



From the Editor

With enthusiasm and expectation we introduce this first issue of the AAPP Newsletter. For the Newsletter and the organization, now in its third year, we look forward to a long and vigorous life.

In this column let me outline what we will try to do in this and coming issues. Our goals are several: to provide information about ongoing activities of AAPP as well as of other similar groups, to serve as a conduit of communication concerning work in our area of interest, and to function as a resource tool with book reviews, bibliographical guides, commentaries, and other materials.

The current issue includes a "President's Column" in which Michael Schwartz describes the history and current activities of AAPP. In his "Letter from England" Bill Fulford, founder and leader of the British philosophy/psychiatry group, outlines the history and activities of that group. Both of these contributions underline the cooperative efforts of the two groups, including their joint sponsorship of a new journal. In future issues we will include reports on activities in other countries. An essay/review by Melvin Woody of Edward Hundert's *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Neuroscience: Three Approaches to the Mind* is a first and exemplary review of a book in our field of interest. Lynn Stephens and George Graham's article, "Philosophy and Psychopathology: A Pocket Guide to the Recent Literature," is the first in a series of bibliographical guides to be included as a regular feature of the Newsletter. The "Pocket Guide" represents a superb overview of the field. Future guides will be focused on specific areas of the philosophy/psychiatry mix. John Sadler's column, "Philosophy and Psychiatry in the Literature," will also be a regular feature of the Newsletter. As in this issue,

President's Column

Many a psychiatrist has said, 'that he did not want to burden himself with a philosophy, and that this science has got nothing to do with philosophy,' but the exclusion of philosophy would nevertheless be disastrous for psychiatry: firstly, if we are not clearly conscious of our philosophy, we shall mix it up with our scientific thinking quite unawares, and bring about a scientific and philosophic confusion. Secondly, since in psychopathology in particular scientific knowledge is not all of one kind, we have to distinguish the different modes of knowing, and clarify our methods, the meaning and validity of our statements, and the criteria of tests — and all this calls for philosophical logic. To sum up, if anyone thinks he can exclude philosophy and leave it aside as useless, he will be eventually defeated by it in some obscure form or another."

Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*

On behalf of the Executive Council and the membership of AAPP, I am pleased to welcome you to our association and to our newsletter.

AAPP began in 1989 as the Group for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry when a small group of philosophers and psychiatrists decided to meet on a regular basis and explore topics of mutual interest. From the beginning, despite obstacles of time, funding, and logistics, the process of conjoint investigation was richly rewarding. Psychiatrists appreciated the subtlety, rigor and logic of the philosopher's approach. In turn, philosophers valued the psychiatrist's descriptions of concrete situations from daily professional life as well as the exploration of issues central to present-day psychiatry.

As originally formulated by John Sadler, M. D., AAPP's object was: "to promote collegial support, cross-disciplinary collaboration, and sympathetic critique for those clinicians and philosophers working in the area of philosophy and psychiatry. The focus is on scholarly inquiry into philosophical problems in psychiatry such as psychiatric methodology, the mind/body problem, the definition of illness and health, and the question of biopsychosocial integration. The emphasis is not on pedantry but on the practical application of philosophy and philosophical methods to current and continual problems."

Early on, at a meeting hosted by Edwin Wallace, IV, M. D. at the Medical College of Georgia and attended by myself, John Sadler, M. D., Manfred Spitzer, M. D., Ph. D., and Osborne Wiggins, Ph. D., some of these "current and continual problems" were enumerated as follows:

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he will provide abstracts and notes on recent articles in the literature. Finally, my own description of the New Haven/Yale-based Society for Phenomenology and Psychiatry will be the first of hopefully many reports on local philosophy/psychiatry groups.

For future issues of the Newsletter we welcome suggestions, potential contributions, and information regarding activities of interest to our readership.

As can be gathered from Michael Schwartz' report, AAPP is a group that is still in the process of developing itself. This is even more true of the Newsletter, whose format we will attempt to tailor to the needs and interests of our membership.

James Phillips

*President's Column**continued from page 1*

1. Advances in psychiatric classification, as exemplified by DSM-III and DSM-III-R, are being confounded by problems concerning the definability of disorders, the boundaries between the disorders, and the proliferation of disorders.

2. These diagnostic problems have spilled over into biological and epidemiological investigations, since, in the end, much of this research is grounded in the assumption that cohorts of patients can be diagnosed correctly (or at least uniformly), and distinguished from each other.

3. Just when many psychiatric researchers have accepted empiricism as the "one true method", other scientific fields are opening up to methodological pluralism. Operationalism of terminology and the use of empirical methods have become the standard approach in psychiatric research. Yet limits to operationalism and empiricism are being appreciated elsewhere, not only in the social sciences but also in fields such as physics and mathematics. Furthermore, if there are multiple ways of doing science, how does this methodological insight apply to psychiatry?

4. Many psychiatrists seem to regard the mind/body problem as an empirically solvable scientific problem that had been solved (by spectacular advances in the neurosciences). This is an example of confusing a philosophical problem with a scientific one.

5. The idiographic or single-case study seems to have been eliminated from psychiatry. We have lost sight of the importance of studying the individual in his or her uniqueness. Historians, neuropsychologists and social scientists fruitfully use this method in their scientific disciplines, and psychiatrists should certainly also continue to profit from single-case studies.

6. The entire field of psychopathology seems to have vanished as a serious academic concern for psychiatry. Still, psychopathology remains a basic science for psychiatry, and its lack of development undermines progress in diagnosis, treatment and research. For example, while the biotechnical and instrumental side of psychiatric research has seen remark-

able progress, declining interest in subtle psychopathological assessment has enfeebled much of this effort. On the one side we see elegant data coming from state-of-the-art laboratories and scanning centers; on the other side this data gets correlated with relatively crude measures such as behaviors and DSM-III-R diagnoses.

