a sense of world catastrophe).

On the modernist side of the comparison, Sass extracts several themes of modernism: avant-guardism (the adversarial stance), perspectifism and relativism, dehumanization (the disappearance of the active self), derealization, spatial form, aesthetic self-referentiality, and irony and detachment. The modernist artist achieves these bizarre fragmented images and thoughts through a process of hyperreflexivity and hyperconsciousness. Hyperreflexivity breaks down reality as we know it and results in a dizzying relativism. Human integration, organization, and rationality are fragile constructions. If stared at too closely they fragment and disappear. Without the usual anchors of experience, people drift into the cognitive chaos that characterizes modernist art and schizophrenia. Thus, Sass concludes, both modernist thought and schizophrenia can be understood as an overfocus on the details of life, resulting in a fragmentation of the organizational structure that the human mind imposes on the world.

Sass's conclusion changes our understanding of schizophrenia. Traditional psychiatric, psychoanalytic, and antipsychiatry models of schizophrenia involve a notion of loss or deficit on the one hand (the broken brain theory in psychiatry and the regression to infantile cognition in psychoanalysis) or the notion of emotional plenitude on the other hand (the wildman or hero of desire theory of antipsychiatry). "At the deepest level, then, all three of these models...share the assumption that schizophrenic pathology must involve a loss of what, in the West, has long been assumed to be the most essential characteristics of mind or subjectivity: the capacities for logic and abstract thinking, for self-reflection, and for the exercise of free will." Through his comparison of the features of schizophrenia with modern art and thought, Sass comes up with a very different interpretation. Rather than a loss of mind and subjectivity, Sass suggests that schizophrenia may be better understood as a "hyperabundance of cognitive functioning."

Stephen Weiner, a member of the growing consumer movement in mental health, has said, "We make a radical demand, one of the most difficult to fulfill: we insist that people get inside our heads and skins and try to empathize. This is something that all outsider groups have demanded, yet the experience of psychosis may be the most foreboding of all. Our plea cannot be "we're just like you" because that isn't true. On the other hand it's not completely untrue." By taking a phenomenological look at schizophrenia and modern art, Sass takes us one step closer toward that demand. We need more work of this kind.

Bradley Lewis, M.D.
Washington, D.C.

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Beyond Neuropsychiatry

The following commentary by Donald Mender, M.D., based on his recently published book, The Myth of Neuropsychiatry *(New York: Plenum, 1994), continues a discussion initiated by Manfred Spitzer in our previous issue on the status of neuropsychiatry in the philosophic discussion of psychiatry and psychopathology.*
Editor

In recent years an avalanche of neuroscientific data, comprising more than 95 per cent of all the brain findings ever linked to behavior, has inundated psychiatry. Computerized scanning machines along with chemical assays and other technological tools have provided the engine for this avalanche.

Neuroscience has also come up with powerful new drugs to limit or reduce many psychiatric symptoms. The efficiency of these drugs appeals to popular demands for cost-consciousness in health care.

As a result of such developments, proponents of biological psychiatry now

AAPP ANNUAL MEETING

May 20 and 21, 1995
Miami, Florida
(in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting)

Theme:
Recovered Memories of Abuse or False Memory Syndrome: Clinical, Scientific and Philosophical Approaches

enjoy new avenues of influence. The United States Congress has dubbed the 1990's "the Decade of the Brain." Scholarly neuropsychiatric societies and publications have proliferated over recent years, and academic neuropsychiatrists exert increasing influence over the career paths of psychiatric residents.

However, there is a price to pay for this trend. Modern cognitive neuroscience has led to a "functionalist" view of the mind. This perspective likens the mental processes of living, sentient organisms to the workings of a computer. Psychiatrists today are therefore beginning to think of human beings as mere biological machines.

Though functionalists see the brain as only one of many possible computer hardwares that might subserve mental processes, they look to brain architecture as the actual computer-like embodiment of our own human minds in nature. The billions of working cells located in the brain are deemed to behave as if they are discrete and countable micro-units. Functionalists have therefore felt justified in assigning to brains a "digital" design, whose ability to calculate relies on discrete components that can be added, subtracted, multiplied and divided.