7. Theory has been vigorously rejected by many psychiatrists and replaced with a preoccupation with the "atheoretical" and with facts. This ignores the question of the possibility of science without theory, and also whether or not we are naively presupposing an unstated theory. A non-theoretical (i.e. naively empirical) approach to psychiatry not only devalues traditional theory-laden approaches to the field from disciplines such as psychoanalysis but also stifles potential theoretical advances from newer fields such as cognitive neuroscience and neurophilosophy. Many psychiatrists bemoan our present failure to profit more from advances in the neurosciences; advances here will require major theoretical work.

8. The present emphasis on standardized approaches and treatment manuals undermines the value of the clinician's expertise and experience. Major epidemiological studies, for example, rely on diagnoses made by lay interviewers applying standardized research instruments. This devaluation of clinical expertise runs counter to modern developments in the philosophy of science which paradoxically reemphasize the skills of the expert.

9. Psychiatric theory and practice subserves and shapes wider sociopolitical, cultural and economic forces. Yet the moral and ethical foundations and consequences of current practice in the field are not often examined.

The problems enumerated above paradoxically intersect with major goals of present-day psychiatry:

1. Psychiatrists strive to forge a more scientific discipline, but our prevalent view of science is curiously dated and not accepted by contemporary philosophers of science or scientists in other fields.

2. Psychiatrists strive to forge a more medical discipline, but our prevalent view of medicine is similarly old-fashioned. At a time when medicine as a whole is embracing the biopsychosocial model, psychiatry seems to be

retreating back to biomedical reductionism. For example, many psychiatrists narrow their field of investigation in disorders such as schizophrenia to the "broken brain". Forty years ago, cardiologists might have behaved in the same manner and singled out myocardial pathology as the cause of a myocardial infarction. Today, cardiologists describe organ pathology and underlying pathophysiological and genetic processes — but also emphasize diet, exercise, life style and stress.

Still, if we are going to consider all of the relevant variables, how can we possibly include them all? Beyond the biological and the psychological and the social, what about the anthropological, the religious, the ethical and the economic? And how to we consider all of this together? Our dilemma becomes even more complicated once we appreciate hidden dualistic assumptions in "biopsychosocial", such as mind/body and biological/psychodynamic. Can we or should we ever overcome these dualisms? Once we begin to comprehend the value of philosophical analysis in psychiatry, and to look at the assumptions, methods and underlying principles of the field, the relevance of such analysis becomes enormous. Research in the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice is required, along with efforts to integrate new discoveries from neurobiological science with more traditional psychiatric knowledge, and conceptual analysis of diverse aspects of psychiatric practice, including the history of psychiatry, psychiatric nosology, psychiatric epistemology and psychiatric ethics. Despite the more common view that psychiatry can only progress when it can free itself from theoretical speculation, it is apparent that psychiatry has never really subjected itself to rigorous philosophical analysis. In fact, psychiatry suffers from too little philosophizing rather than from too much.

AAPP's goal is to promote such philosophizing. Over the years, we have become a going endeavor. After some meetings in 1989 and 1990, the association adopted a more formal structure, incorporated, and began to reach out to new members. Since then, we have continued to meet periodically. We have encouraged the formation of local groups and have also forged links with like-minded colleagues in

Europe. Together with them, we are planning a new international journal, *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology*. We have also established an award, the Jaspers Award, for the best unpublished paper on philosophy and psychiatry by a student investigator, and have also sponsored a monograph, *Philosophical Perspectives on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification*, which will be published by the Johns Hopkins Press in early 1993. Additionally, as a more informal approach to communication, we are publishing this newsletter — for letters, announcements, updates and reviews.

I encourage and invite your interest and participation in AAPP. Comments, criticisms, advice and suggestions are most welcome, as well as the initiatives regarding new local groups. I would be pleased to consult with any member who is interested in starting such a group or to speak or correspond with you about any matter relevant to AAPP. I also look forward to meeting you at AAPP's upcoming San Francisco meeting in May.

Michael Alan Schwartz

Letter from England

The Philosophy Group and the AAPP were set up independently in the UK and USA within a few weeks of each other in 1989. This remarkable coincidence was a clear reflection of the Zeitgeist - neither knew of the existence of the other for six months! Since then the two organizations have moved ever closer together, cooperating on a number of projects - conferences, workshops and training courses - and exchanging non-executive committee members. Our latest joint venture is the new Journal, PPP, but more on that later.

The Philosophy Group differs from the AAPP in being fully integrated into the Royal College of Psychiatrists rather than an independent society. This has brought a number of benefits. We have had strong support both from officers of the College and from College members,

right up to the President. This has given the Group tremendous impetus - our membership is already over 600. There has also been a real "quantum leap" in the visibility of philosophy among British psychiatrists and even an acknowledgement of its potential practical significance. In a recent questionnaire survey at a College meeting on biological psychiatry no less than 50 % of delegates said that they believed the philosophies of science, of mind, and of action, and conceptual analysis (in addition to jurisprudence and ethics), all had a potential contribution to make to clinical practice.

If there is a down-side to being a College Group it is that we tend to be seen as an exclusively psychiatric organization. In fact we were the first College Group to be allowed to have non-psychiatrists as full members. Right from the start we produced an information leaflet and membership form which emphasized the open nature of the Group. The result is that nearly 20% of our members are now philosophers, psychologists and others whose skills and experience make a crucial contribution to the Group's activities.

A second difficulty that we ran into in being College based was the perception that the Group was London-centered, with an off-shoot in Oxford. Again we countered this early on by setting up a network of regional representatives. These now cover most of the University towns in the UK and local groups have become increasingly important in promoting the Group's activities - the annual conferences for 1993 and 1994 are both being organized locally, in Glasgow (on the Scottish philosophical tradition) and Newcastle (on psychiatry and philosophy of religion). Philosophers and psychologists have been particularly active as "local reps".

Turning now to the activities of the Group, these are all aimed at building up the academic cross-links between philosophy and psychiatry. Anyone who has tried to do work in this area has found it to be something of a "no man's land" - within the remit of neither discipline, largely uncharted, and full of intellectual land-mines for the incautious. Thus the Group's prime objective has been to help establish the academic infrastructure for work in

this area. Initially this has amounted to organizing conferences and workshops, running courses and establishing a Newsletter.

Conferences

The Group has experimented with a number of different kinds of conference. An early event was The Atom in Mind, a one-day conference bringing together new ideas on the Mind-Brain problem from physiology, mathematics, physics, psychology and theology. Speakers included Oxford Professors Colin Blakemore, Roger Penrose and Michael Lockwood, the Nobel Laureate Sir John Eccles, the Cambridge theologian and mathematician Professor John Polkinghorne, and myself. A masterly summing up was given by the philosopher Thomas Nagel.

This conference was intended partly to advertise the existence of the Group (we had over 200 delegates) but it also produced a modest profit which gave us an initial financial float. On a more sober scale, but closer to the specific academic focus of the Group, have been two residential conferences; *Concepts of Causation in Mental Illness and Psychoanalysis* and *Personhood*. At both of these we have paired up philosophers and psychiatrists to present coordinated papers. This has involved a great deal of additional work for our speakers and we have been extremely grateful to a number of distinguished academics from both disciplines who have given generously of their time to make this approach possible. It has certainly paid off, with a number of excellent presentations, and a real sense of cross-fertilization of ideas.

The most active area of all, however, has been meetings organized on a local basis by regional representatives. These have included large international conferences (on The Concept of Self in Manchester, and on European Philosophy and Psychiatry in Sheffield), contributions to Royal College Meetings (sessions on Mental Handicap and on the Philosophy of Science), and joint meetings with other societies. Among these, the Philosophy and Mental Health conference, set up with the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine in Oxford last

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Philosophy and Psychopathology: A Pocket Guide to the Recent Literature

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I. DEPRESSING ERRORS

Hamlet's Polonius asserted that to 'define true madness, What is't but to be nothing else but mad'. But Philosophy's John Locke offered a more genuine and much less circular hypothesis, namely that mad or psychopathological individuals hold beliefs about themselves and their world which are grossly unrealistic and distorted. Locke emphasized distortion and unrealism in belief or cognitive judgment only, but a huge literature in psychopathology emphasizes distortion in both belief and reasoning/inference or the cognitive mechanisms for change of belief. Many different sorts of theorists conceptualize psychopathology in terms both of unrealistic beliefs and aberrant reasoning processes.

We refer to any conceptualization of psychopathology which emphasizes cognitive/inferential unrealism and/or distortion as an "Error-based" psychopathology. Error-based psychopathologies are distinguished from non-error based by the assumptions (i) that nonpsychopathological individuals are markedly less prone to error or distortion than psychopathologicals and (ii) that psychopathologicals are characterized by not just a generalized breakdown or degrading of their belief forming and reasoning processes, but grossly mistaken or inaccurate beliefs. Their psychologies are infected with falsehood.

Error-based psychopathologies are especially popular in the literature on depression. Beck (1967, 1976) argues that depression is produced and sustained by specific logical errors including a 'systematic bias against the self' which is activated by stress and anxiety. Similarly, the learned helplessness theory of depression (Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978; Abramson, Alloy, and Metalsky,

1989) in its various incarnations focuses on depressive biases and attributional styles in inferences about personal control over wanted and unwanted events.

The "error" of psychopathologicals' judgments is of course difficult to define. Hence much of the literature on error-based approaches specifically to depression is devoted to comparing and contrasting the "erroneous" or "distorted" judgments and inferences of depressives with the judgments and inferences of nondepressives. Some theorists argue that depressed individuals often are more realistic and accurate in their judgments than nondepressives. Nondepressives, for instance, experience an 'illusion of personal control'. They give themselves more credit for controlling circumstances than evidence warrants.

Productive directions for future philosophic research include an exploration of the criteria for unrealism and error characteristic of error-based psychopathology. Alloy and Abramson's 'Depressive realism: four theoretical perspectives' (1988) offers an epistemologically informed discussion of depressive/nondepressive cognition and of the question of whether nondepressed (normals) people exhibit more distortion and error than depressives. Graham (1990) explores whether depression offers credal contact with important truths difficult to obtain except through depression.

II. REDUCTION AND SUPERVENIENCE

The phenomenon of psychopharmacology offers interesting data for philosophers working on questions of reduction and supervenience. While some philosophers seem aware of the importance of psychopharmacology and surrounding research on the neurochemical explanation of mental illness for those questions (see e.g. Stevenson 1977; Graham 1993), the philosophical literature is sparse. Continuing to consider depression, a helpful overview of the neurochemistry of disorder may be found in both Wilner (1985) and Whybrow, Akiskal and McKinney (1984).

A rather consistent preoccupation of psychopharmacological theory is whether a critical determinant in tax-

onomizing mental illnesses and emotional disorders is their susceptibility to same-or-different chemical treatments. If, for instance, two phenomenologically distinct emotional disorders are susceptible to the same chemical treatment, are they best viewed as versions of the same emotional disorder? Both acutely anxious and severely depressed individuals may be treated successfully with certain antidepressants. Some theorists suggest (see Montgomery 1989 for discussion) that therefore depression and acute anxiety may be the same kind of disorder. Further work is needed to determine how personal/phenomenological descriptions of psychopathology may co-evolve with subpersonal, neurochemical based taxonomies.