Almost all contemporary theories about the causes of mental illness can be translated into a species of analogy to bad neural wiring. To the extent that researchers view nerve fibers as cable-like structures and their transmitter substances as switching mechanisms, many neuroscientific ideas about psychiatric disease have thus come to bear a strong kinship to the notion of a damaged logic board or chip.

In order to tackle inconvenient empirical discrepancies that have arisen between traditional "top-down," control-oriented computers and the human brain, a novel computing analogy has become popular among cognitive neuroscientists in recent years. This new "bottom-up" approach diffuses central control into a probabilistic entity, trading the traditional notion of a master module for a more flexible kind of brain organization. As a result, cognitive neuroscience today sees brain architectures as "networks" with parallel tiers of input-output devices that only at the end of the line reassemble data fragments into an interpreted reconstruction of the world.

Unlike top-down models, bottom-up approaches seem to accommodate the diffuse actions of chemical neuromodulators, like acetylcholine, serotonin, norepinephrine and dopamine, in the brain. For this reason, the hypothesis that defective modulators cause mental abnormalities has gained ground in psychiatry. Concepts of modulatory failure in depression, mania, anxiety disorders, attention deficit syndromes, and schizophrenia have circulated widely.

Such ideas are indeed seductive. However, empirical support for many of them is flawed. Abnormal findings in the brains of psychiatric patients cannot suffice to show that underlying "glitches" create mental disorders. Investigators must also consider the matter in reverse—the possibility that mental illnesses like schizophrenia, perhaps through poor nutritional habits and hygiene, themselves may produce brain abnormalities. Nevertheless, the neuropsychiatric juggernaut rolls on. Many psychiatrists no longer even stop to ask themselves whether the assumptions behind cognitive neuroscience make sense.

Those assumptions do not make sense. It is of limited value to search for the number and type of neural subunits, circuits, and cross-connections in the brain needed to support a healthy mind. It is not even possible to measure how complicated computing machines need to be in order to attain "consciousness." Such questions are quantitative, and, because computer operations themselves can be encoded in numerical terms, the pertinent quantities are self-referent. Self-reference of any sort, including numerical or computational self-reference, generates paradoxes.

The mathematician Kurt Godel approached the problem of self-reference, numbers, and paradoxes by constructing formal statements about arithmetical computation. These statements themselves employed an arithmetically coded and therefore self-referent language. Godel used the self-referently numbered encodement of his propositions to prove that arithmetic as a whole, in its axiomatic form, contains insoluble quandaries. Alan Turing then applied Godel's ideas to numerically self-referent coding by computers to show that a computing machine cannot transcend its own self-referent paradoxes.

Psychiatry, unlike computer science, must effectively deal with the problem of self-reference. The content of thought must subsume its own development. The challenge cannot be met mechanically, since active choices by the psychological investigator must themselves constantly be checked. The student of the mind must direct his or her scrutiny not only at experimental data but also at the personal wellsprings of his or her own hypotheses. Psychiatrists hence must engage in "thinking about thinking," which requires an interplay of factors that is beyond the rigid paradigms of technical, applied, quantitative science.

It is for this reason that no cognitive science based solely on numbers can adequately handle the problems that psychiatrists face every day. We need instead to construct a "larger" psychology that is competent to handle qualitative imprecision without sacrificing numericai precision as a limiting case.

The mathematical giant John Von Neumann agreed that we will require means beyond mathematics as we now know it in order to understand the mind. The discipline of metamathematics may provide a way of achieving such a goal. Metamathematics, as the mode of inquiry responsible for bringing arithmetical paradoxes to light, fully encompasses mathematics proper, but speaks beyond it in more general terms. Metamathematical ideas have the potential to produce a mode of inquiry which incorporates numbers and yet also deals effectively with self-reference and paradox. The proper metamathematical leap for psychology, transcending mere arithmetic but not rejecting it out of hand, might show how supra-arithmetical aspects of the psyche are both unquantifiable and yet also real.