III. COGNITION

Disorders and disasters of cognitive performance are among the most common manifestations of psychopathology. The studies we have reviewed exhibit elements of error and non-error based approaches. Oltmanns' and Maher's collection (1988) provides an excellent overview of current work on delusions. Of particular interest are the papers by Maher ('Anomalous experience and delusional thinking: The logic of explanations') and the Chappmans ('The genesis of delusions') which discuss delusions in relation to normal cognitive performance; and the papers by Johnson ('Discriminating the origin of information') and Kilstrom and Hoyt ('Hypnosis and the psychology of delusions') which make connections with a variety of topics in cognitive psychology. For more detailed discussions of particular delusional syndromes, such as Capgras' Syndrome, see Friedman and Faguet (1982), Christodoulou (1986), and Enoch and Trethowen (1991).

Confabulation receives a brief philosophical discussion in Wilkes (1988). The phenomenon is particularly intriguing when viewed in the light of Calvin's (1990) and Dennett's (1991) stress on the role of 'scenario-spinning' or 'narratization' in human cognition. Johnson's paper 'Reality monitoring: Evidence from confabulation in organic brain disease patients' in Prigatano and Schacter (1991) provides an up-to-

date discussion of confabulation. See also relevant sections of Parkin (1987) and Kopelman (1987).

Prigtano and Schacter (1991) includes a variety of papers on anosognosia, i.e., failures to recognize or acknowledge deficits such as blindness, amnesia, paralysis, etc. This topic has attracted some attention from philosophers, e.g. Patricia Churchland (1983) and Wilkes (1988). The paper by Bisiach and Geminiani, 'Anosognosia related to hemiplegia and hemianopia' (in Prigtano and Schacter) connects the topic with issues concerning propositional attitude ascription.

Bentall and Slade (1988) provide an extensive review of recent work on hallucinations. Johnson's paper in Oltmanns and Maher (1988) provides a discussion and good bibliography of experimental work on how people discriminate between hallucination and (genuine) perception.

IV. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND SELF-AWARENESS

Disturbances of the sense of self occur in a variety of forms of psychopathology. Eagle (1988) provides a good discussion of the general issue within the psychoanalytic tradition. For a philosophical discussion with a similar orientation see Zemach (1986).

The phenomenon of this type most widely discussed by philosophers is Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD): see, for examples, Mackie (1985), Wilkes (1988) and Dennett and Humphrey (1989). Ross (1989) offers an excellent introduction to the clinical literature on MPD. Gillett (1986 and 1991) provides a philosophically informed discussion by a psychiatrist.

Various other phenomena, such as verbal hallucinations, thought-alienation, depersonalization, and ontoscopic experiences also involve disorders of self-awareness. See Stephens and Graham in 'Voices and selves' (Sadler, Schwartz, and Wiggins (forthcoming) and 'Mind and mine' (Graham and Stephens, forthcoming) for a discussion and bibliography of some of the relevant clinical literature. Hoffman (1986), Frith (1987), Frith and Done (1988), and Bentall and Slade (1988) provide good discussions and extensive references on verbal hallucinations. Fulford's 'Thought insertion

and insight: Disease and illness paradigms of psychotic disorder' in Spitzer, Uehlein, Schwartz, and Mundt (1992) discusses thought-alienation. On depersonalization see Christodoulou (1986) and Roberts (1984). On autoscopic hallucinations see Grotstein 'Autoscopic phenomena' in Friedman and Faguet (1982). Several papers in Prigtano and Schacter (1991) discuss disturbances of self-awareness associated with brain damage. Of particular interest are the papers by Bisiach and Geminiani ('Anosognosia related to hemiplegia and hemianopia'), Stuss ('Disturbances of self-awareness after frontal system damage'), and Kihlstrom and Tobias ('Anosognosia, consciousness, and the self').

V. VOLUNTARY ACTION AND SELF-CONTROL

There has been considerable discussion of psychopathology in connection with questions of moral or legal responsibility. Less attention has been paid to what psychopathology has to tell us about the etiology of voluntary action and the mechanisms for monitoring and controlling behavior. The literature on obsessive-compulsive disorder is particularly relevant here. Jenike, Baer, and Minichello (1990) offers a good survey of recent work on OCD. Rapaport (1989) provides both a theoretical perspective and several fascinating case studies. The literature on Tourette's Syndrome and other tic disorders is also of considerable interest in this connection: see Cohen, Bruun, and Leckman (1988) and the paper by Abuzzahab, 'Gilles de la Tourette's Syndrome or Multiple Tic Disorder' in Friedmann and Faguet (1982). Hoffman (1986) and Frith (1987) discuss voluntary action in their accounts of verbal hallucination.

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The Society for Phenomenology and Psychiatry

This group was started in 1986 by two philosophers, Maurice Natanson and Edward Casey, and two clinicians, Eugene Daniels and myself. We all shared an interest in the interface of philosophy and psychiatry/psychology and felt that there was enough general interest in the New Haven area to support a local group. The group was New Haven and Yale based and has always met in the Whitney Humanities Center of Yale University. Because of the continental philosophical orientation of the founding members the group was given the above name. However, we have tried not to be restrictive regarding philosophical orientation and are now considering changing the name of the group.

Our format has been three meetings per year, held on Saturday afternoons and followed by dinner into the evenings. We generally have one or more formal presentations, a formal response, and general discussion. Our discussions have been lively and, because untimed, thorough. Our time-keeper has been mutual exhaustion. Our very first presentation, on February 8, 1986, was given by people well-known to the AAPP membership, Osborne Wiggins and Michael Schwartz, and was entitled "The Classification of Mental Disorders: A

Phenomenological Approach." Other presentations have been on topics such as "Phenomenology of the Unconscious," "Heidegger Among the Doctors," "Emotion and Memory in Freud," "The Return of Emotion to Psychotherapy," "Freud's Legacy: the Laying on of Words," and a session on Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*.

While we have maintained our meeting format over the years, our organizational structure has changed somewhat. We now function rather informally with an Organizing Committee, of which AAPP President, Michael Schwartz, has been a member. Of the four founding members, Ed Casey and I remain on the Committee. Our only officer is our secretary, Larry Davidson.

One of the goals of AAPP is to encourage and support the development of local groups, as well as to maintain contact with the groups. In this regard we will use the newsletter to inform the readership of activities of the New Haven group, and at the local level we will encourage involvement in AAPP. In future issues we will report on other local groups, both formed and forming.

Anyone interested in being on the mailing list for this group's meetings should contact our secretary, Larry Davidson, Ph.D., Department of Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine, 34 Park St., New Haven, CT 06519.

James Phillips

Letter from England

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year, was supported by a strong delegation from the AAPP. Local groups have also organized some fifty workshops.

Workshops

Although perhaps the least glamorous of our meetings, the workshops have been the most productive. Intended as "work-in-progress" sessions, they have ranged from one day meetings (on the Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, the Idea of Medical Ethics and The Relevance of

Philosophy for Psychiatry) through to two-hour sessions on topics as diverse as mental handicap legislation, neuroscience and mental illness, the limits of biological explanations of schizophrenia, concepts of care in mental health provision, subject and object in psychoanalysis, value theory and psychotherapy, quantum mechanics and the self, nosology and taxonomy in psychiatric classification, meaningful and causal connections, illness and the phenomenology of insight, the philosophy of psychoanalysis, pain, mind and masochism, and models of mind in the Law.

The intention of these meetings is to provide detailed feed-back from philosophers and psychiatrists before an author "goes public." A number of workshop presentations have already been turned into successful publications.

Training Courses

Until recently there have been no courses in philosophy in the UK designed for psychiatrists. There are still no courses in psychiatry for philosophers!

An early initiative in this area was Professor Alec Jenner's MA course in the University of Sheffield on Psychiatry and Society. The Philosophy Group, again through the initiative of local representatives, has run a number of more informal courses - introductory courses at the Institute of Psychiatry and at the Royal Free Hospital; and a more advanced course in the philosophy of science organized by Dr Derek Bolton and Professor David Papineau at King's College, London. A similar course in the philosophy of mind is planned for next year.

Newsletter

The Group's Newsletter is now in its ninth edition, thanks entirely to the energy of its editor Dr Rosalind Ramsay. An issue is produced at the start of each academic term giving advance information about the Group's activities. Details of courses, conferences and meetings of other organizations of interest to Group members, are all included. The Newsletter is not an academic publication. It is for news and as such has proved to be an invaluable organ of

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Getting It All Together, an Essay/Review

Philosophy, Psychiatry and Neuroscience: Three Approaches to the Mind, by Edward M. Hundert. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xiv+346. ISBN 0-19-824796-6

How shall the scientist understand himself? That question has provoked Western thought ever since Milesian physicists and Pythagorean mathematicians discovered the ingredients of a rigorous, naturalistic alternative to mythic thought - and then began to ask how they should understand themselves in light of this new mode of understanding. Democritus proposed to absorb the mind within his atomistic physics by describing it as a volatile brew of spherical atoms that would dissipate after death, like a puff of wind. The Pythagoreans were more concerned to explain their own knowledge of mathematical truths. How could the mind obtain certain knowledge of such timeless and abstract objects as the invariant relationship amongst the sides of a right triangle? Surely, the mind that can grasp such eternal truths thereby demonstrates its own transcendence of the sensuous, temporal world. Socrates demonstrates the incongruity of these two approaches to the mind in Plato's *Phaedo*, where he faces two young physicists who try to combine the two.

One may try to finesse this problem by resorting to a dualism that exempts the knowing mind from the conditions of objective knowledge. But that places the scientific mind beyond the reach of scientific understanding. Descartes may have hoped to resolve this dilemma of scientific self-understanding by distinguishing so sharply between mind and body. But he only transformed it into the familiar modern perplexity about how to bridge the gulf between the transparent self-certainty of the cogito and his scientific knowledge of the world of extended substance. Descartes insisted that he could find nothing in common between his own thoughts and the objects of his physics - and thereby rendered his own psychophysical existence into a riddle more enigmatic than the sphinx.

The dichotomy between mind and matter provided a license for Descartes' program of research in optics and physiology, which opened the way to modern neuroscience. But by placing the mind outside the domain known to science, Descartes also opened an abyss of fresh doubts about the very possibility of the knowledge that he had sought to secure against skepticism. Eventually, behaviorism sought to seal off that abyss and vindicate the complete authority of science by banishing the mind from psychology. The objectivity of science could thus be secured - but only at the price of ignoring the interiority of the knowing subject.

An adequate theory of mind should be able to account for itself. If it is to be scientific, it must not only offer a scientific explanation of the mind, but one that explains how the mind can offer scientific explanations, thereby embracing both the object and subject of scientific knowing. In *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Neuroscience: Three Approaches to the Mind*, Edward Hundert sets out to devise just such a theory. He focuses his inquiry upon the question of how valid knowledge is possible and tries to integrate the perspectives of philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience in a "synthetic analysis" that draws upon contributions from each of these fields to formulate a coherent explanation of how valid knowledge can be realized. Indeed, Hundert's project is even more audacious than his title proclaims, since his "psychiatry" encompasses developmental and cognitive psychology as well as the medical psychiatry in which he is trained.