Two newer branches of mathematics honed from matamathematical ideas have attributes that can guide us in looking for a better scientific approach to the mind. These are Abraham Robinson's "nonstandard" analysis, which has simplified Newton's approach to the calculus, and Paul Cohen's "non-Cantorian" set theory, which has freed infinite numbers from old, intuitively bound biases. Both systems of thought extend the horizons of mathematics beyond the standard purview of more traditional approaches. Both deal with issues that transcend formal arithmetical systems. Both retain the concepts of more orthodox theories as valid though restricted cases within their own larger frameworks. These are all properties that psychiatry might bear in mind during its search far a metamathematical foundation.

Psychiatry more than any other field of study needs interdisciplinary dialogue with other fields like metamathematics. The next step on our road to self-knowledge must marshal tools at the cutting edge of today's intellectual frontiers in order to transcend comfortable old ideas. Psychiatry might then bloom into a truly coherent art with a coordinated understanding of its own overall structure

and therapeutic possibilities.

Donald Mender, M.D.
New York

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Situating Ellenberger

A review of *Beyond the Unconscious: Essays of Henri F. Ellenberger in the History of Psychiatry,* Introduced and edited by Mark S. Micale, Translations from the French by Francoise Dubor and Mark S. Micale, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1993).

"Our relations with ideas are inevitably, and with good reason, relations with people." (Merleau-Ponty).

Ellenberger's masterpiece *The Discovery of the Unconscious: the History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (1970) is a seminal text whose importance in the history of psychiatry can hardly be exaggerated. It was Ellenberger who radically revised the institutional fallacies surrounding the origins of psychoanalysis. Without depreciating Freud, as is the vogue with much recent criticism, Ellenberger simply positioned him within the socio-historical context of European psychiatry. *The Discovery* illuminates the cultural nexus which propelled Freud's work. By its account, psychoanalysis is revealed as a complex cultural construction, that is, a convergence of forces and not, as in the Jones fiction, a virgin birth from the head of the prophet, in the same manner that metaphysical dualism was not merely the product of Rene Descartes but a historical concatenation of ideas of which Descartes became something of a symbol. It is important to note that Ellenberger's work is not centered on Freud alone, but provides an entire intellectual history of 'dynamic psychiatry', of which Freudian psychoanalysis is properly situated as playing only a part. He was, for example, the first to draw attention to Pierre Janet as the equal to Freud in scientific importance, thereby inaugurating the present revival of Janet studies. The list of treasures excavated from the unknown history of psychiatry by Ellenberger is a dazzling testimony to a great scholar, in whose work the distinction between writing about history and making history is dissolved.

Those familiar with *The Discovery* will not fail to understand the relevance to it of this new collection of essays. In this respect, Micale's choice of the term 'beyond' in his title might at first appear questionable. *The Discovery* looms large in the background of this collection, none of whose essays can be said to surpass it in scope of scholarship. Nor is the collection as a whole temporally 'beyond' the *magnum opus*, as most of the essay selections were written in the years preceding the publication of *The Discovery* . Many of the entries are actually monographs that show the development of Ellenberger's researches before being synthesized into *The Discovery*. So what new material does this publication provide? The answer is: plenty.

The collection includes much of Ellenberger's research that did not find its way into the *magnum opus*, or that was published posthumously. To pick an instance, his first historical essay "The Life and Work of Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922)", is an outstanding example of his talent for bringing to light the unsung figures who shaped the course of psychiatry. While the name Rorschach is almost a part of household parlance, few people connect the name with the contributions of a historical individual. Ellenberger provides an intimate portrait of the personality and culture behind the inkblots with which we are familiar. Nicknamed *Klex* (inkblot) by his fraternity brothers, Rorschach later experienced a "destiny dream" following a brain autopsy in medical school. Ellenberger cites the passage in Rorschach's medical thesis where he describes his dream of feeling his own brain cut into slices. There is a clear link between this dream and the concept of kinesthetic projection underlying the *Erlebnistypus* equation of the test that now bears his name, an instance of the romantic integration of artistic creativity and scientific rigor that Ellenberger shows us to be the case with all the great figures of dynamic psychology and psychiatry. Exactly such an integration characterizes Rorschach's work *Psychodiagnostics* (1921) which, apart from inaugurating a whole new approach to psychopathology, is less known as the foundation to a unfinished theory of personality yet to be recovered and brought to fruition. From Ellenberger's portrait of Rorschach, there emerges a frustrated genius whose unquestionable potential was arrested at age 37 by an early death. The article concludes that had he lived, Rorschach's personal friendships with Ludwig Binswanger and Eugene Minkowski (also friends of Ellenberger himself) would have catalyzed a major contribution to the phenomenological movement in psychiatry that was developing in Switzerland in the 1920s.

Ellenberger's historical revision extends from therapists to their 'Great Patients'. Three essays in Micale's collection are devoted to "paradigmatic" patients (Anna O, Emmy von N. and Jung's Helene Preiswerk) of psychiatric history, many of whom are discovered to have exerted so strong an effect upon their therapists that we, with some postmodern humor, are led to ponder the question of authorship. By a minute attention to detail, Ellenberger uncovers, almost after the manner of a detective narrative, the discrepancies between the published accounts of these patients and the actual historical records that he himself gathers. We learn of Breuer and Freud's deliberate omission of Anna O's (Bertha Pappenheim) dramatic relapse, which reveals that this 'prototype of catharsis' was no more than an instance of iatrogenic influence, comparable to the ambiguous relationships between an earlier generation of Romantic psychiatrists and the clairvoyants and faith healers who were the subjects of their psychical researches.

In Jung's case, the iatrogenic influence is even more conspicuous. The subject of his medical thesis was the unflattering case-study of his cousin, Helene Preiswick, who as a teenager assumed the role of a medium and conducted seances. Ellenberger is critical of the poorly disguised publication of her personality crisis, as being detrimental to the well-being of the Preiswick family. Moreover, from interviews with Helene Preiswick's contemporaries, Ellenberger found that her experiments with seances were undertaken primarily to attract the interest of her older cousin Carl with whom she was infatuated. We learn also that after her resolution of this crisis, via the normal course of her development, and the subsequent waning of her interest in the young Carl, his interest was, in turn, piqued - albeit unsuccessfully - by the wholesomeness of her new adult personality. Years later, he admitted to his analysand/mistress, Sabina Spielrein, of having had visions of Helene clad in a white robe, suggesting to Ellenberger, an attachment not unlike Jung's own anima archetype.

Both Bertha Pappenheim and Helene Preiswick overcame their personal crises, whether because of, or, as Ellenberger suggests, despite, their contact with psychiatry. In the case of Emmy von. N (Fanny Moser), the resolution of her pathology is less certain. Moser was an unpleasant *nouveau riche* aspirant for aristocratic status, the young widow of a self-made industrialist, and said to be the wealthiest woman in Central Europe. Unlike the other great pa-

tients, she remained, to the end, swamped in self-indulgence. Ellenberger provides many new biographical details of Moser's case, but appears more impressed by the stories of the two surviving Moser daughters who, like Pappenheim, overcame the "terrible melancholy of well-being" to which talented young women of the upper middle-class were subject, by developing strong social interests. Against all odds, the eldest became a successful academic; the youngest, most mistreated by her hysterical mother, developed into a passionate socialist. This second daughter, Mentona Moser, is a striking example of a woman who emancipated herself from her pathological family history, and tried in some measure to offset her family's abuse of social privilege. She wrote autobiographical booklets criticizing the education of upper-class women and giving practical advice on how the ill-effects of such education could be undone through social involvement. She herself opened an orphanage in Soviet Russia. After a lifetime of devotion to the socialist cause, she died in East Berlin in 1971 at the age of 96. Movingly, Ellenberger recalls Jung's aphorism: "Nothing influences children more powerfully then the lives that their parents did not live".