Yet the book does not attempt an encyclopedic survey of all of these diverse disciplines. Instead, Hundert selects a few important strands from each field and weaves them together into a continuous and cumulative argument. He devotes one section of the book to each of the three fields.

Hundert begins with Descartes' formulation of the problem of knowledge and devotes the first, philosophical part of the book to a thoughtful and provocative discussion of how subsequent philosophers have struggled to overcome the Cartesian dichotomy between inner thoughts and outer

things. But he doesn't just review the history of modern epistemology. Hundert aptly describes his work as a "synthetic analysis" because he develops his own argument through an appreciative critical analysis of what other philosophers have had to say about this question. While he draws upon many modern and contemporary philosophers, he organizes his discussion around two major strategies, which he describes as Kantian and Hegelian "directions". He credits Kant with breaking out of the Cartesian impasse by exploring how we can distinguish between our inner experiences and the external objects we experience and by showing that consciousness of self and consciousness of independent objects are interdependent. Kant's great contribution was to recognize "the contribution of thought to things," - to show how objective knowledge depends upon the active role of the mind in organizing the disparate contents of sense experience under an objective conceptual order, and that certain organizing categories are necessary to the unity of self-conscious experience.

Hundert finds the unity of human self-consciousness rather more tentative and tenuous than Kant assumed and he proposes to "soften" Kant's sharp distinction between sensibility and understanding. With those reservations, he endorses the substance of Kant's account of the active role of thought in the realization of valid knowledge, though not all the details of Kant's derivation of the categories. Yet in the end, he charges, Kant left the door open to skepticism by incongruously clinging to a correspondence theory of truth and insisting that the objects we know are "only" products of human experience and understanding, whereas things as they are in themselves lie beyond human ken.

Hundert urges that we have to turn to Hegel for a more coherent account of how valid knowledge can be realized. Whereas Kant accepted Newtonian physics as a *fait accompli* and asked how such knowledge is possible, Hegel recognized that we cannot identify truth with the state of science at any particular moment in history. Hundert describes Hegel as showing how incoherencies within the inner

order of our own concepts refer us beyond those concepts to the things upon which they depend. Hegel described how knowledge comes into being through a dialectical process of self-criticism and self-transcendence. Hegel's great contribution, then, is to show us how things contribute to thoughts, how the concepts that we employ in organizing our knowledge evolve out of our interactions with our environment. But that environment is not only natural, but human and social, and Hegel recognized that the self-consciousness that makes self-criticism possible is as much a function of our interaction with other subjects as of our experience of objects. Hegel assimilates knowing to the process of living and his view is consequently more dynamic, evolutionary and historical than Kant's. Hundert embraces this part of Hegel's view as a significant advance upon Kant, though he rejects the substance of Hegel's metaphysics for reasons he never specifies. He relies almost entirely upon Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, but stops short of absolute knowing and he balks at Hegel's Logic and doctrine of absolute mind. He emphasizes the biological, interpersonal and pragmatic themes in Hegel's philosophy, which set the stage for his own discussion of "psychiatry," the second of his three approaches to the mind.

Whereas Hundert's discussion of philosophy aimed at a conceptual analysis of the problem of how valid knowledge is possible, he turns to psychology and psychiatry for an account of how valid knowledge is actually realized. He begins with a summary analysis of Piaget's "genetic epistemology" and finds that Piaget's studies of the development of thought in childhood and adolescence illustrate and confirm the major philosophical elements that he has appropriated in Section I. He has no trouble locating Kantian themes in Piaget, of course. He finds evidence in Piaget's research both for Kant's contrast between sensibility and understanding and for Kant's account of the assimilation of sensation under organizing structures and schemata supplied by the knowing subject. But he finds Hegel's strategy for overcoming the gulf between thought and things by recognizing a

dialectical interplay between self and other reflected in Piaget's account of the development of cognition. For Piaget described cognitive development as a process of biological adaptation that balances the assimilation of percepts to the demands of the knowing subject with the accommodation of the subject to the demands of the environment and the progressive "decentration" of the subject. Although they function like Kant's schematized categories, Piaget's conceptual schemata are not a-priori in Kant's sense because they reflect the child's accommodation to an external world whose constancies do not change from moment to moment or from one individual to the next.

Thus far, the exploration of the problem of knowledge has abstracted from all questions of motivation and affect. But, Hundert argues, if we recognize that knowing is an aspect of living, as Hegel claimed, or follow Piaget in assimilating epistemology to biology, then we must discard the ideal of a dispassionate and disinterested knower and acknowledge the role of affect in the realization of knowledge. To explore these issues, he turns to psychiatry proper, to Freud and object relations theories. This approach to the mind is more properly "psychiatric" and it reveals new dimensions of the developmental questions that concern Hundert in this section. Freud reminds us that the cognitive problem of the relation between subject and object first arises as the infant's problem of distinguishing between self and other. And since the primordial other is the mother - or the primary care-giver who mediates between the infant and the wider environment, this process of separation is fraught with emotional issues. Hundert compares Freud's account of the way in which our complexes and drives shape our experience to Kant's account of the contribution of thoughts to things and describes the object relations theorists as supplying a Hegelian corrective to Freud by showing how the "objects of our affection" shape our affective mental structures:

Suddenly, the achievement of separating 'self' from 'other' was understood in all its painful reality as a process involving a limit on our own fantasied omnipotence. Indeed, the development of Piaget's boundary,

beginning at the 'point of contact' between our body and external things', occurs partly as a result of intermittent frustration and gratification from that world which declares itself to us as 'separate' by not always acting as we wish it would. So the boundary between 'self' and 'other' is tied to the boundary between 'fantasy' and 'reality', and so the intimate connection between cognition and emotion begins to reveal itself. (290)

Failure to distinguish between fantasy and reality is madness, which has always posed serious epistemological problems for both philosophers and psychiatrists. Psychotic hallucinations and delusions inevitably provoke the philosopher to wonder how we can ever trust our own experience or judgments about what is real, while the psychiatrist faces the challenge of understanding madness, whose manifold diversity seems to defy any unifying definition or theory. While it may be tempting to define madness or psychosis as defective reality testing, that "solution" obviously assumes an answer to the philosophical question of how to tell what is real, which is the motivating question of the entire book.

Hundert has progressed far enough in his inquiry by this point to offer an answer that doesn't boil down to condemning the psychotic's experience and convictions because they don't agree with the psychiatrist's or conform to "common sense" assumptions that really only reflect a local and transient consensus. He draws upon the existential psychoanalytic technique of exploring the psychotic's world in search of inner contradictions and incoherence, which he sees as an extension of the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and thereby integrates into the rest of his own synthetic analysis. Madness either distorts or "shatters" the categorial structures of experience that arise out of the dialectic of self and environment and reflect the enduring and unavoidable characteristics of a reality that is both the limit and enabling condition of all our activities. Hundert's account of madness thus extends and elaborates the very theory of knowledge upon which it depends, thereby illustrating and vindicating his argument that philosophy and psychology are interdependent.

Neither of these two approaches to the mind is self-sufficient, he claims, and even the two together refer beyond themselves to an independent natural and social world that provides their necessary setting and support.

Science makes the natural setting of mental activity an object of inquiry in neurophysiology, Hundert's third approach to the mind. He turns first to artificial intelligence, which offers a bridge between psychology and neurophysiology. He draws upon Jerry Fodor's *The Modularity of Mind*, where he finds a contemporary confirmation and refinement of many of those features of the Kantian model of the mind that he appropriated earlier in the book. Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding reappears in Fodor as a distinction between the input systems that convert physical stimuli into information and central systems that process the information thus acquired.

When Hundert delves into neurophysiology to see how this model of the mind fits into the brain, he finds convincing evidence both for this distinction and for other important features of the theory of knowledge that has emerged from his sections on philosophy and psychiatry. He considers evidence from anatomical, functional and neurochemical research, and tries to show that although anatomically distinct, sensibility and understanding are functionally interdependent and overlapping neural systems. The sensory input systems are not simply passive receivers or transducers, for example, but engage actively in the analysis and organization of information, in keeping with Hundert's reservations about the sharpness of Kant's distinction between the two. On the other hand, whereas the neurological "architecture" of the sensory modules is relatively fixed, it is not simply "hard wired", whereas the associational cortex, which handles the central system functions, is even less fixed. Hundert draws upon the work of Hubel and Wiesel to demonstrate the plasticity of the sensory systems and points to neurochemical evidence for the greater plasticity of the parts of the brain that carry out the tasks of the understanding. If mental functions were simply and inalterably "hard-wired" into the

brain, neurophysiology might ratify Kant's account of the way in which the mind imposes a-priori forms upon experience, but would rule out the other side of Hundert's dialectic, the "contribution of things to thoughts." A fixed neural architecture would point to innate categories and leave no room for the processes whereby the environment shapes our cognitive structures, the more dynamic, "biological" conception of the mind that Hundert discovered in Hegel and traced in Piaget's "genetic epistemology" and in psychodynamic theories in psychiatry. Hundert finds apt support for this "Hegelian direction" in Edelman's theory of neural Darwinism, which invites him to reconceive "the contributions of things to thoughts" as "the contributions of the biological world to repertoire building in groups of neurons."

This survey of Hundert's itinerary through philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience barely suggests the wealth of resources he summons to his task. Indeed, the very richness of his synthesis makes it hard to digest, and the reader may well wish that he would simply state his own case more directly. On the other hand, scholars in each of the domains he includes may bridle at his interpretation of ideas and research in their specialties. Historians of philosophy may object to Hundert's rendering of Kant or Hegel, while psychologists, psychiatrists and neurophysiologists may have comparable reservations about his selective treatment of ideas and research in their disciplines. Hundert acknowledges both of these difficulties from the outset:

I am admittedly picking and choosing as I incorporate bits and pieces of these other theories into the synthetic analysis. This *modus operandi* carries with it the risk of distorting the original meaning of these thinkers — or worse: the risk that the bits and pieces I choose may in some way be invalidated by extraction from their original contexts. Worst of all, this whole procedure could even conceivably be seen as an attack of (sic) each of the thinkers in question.

Quite the contrary. When I 'reframe' someone else's argument, it is strictly to acknowledge my debt to them. Simply defining my own terms and proceeding as if all the ideas I discuss were my own would be a fraudu-

lent (and futile) attempt to conceal the contributions of those who made the Synthetic Analysis possible. (p.7)

Still, Hundert is so appreciative of the contributions of others that he sometimes forgets to be critical of his sources, or to justify his selection of some rather than others. (On the basis of his account, one would scarcely guess that Piaget, Freud, Fodor and Edelman are controversial theorists, not canonical authorities. And why choose Freud or Fodor rather than Jung or Dennett?) Hundert's synthetic *modus operandi* evokes this sort of misgiving at every turn. One wonders about the authors he has left out — or worries about how his interpretation may be biased by his neglect of criticisms or features of the theories that he does include.