Thus far Ellenberger. In reviewing this collection of essays, however, its editor's achievement must also be acknowledged. Mark Micale takes us not only 'beyond', but also 'behind' *The Discovery*. The essays in the collection are organized thematically, rather than chronologically, thereby releasing to independent consideration those aspects of Ellenberger's research, hitherto confined to the orbit of the *magnum opus*. Notable among Micale's appendices is the inclusion of one of Ellenberger's travel diaries, which furnishes an illuminating glimpse of his general approach and methodology. Historians and clinicians alike will also be delighted by the concluding "Bibliographical Essay", which gives detailed references to the storm of historiographical research generated by Ellenberger on topics such as early Romantic psychiatry, sexology, mesmerism and hypnosis, the history of diagnostic categories, Charcot and Swiss psychiatry. But the most impressive aspect of Micale's achievement in this book is his substantial analytic introduction, which comprises almost a quarter of the entire publication. Here, he provides a biographical narrative of Ellenberger, outlines the 'anatomy' of *The Discovery*, reviews the critical reactions to its publication and organizes the corpus of Ellenberger's scattered historical essays into eight 'themes'.

Micale's life-historical narrative of Ellenberger is the first of its kind, and situates Ellenberger as having lived in a unique cultural and linguistic matrix. Born to the second generation of a family of Swiss protestant missionaries to colonial Africa, Ellenberger's medical training and early career took place in France. He later repatriated to Switzerland to protect his family from the war in the 40's. However, his French degree would not permit professional advancement in Switzerland, and this forced a move to America and the Menninger Clinic in the early 50's. It was his residence in Switzerland, however, that marked the most crucial period of his intellectual development, since during this time he received a training analysis with Oskar Pfister, encountered existential-phenomenological thought, and developed life-long professional contacts with the prominent figures of Swiss psychiatry. Given the span of Ellenberger's cultural experience, we are hardly surprised to find that historical research was a professionally necessitated side-track from his true interest, of cross-cultural psychology, to which he intended to return after retirement, but was thwarted by the debilitating effect of Parkinson's disease, diagnosed just three months after his retirement in 1977.

Micale concludes his introductory essay with a critical assessment of Ellenberger's significance to the course of the history of psychiatry and to the field of psychiatry itself, which successfully combines an ardent enthusiasm for his work with a competent birds-eye perspective on its influence. He outlines certain patterns and cycles in the history of ideas in which Ellenberger is himself situated. It would seem, ironically enough, that Ellenberger's encyclopedic comprehension of dynamic psychiatry occurred at the very moment of its decline. It is presently being usurped by the biogenic model that is tending to turn psychiatric theory in the opposite direction. In the view of this reviewer, the lesson to be learned from history remains: even this tendency will have had its day.

It is unfortunate, in the opinion of this reviewer, that Micale chooses to leave undeveloped, the brief reference in his introduction to Ellenberger's effect upon American psychology and psychiatry twelve years prior to the publication of *The Discovery*. Such an effect came about through his role in selecting, translating and editing, the essays comprising the text *Existence: a new dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* (1958) co-edited with Ellenberger by Ernest Angel and Rollo May. It remains unclear why Ellenberger, the senior of the three editors, is rarely mentioned in connection to this groundbreaking text, which launched Rollo May's career. May himself writes in its "Preface" that he and Angel invited Ellenberger's participation, because of his extensive knowledge and clinical experience with phenomenological and existential psychiatric methods. May writes that "He and Mr. Angel are chiefly responsible for the selection of papers translated" (1958, p. vii). Ellenberger's introductory essay in the *Existence* text remains a classic in the field. He distinguished psychiatric phenomenology from philosophical phenomenology and showed how, the term "phenomenology" in psychiatry signifies something quite distinct from mere symptomatology (with which it is frequently confused in psychiatric literature). In the method of psychiatric phenomenology, the patient's world is perceived "inside out", since patients are approached not just from the point of view of medical science, but also from the respective points of view of the patients themselves. In other words, a clinical phenomenologist comprehends the world-views of his patients through the categories of time and space that are constructed by them. In the closing passage of this introductory essay, Ellenberger writes:

> If the psychiatrist is merely concerned with an intellectual, one-sided scientific study, the patient will feel that his personality is being disregarded; such an investigation could do considerable harm. On the other hand, if it is done with genuine interest in the patient himself, the patient feels understood. He will be like the miner imprisoned under earth after an explosion, hearing the signals of the rescuers; he does not know when they will arrive or whether they will be able to save him, but he knows that they are at work, doing their best, and he feels reassured. (1958, p.124)