Yet in the end, such objections are beside the point. The great interest of this book resides in the way Hundert appropriates ideas and information from others to the purpose of his own inquiry and then integrates them into an original, synthetic theory of knowledge. The selective treatment of each ingredient is dictated by the scope and coherence of the whole, which also supplies Hundert with his standard of criticism. From the perspective of that synthesis, each of his sources reveals a fresh aspect. Granted, his synthesis doesn't include everything and a different selection of sources would yield a different synthetic result. But who else includes so much? Even as it is, the scope of Hundert's argument taxes the reader's powers of assimilation. Aware of the consequent danger of indigestion, Hundert supplies a digest in the final chapter, which begins with a synoptic review of the entire course of development. Granted, too, that a different selection of ingredients would yield a different synthesis — and that we should expect psychiatry and neurophysiology to turn up fresh data and theories. But Hundert does not claim to offer a final solution. That would not be compatible with his account of knowledge as a dynamic, self-critical, evolutionary process. Indeed, he ends the last chapter by describing new lines of research suggested by his synthetic analysis, including some that might yield results that would falsify the entire theory.

How, then, shall the scientist understand himself in the light of his own science? Hundert emerges from his reflections on philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience with an explanation of how valid knowledge is possible that does not exempt the scientist from the world he claims to know. He arrives at a naturalistic epistemology that clearly situates science in the world as science now describes it. He explains how the mind is "comfortably" lodged in the brain, which he understands as "a mechanism for experience, but a tool for knowing," thereby acknowledging the active role of mind in wresting knowledge from experience. Knowing is thus assimilated to the process of biological adaptation wherein organism and environment mutually modify one another. Hundert's theory is a self-consistent example of scientific self-understanding—not only because it is deeply rooted in contemporary science, but because it is accepts contingency of knowledge upon the current state of research—and even suggests the conditions of its own falsification. His theory is also philosophical in a Platonic sense that goes beyond the conceptual analysis of the first section of the book and seeks to integrate and transcend the diversity of the sciences to reach a single, synthetic understanding of knowledge. And that understanding of knowledge serves psychiatry by anchoring a general, unified definition of madness. One could scarcely ask for a clearer demonstration of the value of productive collaboration among these disciplines.

J. Melvin Woody
Connecticut College

Philosophy and Psychiatry in the Literature

Citations and brief notes about recent articles dealing with philosophy and psychiatry

Alexander, Joyce Rachel; Lerer, Bernard; & Raron, Miron. "Ethical issues in genetic linkage studies of psychiatric disorders." *British Journal of Psychiatry* 160, 98-102, 1992.

Through their own experiences in doing psychiatric genetic linkage studies, the authors summarize the variety of ethical problems encountered. Most of them concern consent and privacy issues regarding the often-large families of research subjects. The authors conclude by suggesting some areas of empirical research in the ethics of genetic linkage research and recommend closer attention to these kinds of ethical problems.

Elliott, Carl. "Moral responsibility, psychiatric disorders, and duress." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 8, (1), 45-56, 1991.

Elliott argues for a duress model in tempering criminal responsibility for impulse-control disorders, paraphilias, and related disorders, disorders he calls "volitional disorders." Defining duress as a forced choice between aversive alternatives, he describes the conditions for making volitionally disordered actions "under duress." Requirements for duress-mediated responsibility include symptom-related psychological distress and participation in psychiatric treatment.

Longino, Helen E. "Multiplying subjects and the diffusion of power." *Journal of Philosophy* 88, (14), 666-674, 1991.

This brief summary of contemporary trends in philosophy of science discusses the advantages/disadvantages of pluralistic science, with an eye toward the possibility of scientific progress. AAPP members should find her four criteria for the role of (philosophical) discourse in science of inter-

est: (1) the need for public forums for criticism of evidence, methods, assumptions, and reasoning; (2) the need to go beyond tolerance of scientific dissent, and incorporate critical discourse into scientific change; (3) the development of relevant critical standards for scientific communities; (4) the need for equality of intellectual authority among communities, (i.e. consensus based on critical dialogue, not political power).

Slavney, Phillip R. "Belief and behavior: The role of 'folk psychology' in psychiatry." *Comprehensive Psychiatry* 33, (3), 166-172, 1992.

Slavney briefly reviews criticisms of "folk psychology" from the cognitive science movement. He then provides an argument for the utility of folk-psychological concepts. This is accomplished through examining explanations of various self-mutilation phenomena and comparing the relative powers of each explanatory context. He finds that neuroscience's explanatory powers are as deficient in some contexts as folk psychology's are in others.

John Z. Sadler

Letter from England

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communication.

So what does the future hold? In addition to developing our teaching base, our priorities must be to improve library resources and opportunities for academic publication, and thus, in turn, to promote an active program of new cross-disciplinary research.

It is here that the joint venture between the Philosophy Group and the AAPP on a new journal will be vital. Preliminary information on PPP - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology has been circulated to both our memberships and I will not run through the details again here. But it is remarkable that despite a number

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of well-established journals for philosophy and psychology, there has been no focus for philosophy and psychiatry. Relevant work has appeared increasingly frequently in the past few years - another reflection of the Zeitgeist? - but it has been scattered widely through many different journals and in books from a large number of academic publishers. PPP will seek to establish itself as the journal of first choice for first class academic work in this area. Its initial success, though, will depend on the support of our own members on both sides of the Atlantic - so get those word processors humming!

K.W.M. Fulford

The Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry was established in 1989 to promote cross-disciplinary research in the philosophical aspects of psychiatry, and to support educational initiatives and graduate training programs.

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