From a close reading of the introductory essay to *Existence*, Ellenberger's influence upon the selection of the case studies that follow becomes evident. The text radicalized American psychology by reintroducing into it the interplay between philosophy and psychopathology. It broke the hold exercised by behaviorism and orthodox psychoanalysis over clinical thinking and began a reassessment of the medical model that is still overtaking us today. Here, as in the case of *The Discovery*, Ellenberger, the senior member of a trio of editors, did more than just write about the history of psychology; he himself shaped that history. His contribution to *Existence*,

ironically so neglected, would seem itself to demand historical exegesis in the spirit of Ellenberger's own revisions.

Finally, Ellenberger's engagement in the *Existence* enterprise might reveal to a more detailed examination, a connection between his approach to patients as a psychiatrist and his agenda behind the revision of psychiatric history. By analogy to historical research, in psychotherapy, we are also excavating lives.

References

1. Ellenberger, May and Angel (ed.) *Existence: a New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*. New York: Basic Books (1958).

2. Ellenberger, H. *The Discovery of the Unconscious: the History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books (1970).

3. Rorschach, H. *Psychodiagnostics*. Translated by P. Lemkau and B. Kronenberg, Bern: Hans Huber Verlag (1921/1942).

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NEW PUBLICATIONS

We would like to use the Newsletter as a forum for announcing new publications by members of AAPP. Members are invited (and encouraged) to notify the editor of new and recent publications.

(Continued from page 1)

to two days was felt to be a success in Philadelphia, we will continue this format. There was considerable discussion about how to divide the time between invited speakers and submitted papers. The advantages of having known speakers in the recovered memory/false memory debate versus allowing more time for member participation were debated.

Bill Fulford and John Sadler gave a progress report on *PPP*. Volume 1 is complete, and much of the material for Volume 2 is in place. Submissions are coming in, but more are needed and encouraged. The idea of devoting an entire issue, or a section of a particular issue, to a specific theme was discussed. John and Bill are working on getting *PPP* into the various philosophical and psychological indices (including improving the currently inadequate Keywords in use).

Fund-raising was an active topic at the meeting. More funding would certainly allow us to sponsor more activities. The possibilities of foundation and pharmaceutical support were discussed. Since we are a tax-exempt organization, we are also in the position to accept gifts.

With respect to the Newsletter, Jim Phillips reported that the ongoing plan is for two issues per year of 8-12 pages. Content ideas include news of AAPP activities and local group activities, book reviews, commentaries, letters to the editor, bibliographical guides, reports about activities in other countries (including a yearly report from Bill Fulford in the UK), and announcement of member publications.

A number of developments were discussed in the area of information. Lindy Muncy is in the process of developing a directory of AAPP members which will be available to the members. She is also developing a database of literature in philosophy and psychiatry, which will be available on disc to members when it is completed. We are also exploring the possibility of a bulletin board or some other vehicle of communication on the internet.

Finally, the international meeting in Spain in 1996 was discussed. While many of the details are still to be worked out, the meeting is scheduled, and the basic arrangements are in place.

James Phillips, M.D.

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AAPP SESSION

An AAPP session will be held at the Annual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Thursday, April 27, 5:15-7:15 PM, Private Dining Room #5. George Graham and G. Lynn Stephens will present a paper entitled "On Constructing a Cognitive Architecture of Multiple Personality Disorder." Bennett Braun, M.D. will comment.

ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHIATRY (AAPP)
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

Membership in AAPP is open to all individuals interested in the subject of philosophy and psychiatry by election through the Membership Committee. The Association welcomes Student Members (enrollees in degree-granting programs in colleges and universities and physicians enrolled in approved psychiatric training programs and post-graduates in post-doctoral programs). In order to join AAPP please detach this form and mail to: Ms. Alta Anthony, Journal Subscriptions/Memberships, The Johns Hopkins University Press, P.O. Box 19966, Baltimore, Maryland 21211.

Annual Dues: $65 Members; $32 Student Members (this includes a year's subscription to ***Philosophy, Psychiatry, &Psychology (PPP)***. Make checks payable to The Johns Hopkins University Press.

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